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EMPLOYMENT AND RELATED OCCUPATIONAL DISCRIMINATION

F. Security Clearances
In 1986, the rights of a gay person who seeks a security clearance
remain unclear. Security clearances are generally sought by three types
of employees: (1) military personnel; (2) employees of government
agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National
Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or
the Department of State (State); and (3) employees of private employers engaged in defense contract work. This subsection of the article1
"1.Deviating from the expected or normal; strange. 2. Odd or unconventional in behavior;
eccentric. 3. Arousing suspicion. 4. Slang. Homosexual." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1070 (W. Morris ed. 1976).
**Associate Dean and Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A.,
Douglass College (1959); M.P.A., Syracuse University (1960); J.D. Wayne State University
(1967). Member, Ohio and Michigan Bars. I wish to thank the following persons: research, Daren
Draves; footnote specialist, Winnifred Weeks; editor, Carol Fey, J.D. (OSU 1984); typist, Carol
Peirano.
I. This article is the third in a series. The previous two articles are Rivera, Our StraightLaced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
799 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rivera I, and Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311 (1980-81) (hereinafter cited as Rivera II. This article builds
on those articles and continues the reporting begun there. The author strongly suggests that the
reader of this article review the introductions and conclusions of those articles before reading this
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will focus on civilian security clearances which involve the latter two
types of employees.
The Nation's current security program grew out of a security program instituted in the late 1940's by all three branches of the armed
forces in reaction to the "cold war." The security program existed for a
long time before being subjected to external scrutiny. In 1958, the program was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in the now
famous case of Greene v. McElroy.' In Greene, the Supreme Court
held that procedural due process requirements applied to the revocation
of a security clearance. 3 The response of the President to these limitations was the issuance of Executive Order No. 10,865.4 This Executive
Order created a program in the Department of Defense to safeguard
classified material used by private industry in executing defense contracts. The Department of Defense implemented this program through
Department of Defense Directive No. 5220.65 which included a set of
procedural safeguards. The directive listed twenty-one criteria specifying conduct which could lead to a refusal to grant a security clearance.
Men and women classified as homosexuals were generally denied clearances.' The four criteria most often used to refuse clearances to gay
people were:
N. Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the
individual is not reliable or trustworthy.
P. Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.
Q. Acts of reckless, irresponsible, or wanton nature which indicate such
poor judgment and instability as to suggest that the individual might
disclose classified information to unauthorized persons.
S. Any facts or circumstances which furnish reason to believe that the
individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure
which
7
may be likely to cause action contrary to the national interest.

article; the author also suggests keeping those articles on hand for reference as one reads this
article.
This is the second part of a three-part article. The first part was Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual
Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties-Part 1, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Rivera, Part I]. Part I covered private employment, federal employment, state and local
government employment, teaching, and professional and occupational licensing. Part II will appear in Volume 12 of the University of Dayton Law Review.
2. 360 U.S. 474 (1959). For further discussion on Greene, see Rivera I, supra note 1, at
831.
3. Greene, 360 U.S. at 506-08.
4. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960).
5. Dept. Def. Directive No. 5220.6 (1966).
6. Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403, 409 (1973).
7. Dept. Def. Directive No. 5220.6 (N), (P), (Q), (S) (1966). See also Note, supra note 6,
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Between 1969 and 1973, a number of challenges to security clearance decisions were brought by gay persons adversely affected by denials of security clearances. 8 In dealing with these challenges, the courts
established two broad principles. First, a rational nexus must be shown
to exist between a person's homosexuality and the reasons for denial of
a security clearance. 9 Second, an employee may not be questioned
about his or her sex life in a way which severely invades one's personal
privacy.10 The application of these principles, however, did little to prevent discrimination against gay persons seeking security clearances.
The rational nexus test as applied to security clearance decisions is substantially weaker than the rational nexus test which is applied to government employees in general. 1 In addition, the cases which attempted
to delineate between permissible and impermissible questions about
one's sex life drew no clear lines. In fact, in two cases, the courts, operating under these two broad principles, upheld the denial of security
clearances to gay persons.' 2
Since 1974, no security clearance case involving a gay person has
reached a federal court of appeals. Apparently, only one case filed in a
federal district court has been decided on the merits.13 Consequently,
almost all information on how gay persons are faring in their applications for security clearances must be gleaned from accounts in
newspapers.
In December, 1980, a nongay newspaper reported that the NSA
had allowed a gay employee to keep his job and his clearance after the
agency learned of his homosexuality.' 4 The Agency conditioned their
at 409.
8. See Rivera I, supra note 1, at 829-37.
9. See, e.g.. Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039
(1970). Although the majority did not broach the subject, the dissent strongly demanded that the
government show a "rational connection" between one's homosexuality and one's ability to protect
classified information. Id. at 242 (Wright, J., dissenting). See also McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d
1262 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding a denial of a top secret security clearance on the grounds that
plaintiff was a potential blackmail target, thus establishing a sufficient rational nexus between the
plaintiff's gayness and government denial of a security clearance); Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d
740 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (applying a diluted version of the rational nexus test in examining the degree to which the government could inquire into the applicant's private sex life).
10. Gayer, 490 F.2d at 752.
II. The rational nexus test applied to government employees in general was enunciated in
Norton v. Macey, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court in Norton stated: "A reviewing
court must at least be able to discern some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between an
employee's potentially embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of the service." Id. at 1167.
12. See McKeand, 490 F.2d at 1264; Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (C.D.
Cal. 1974). See also Rivera I, supra note 1, at 835-36 for a discussion of these cases.
13. Doe v. Casey, 601 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1985). For a discussion of Doe, see infra notes
24-35 and accompanying text.
14. Homosexual Employee to Keep Security Job. The Columbus Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1980,
at 4.
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acquiescence to the employee's homosexuality on the employee's "coming out" to his family. The imposition of the condition was apparently
made to prevent the employee from being subjected to possible blackmail. The employee had been with the Agency for six years, performing classified work. When his homosexuality was discovered, he was
asked by the Agency to resign. Instead, he fought back and achieved a
victory.
Also reported in December, 1980, was the case of Warren Preston.1 5 Preston had been employed by the General Telephone and Electric Co. for twelve years prior to the denial of his application for a
security clearance to work on a U.S. Army contract. Rather than acquiesce, Preston filed suit in federal district court. However, the Army
settled the suit before trial, paying Preston ten thousand dollars and
promising to notify his employer that the clearance denial had been in
error. According to Preston's lawyer, the Army also agreed to rewrite
its regulations so that homosexuality per se would not be sufficient to
cause the denial of a security clearance.1 6
In mid-1982, three gay newspapers reported the case of Betty Anderson.17 Anderson was a GS-7 secretary in the Pentagon. She applied
for a security clearance so she could compete for higher-paying jobs. At
first, she was denied a clearance because she refused to undergo a psychiatric examination, supposedly necessary because of her homosexuality. The examination was ordered to see if she suffered from "ego-dystonic homosexuality."1 " According to the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II), a manual used to describe

psychological disorders, one has "ego-dystonic homosexuality" when
one is unhappy about being gay. At the time, Anderson was in the
nineteenth year of a gay relationship and showed no apparent signs of
dissatisfaction with her homosexuality. After a two-year battle, Anderson received her security clearance.
One common thread in all three of these cases is that the gay parties involved had the advice and support of Franklin Kameney, a longtime gay activist. In the 1960's, Kameney was instrumental in winning
changes in the federal civil service favorable to gay employees."

15. Gay Community News, Nov. 29. 1980, at I.
16. id.
17. News of the Columbus Gay and Lesbian Community, Nov. 1982, at 3; The Washington
Blade, Sept. 30, 1982, at A-I; The Advocate, July 8, 1982, at 6.
18. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-111) (1980). This is the current compendium of diagnostic classifications approved by the American Psychiatric Association. Following the elimination of
homosexuality per se as a diagnostic category, ego-dystonic homosexuality was created to take its
place.
19. J. D'EMILIO. SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL
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In late 1982, gay newspapers reported that two gay men had their
top secret security clearances suspended. Both men were cartographers
with the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). The suspensions occurred
when the DMA officially learned that the men were gay. Both men
indicated that they were "out" to their families and co-workers. Nevertheless, the DMA informed the men that they were being investigated
for possible susceptibility to blackmail by hostile intelligence organiza-

tions. A spokesperson for the Agency indicated that although there was
no policy prohibiting the award of security clearances to gay persons,
homosexuality could be a factor in determining whether a security
clearance should be awarded. The DMA spokesperson indicated that
decisions whether to award a security clearance to a homosexual employee were made on a case-by-case basis.20 The end result of that particular case is not known. Of importance in that case and others is the
issue of potential blackmail of the homosexual based on his or her sexual orientation and protests from governmental agencies that no blanket policy exists against security clearances for gay persons. In a sense,
this attitude represents grudging progress. Not many years ago, most
agencies would have proudly announced a blanket proscription against
issuing security clearances to homosexuals.
The common thread of "no categorical denials of security clearances to homosexuals" is supported by a National Gay Task Force
(NGTF) report.' 1 It's Time, the NGTF's newsletter, stated in late
1982 that "the U.S. Departments of Energy, Transportation, Agriculture, Defense, Commerce, and Housing and Urban Development have
all affirmed that 'homosexuality per se is not grounds for denial of a
security clearance.' -" The policy of all these departments seems to be
to encourage gay workers to "come out" in order to remove their susceptibility to blackmail.
The last case which appeared in the print media on a national
scale was that involving John Green. 3 Green sued the CIA in NovemCOMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, at 150-57 (1983). Franklin Kameney was barred
from federal employment by the U.S. Civil Service Commission in 1958 following the discovery
by investigators that he had been once arrested for "lewd conduct." Eager to put his anger to
work, he, along with several others, founded Washington, D.C.'s Mattachine Society. With
Kameney's leadership, the Washington D.C. Mattachine Society "aimed its fire at the government, specifically the discriminatory policies of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, the armed
forces' exclusion of homosexuals and the blanket denial of security clearances to all homosexuals
by the Pentagon." Id. at 154.
20. The Advocate, Jan. 20, 1983, at 11.
21. It's Time, National Gay Task Force Newsletter, Nov.-Dec. 1982.
22. Id.
23. See A Gay Aerospace Worker Sues the CIA, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1983, at 53, col. 1;
CLA Is Sued by Homosexual, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1984, at 6; Homosexuals Press Fight on
Right to be Agents, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1984, at 136, col. 3; The Advocate, Jan. 24, 1984, at 12.

Published by eCommons, 1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:2

ber, 1983, because, after ten years of working on sensitive intelligence
projects, his security clearance was suspended. Green was an engineer
with Thompson, Ramo, Woolridge, Inc. (TRW). By November, 1984,
the CIA had settled Green's suit against that Agency. The exact details
of the settlement are unknown because the federal district judge handling the case ordered the settlement sealed. We do know that Green
was reinstated to his job at TRW and did receive back pay. Green
maintained that his "gayness" had never been "closeted" information
on the job. Only a few months before the suspension of the clearance,
he had indicated at work that he belonged to the largest gay ski club in
California.
Security clearances for gay men and women have been a sub rosa
issue for over ten years. Homosexuality per se seems to have been laid
to rest as a non-rebuttable presumption of unfitness in security clearance cases. Whether the average gay person employed in a defense industry has been able to obtain a security clearance routinely is simply
unknown to anyone except the investigators who reveal nothing on this
subject. Two trends seem evident. First, gay men and women who "dig
in their heels" and fight the revocation or denial of security clearances
based on homosexuality seem to win after long battles. Second, openly
gay persons can successfully rebut their susceptibility to blackmail.
After a period of no reported cases, January, 1985, brought a decision in favor of a gay employee of the CIA.2 4 The nonprobationary
career employee was terminated for reasons of national security after
he had voluntarily disclosed his sexual orientation. The employee had
worked for the CIA as a clerk typist for four years and had been promoted to the position of electronics technician. In 1978, he had been
selected to participate in a special CIA upward mobility program.
However, in 1982, after nine years of exemplary service, Doe was
placed on administrative leave and was subsequently terminated three
months later. 6 As an employee, he had never made advances to fellow
employees nor was there any indication of his disclosing classified information.2 6 The court, in finding for Doe, said there was no evidence that
"his homosexuality disrupted or affected his duties and responsibilities
in any manner.' While the Doe case is not per se a security clearance
case, the issue is of a security clearance nature because of the type of
the governmental agency involved.
Why was Doe dismissed? The Deputy General Counsel of the CIA

24.
25.
26.
27.

See Doe, 601 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1985).
See The Advocate, Feb. 19, 1985, at 4.
Doe, 601 F. Supp. at 583.
Id.
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said that no policy existed suggesting that homosexuality per se was a
ground for dismissal. 8 Rather, the Deputy General Counsel reiterated
the by now familiar assertion that the CIA made such decisions on a
case-by-case basis. When Doe was terminated he received no hearing
and no justification for his dismissal. The CIA maintained that the Director could terminate anyone at his discretion for national security
reasons.2
The court found in favor of the gay plaintiff and reinstated his
administrative leave status, upholding Doe's right to procedural due
process. The court's decision did not turn on the substantive issue of
homosexuality. Rather, the court focused on the procedural rights of
nonprobationary employees. The court held that actions of the Director
of the CIA could be subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act and imposed the requirements of procedural due
process on the Agency in handling personnel terminations."0 The court
relied s on Norton v. Macy,8 2 Ashton v. Civiletti," and Matlovich v.
Secretary of the Air Force" as foundation for the due process standards imposed. Thus, even gay employees are entitled to fair treatment
and procedural safeguards.
Doe v. Casey is significant because of (1) the statement by the
CIA that gay persons are not per se excludable, and (2) the judicial
imposition of due process requirements on personnel actions of the
highly security-conscious CIA. The use of the Norton case as the basis
for applying procedural due process requirements to government security agency personnel actions is important because the Norton case established the requirement of the proof of a rational nexus between a
person's sexual orientation and the effect that orientation will have on
the agency's efficiency."' Doe v. Casey may be the first step toward
establishing a similar requirement for the CIA.
Newspaper accounts, coupled with the Doe case, seem to indicate
that gay persons, if they are tenacious and persistent, can get security
clearances. All accounts indicate that the investigations are not carried
out quickly and that the gay employee must wait out the government.
The long delays accompanying gay security cases are the subject of
current litigation in California. Richard Gayer, who was himself a liti-

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 590.
See id. at 588.
417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
613 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Norton, 417 F.2d at 1167.
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gant on security clearance issues in 1971 and 1973,6 represents the
plaintiffs in a rather unusual suit, High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office.37 On October 31, 1984, Gayer filed suit
on behalf of an organization called "High-Tech Gays." High-Tech
Gays describe themselves as "an unincorporated association of over one
hundred gay engineers, computer scientists, and others who work in the
high-technology electronics industry in the 'Silicon Valley' of Northern
California. '"8 This organization, and named individuals, brought suit
against the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), and
against the Defense Investigation Service (DIS), both agencies of the
Department of Defense. The DIS is the arm of the Department of Defense which investigates individuals who apply for security clearances.
The results of the investigation go to DISCO, which can either grant
the clearance or refer the request with its recommendation to the Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review (DISCR), a third
arm of the Department of Defense. The plaintiffs do not maintain that
DISCO and DIS will never issue security clearances, but rather they
allege that gay persons are subject to longer, more detailed investigations than are nongay persons and that the delay is purposeful and injurious. The High-Tech Gays allege that the delays cause gay persons
in the defense industries to lose jobs, promotions, and opportunities,
because defense contractors cannot just "sit around" and wait for long
delayed results. Moreover, according to the complaint, the lengthy delays unjustly stigmatize workers. The complaint alleges that DISCO
and DIS have discriminatory policies, but that when the clearance is
reviewed by DISCR, the clearance is often granted because DISCR
39
does not seem to have the same policy.
The most interesting part of the suit is the claim that DISCO and
DIS are acting in bad faith because the agencies have known since
1957 that gay persons are no more of a security risk than are nongay
persons. The plaintiffs make this allegation based on The Crittenden
Report,40 completed by the Navy in 1957 and recently obtained under
the Freedom of Information Act. The report explicitly states that "no

36. See Gayer, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gayer v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C.
1971).
37. No. C-84-6078 TEH (N.D. Cal. 1984).
38. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, High Tech Gays
v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, No. C-84-6078 TEH (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1984).
39. Id. at 6.
40. S. CRITTENDEN, JR., UNITED STATES NAVY. REPORT OF THE BOARD APPOINTED TO
PREPARE AND SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR THE REVISION

OF POLICIES. PROCEDURES AND DIRECTIVES DEALING WITH HOMOSEXUALS (Dec. 21, 1956-Mar.
15, 1957) [hereinafter cited as CRITTENDEN REPORT]. See infra notes 326-31 and accompanying

text.
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intelligence agency . . . adduced any factual data '41 to support the
opinion that homosexual persons were security risks. The report concludes that "in view of the lack of statistical data to prove or disprove
[the] thesis [that gay people are greater security risks than nongay people] the Board believes a factual study should be conducted.1 4 This
part of The Crittenden Report begins with the following words: "A
third concept which persists without sound basis in fact is the idea that
homosexuals necessarily pose a security risk."48 The High-Tech Gays'
complaint specifically charges that various government agencies, having
knowledge of the report, deceived the courts about gay people as security risks.
The case is unique both in the underlying theory and in the remedy requested. The plaintiffs do not seek relief based on their right to
privacy, nor do they seek relief based on their right to equal protection
under the law. Rather, the suit asks for declaratory and injunctive relief to bring about fair play. In essence, the plaintiffs ask that DISCO
and DIS investigate gay people with the same alacrity with which nongays are investigated. Moreover, plaintiffs say, "if the Government is
truly concerned about sexual activities, it should ask every applicant
about the frequency and variety thereof, and determine if he desires to
conceal any aspect of his sexuality from anyone. ' " The government
has sought dismissal of the suit on a range of grounds, from lack of
standing to sovereign immunity. The complaint has now survived two
motions to dismiss.
High Tech Gays have submitted to the government a set of interrogatories which have remained unanswered while the battle over the
motions to dismiss continues. If answered, the interrogatories will
clearly raise "rational nexus" issues. For example, plaintiffs ask:
"What is the security significance of whether the employee takes 'the
active or passive role' in sexual relationships, and what is the security
significance of the fact that the employee meets other persons in bars
with whom he later has consensual sex in private?"' "5The interrogatories also raise issue with the popular belief that gay people are "spies"
more often than nongay people by asking for statistics on how many
gay persons have been approached by blackmailers and how many have

41.

CRITTIENDEN REPORT, supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Brief Opposing Dismissal at 2, High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
No. C-84-6078 TEH (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 1985).
45. Plaintiff's Interrogatories Nos. 8-9, High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, No. C-84-6078 TEH (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1984).
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actually complied with the demands."' If the High Tech suit survives
the motions to dismiss, accurate answers to the interrogatories may
prove highly embarrassing to security personnel. The case has great
potential for defining the rights of gay persons."' The suit goes beyond
defending one person and attacks the system by seeking to destroy the
false premises used by security agencies to hold up or deny security
clearances to gay people.
As indicated earlier, ascertaining the actual policy that security
personnel apply to gay employees seeking security clearances is often
difficult. The current public relations stance is that no general policy
exists which discriminates against gay people and that cases are decided on a case-by-case basis. This official policy is enunciated by
DISCO in their pleadings in the High Tech case. However, general
discrimination against gays remains extant.
On May 16, 1979, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings on "pre-employment security procedures of intelligence agencies."" Karl Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Security in the State Department," was asked directly by Representative McClory, "What do we do in order to try to avoid getting homosexuals?" 50 Ackerman's reply did not directly answer McClory's ques"Would
asked,
Aspin
Representative
Subsequently,
tion.
[homosexuality] be enough to disqualify a person from getting a security clearance nowadays?" 5 1 Ackerman answered, "In a given case, yes
sir." 52 Ackerman pointed to evolving standards but reiterated: "On the
matter of homosexuality, insofar as it is adjudged to be a matter of a
security risk, that has not changed." 5 3 Representative Aspin asked

46. Id. As I write, the John Walker spy case came to public light, with the subsequent
arrests, investigation, trial, and convictions of family members. It thus appears that a heterosexual
and his or her family is also not immune from the influence of others!
47. On July 3, 1985, Judge Henderson issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion to certify
gay persons who, since January, 1982, have applied for, are now applying for, or
a class of "[a]ll
may in the future apply for Secret or Top Secret industrial clearances from DISO . . .and all
gay persons who, since January, 1982, have held, now hold, or may in the future hold such clearances." High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, No. C-84-6078 TEH (N.D. Cal.
July 3, 1985) (order granting class certification). In addition, plaintiffs' motion to file a third
amended complaint was granted and defendant's countermotion for partial judgment on the pleadings was denied. Id.
48. See Pre-Employment Security Procedures of the Intelligence Agencies: Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 96th
Cong. IstSess. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Security Procedures Hearings].
49. See id. at 1-30 (testimony of Karl Ackerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security,
Department of State).
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Id.
53. Id.at 17.
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whether, if in light of changing public attitude, the rules have
changed." Ackerman answered that a "closet homosexual is likely to
be judged a security risk" but that his Agency had been studying carefully the question of the so-called open homosexual. 5 Moments later,
however, Ackerman discounted the openness issue by saying that even
if the employee were open, two other issues weighed against "open
homosexuals." 6 First, he indicated that homosexual persons would not
be cleared because the Department of State has a "worldwide service,"
and, in many countries, homosexuality is a "flat violation of the law." 5'
Second, he stated that there is a "very definite area where the psychiatric profession is not at all in accord as to whether homosexuality, be it
open or closed, open or closet, is still not perhaps a manifestation of a
deeper psychological problem."" Representative Aspin summarized
Ackerman's testimony on this point: "[T]he matter is under review but
so far the policy has not been changed." 5 Ackerman replied, "That is
correct. But very much on a case by case basis.""
Evidently, while the last words say "case by case," "closeted" gay
persons are all still considered security risks and open gay persons are
at risk because of alleged foreign and psychiatric disapproval. Later in
the same hearings, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of Security for the
CIA, also testified.6 1 In a question related to the extension of security
clearances to openly gay persons, Gambino opined that openness may
not be enough to overcome the denial of security clearances." He
stated, "Even in the so-called open homosexual case, [the gay individual] associates with a number of people that have the same lifestyle
who are not as open and who, as a matter of fact, may be lovers or
close friends who would go to any extent to prevent themselves from
being exposed." 3 Thus, the open homosexual can be "vulnerable
through his friends."" Gambino said that this vulnerability, coupled
with the fact that "the medical and psychiatric community is in disar-

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. This remark is very similar to reasons offered by the military for the discharge of
gay service members. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
58. Security Procedures Hearings, supra note 48, at 17 (testimony of Karl Ackerman).
59. Id.
60. Id.

61. See id. at 30-54 (testimony of Robert Gambino, Director, Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency). For an interesting juxtaposition to Mr. Gambino's testimony, see Gayer v.
CIA, No. 84-2229, D.C. No. 84-0330 SW, (D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1984), affd, 760 F.2d 275 (9th Cir.
1985).
62.
63.
64.

Security Procedures Hearings, supra note 48, at 47 (testimony of Robert Gambino).
Id.
Id.
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ray as to whether or not homosexuality is an outward manifestation of
a deeper psychological problem," creates a risk to be resolved in favor
of the agency and presumably against the gay employee. 65 Also testifying was Thomas O'Brien, Director of Security Plans and Programs, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense."6 O'Brien was asked by
Representative Young, "Would your policy [against hiring homosexu'' 7
als] be the same [as that of the CIA and the State Department]? 1
This question was answered in the affirmative.66 "What about a civilian
employee?" 6 9 O'Brien said the issue there was not as clear because
there were "court decisions that tell us we cannot use homosexuality
per se as a basis for denial of [a security] clearance. ' 70 O'Brien added
that they look "at the whole person" to determine if he or she meets
their stringent criteria.71
In March, 1980, the House of Representative's Subcommittee on
Investigations held hearings on federal personnel security background
investigations. 72 In these hearings, the government employees who testified made a distinction between whether a gay person was "suitable"
for federal service as opposed to whether he or she was a potential security risk.73 Mr. Arch S. Ramsay, Associate Director of the Staffing
Services of the Office of Personnel Management, testified. He pointed
out that in determining suitability for hiring in the civil service, a nexus
must be established between conduct and job performance."' A concern
about blackmail, he indicated, was not considered in "suitability" decisions but was still relevant in security situations.7 5 Representative Albosta asked Ramsay if the change in public attitude with regard to
homosexuality and the suitability for federal employment caused undesirable people to be in the federal service.7 6 Ramsey replied that "the
quality and the efficiency of the Government service have not

65. Id.
66. See id. at 56-97 (testimony of Thomas O'Brien, Director for Security Plans and Programs, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Review).
67. Id. at 76.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Federal Personnel Security Background Investigations: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. I (1980) [hereinafter cited as Personnel Security Hearings].
73. See, e.g., id. at 29 (testimony of Arch S. Ramsay, Associate Director, Staffing Services
Group, Office of Personnel Management).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 32.
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suffered." 7
Thus, if Doe v. Casey7 8 really results in the imposition of the rational nexus test to the same degree in security clearance matters as
the test is used in other government agency personnel actions, 7 9 discrimination against at least "open" gay persons may be coming to a
slow but steady end. One should note the similarity between the "open"
standard being developed in security clearance matters and the protection given by the California Labor Code to "open" (or manifest) gay
persons under the rule of Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Company.80 In both situations, a gay person

may have more protection under the law when the gay person is "out of
the closet."
G.

Military

In no other arena of American life has discrimination against gays
been so systematic and systemic as in the armed forces.81 Elimination
of gay persons in the military has been an official policy since 19438"
and continues as the policy to this day. The content of this policy has
gone through various stages with varying results. In the period prior to
1973, the court cases which arose from this policy were of two kinds.
One set of cases reviewed court martial proceedings of persons accused
of sodomy pursuant to article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) 8a or of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman pursuant to article 133 of the UCMJ." These cases did not
deal with persons who had a "gay"" identity but rather with individu77. Id.
78. 601 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1985).
79. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
80. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (for the first time in American
legal history gay people were extended strong protection in employment). See Rivera II, supra
note 1, at 315; Rivera I, supra note 1, at 809.
81. See Rivera II, supra note 1, at 319-24; Rivera I, supra note 1, at 837-55. See also
Heilman, The Constitutionality of Discharging Homosexual Military Personnel, 12 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 191 (1980-81); Comment, Homosexual Conduct in the Military: No Faggots
in Military Woodpiles, 1983 ARZ. L. Rav. 79; Comment, Employment Discrimination in the
Armed Services-An Analysis of Recent Decisions Affecting Sexual Preference Discriminationin
the Military, 27 VILL. L. REv. 351 (1981-82).
82.

See Berube, Coming Out Under Fire, MOTHER JONEs, Feb.-Mar. 1983, at 24.

83. 10 US.C. § 925 (1982). Article 125 provides that:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with
another person of the same sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however
slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Id.
84. Id. § 933.
85. The fifth definition given the word "gay" as a noun in The American Heritage Dictionhomosexual, with a derivation described as "Middle English gay,
ary
of the English
Language is1985
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als allegedly caught while engaged in same-sex conduct or in a situation which indicated same-sex conduct. The central issue in such cases
was not the constitutionality of the military's regulations but the guilt
or innocence of the defendant accused of a "crime" under military
law." The second type of case seen before 1973 reviewed administrative discharges of personnel thought to be homosexual persons. These
cases usually focused on procedural questions and generally did not
challenge the consitutional basis for the discharges.8 7
Starting in 1973, however, challenges were brought by persons
who self-identified as "gay" and who attacked the constitutionality of
the military regulations which were used to either refuse them induction or to separate them from the service."' The substantive basis for
these civil rights suits included the right of privacy, the right of association, the impermissibility of the use of a person's status as a basis for
punishment, and the due process requirement of a rational nexus between conduct and punishment.6 9 The suits challenged the regulations
used by all the armed services to discharge gay men and women. The
trend of the cases seemed to be leading, albeit slowly, to a less repressive posture by the armed services. In Doe v. Chafee,9° decided in 1973,
a federal district court applied the rational nexus test of Norton v.

gai, from Old French gai, from Old Provencal, probably from Gothic gaheis (unattested), akin to
Old High German gahi, sudden, hurried, impetuous." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W. Morris ed. 1980).
86. See United States v. Hooper, 9 C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958); United States v.
Lovejoy, 41 C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M.R. 1969); United States v. Yeast, 36 C.M.R. 890 (A.C.M.R.),
petition for review denied, 36 C.M.R. 541 (C.M.A. 1966); United States v. Vaughn, 20 C.M.R.
905 (A.C.M.R. 1955), petition for review denied, 21 C.M.R. 340 (C.M.A. 1956); United States
v. Jones, 13 C.M.R. 420 (A.C.M.R. 1953); United States v. Knudson, 7 C.M.R. 438 (N.C.M.R.
1951). For an analysis of the above cases, see Rivera I, supra note 1, at 838 n.228.
87. See Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967);
Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965), modifying and affg, 230 F. Supp. 249
(N.D. Cal. 1964); Benson v. Holloway, 312 F. Supp. 49 (D. Neb. 1970); Courtney v. Secretary of
the Air Force, 267 F. Supp. 305 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D.
Pa.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966); Unglesly v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965);
Beard v. Stahr, 200 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1961), vacated per curiam, 370 U.S. 41 (1962); Bray v.
United States, 515 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl.
1961).
88. See Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974); benShalom v. Secretary
of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977),
vacated, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd sub nom. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980); Matlovich v. Secretary of the
Air Force, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Doe v.
Chaffee, 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
89. See Champagne, 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974) (right of privacy); benShalom, 489 F.
Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (right of association and impermissible use of a person's status as a
basis for punishment); Matlovich, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1976) (right of privacy); Doe, 355 F.
Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (rational nexus).
90. 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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Macy 1 to a military discharge proceeding. If this trend had continued,
the military would have been required to show a rational nexus between a serviceperson's homosexuality and the quality of their military
service. When this same standard was imposed on the federal civil service, the government was unable to show that gay persons were not
good employees. 92 In 1974, in Champagne v. Schlesinger," the Navy

articulated a new "gloss" on their regulations. The Department
claimed that not all gay men and women had to be discharged--exceptions were allowed. This claim came back to "haunt"
the Navy as well as the Air Force, which claimed a similar regulation
in 1976 and 1977, when Leonard Matlovich" and Vernon Berg 6
brought suit. These suits proved to be the strongest challenge the Navy
and Air Force had faced, up to that time, to their policy of eliminating
gay persons from the military.
Matlovich was a decorated Vietnam veteran and a noncommissioned Air Force officer with an exemplary record. Vernon Berg was an
Annapolis graduate, an ensign, who also held an unblemished military
record. Both men had "come out" to their superiors, and both men
were subsequently discharged. Each man lost his constitutional challenge in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia." Although Judge Gesell castigated the Navy and Air Force in the strongest terms for what he termed their "knee jerk" reaction, he held that
the policies were constitutional." Matlovich and Berg appealed and
their cases were combined. The court of appeals vacated and remanded
both cases. 98 Since both services had insisted at trial that the policies
were not mandatory and that exceptional gay servicemen and women
could be retained, the court of appeals demanded a reasoned explanation as to why Matlovich and Berg were not within the exception." The

91. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The rational nexus test requires that there be some
rational basis for the connection between homosexuality and discharge from civil service employment based on quality of work. See id. at 1164.
92. See Rivera II, supra note 1, at 317, 319; Rivera I, supra note 1, at 822. See also 5
C.F.R. § 731.202(b) (1984) (providing for specific factors to be considered in making suitability
disqualifications).
93. 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974) (two women challenged their general discharges on the
ground that Navy policy regarding private consensual homosexual conduct between adults was
void because it was unconstitutional).
94. Matlovich, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1977).
95. Berg, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977).
96. Matlovich, 414 F. Supp. at 693; Berg, 436 F. Supp. at 83.
97. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, Civ. No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976) (oral
opinion of Judge Gesell).
98. Matlovich, 591 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Berg, 591 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
99. Maulovich, 591 F.2d at 859; Berg, 591 F.2d at 851.
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court did not dispute the Navy's or Air Force's right to rid themselves
of gay persons but rather held that due process required a rational basis for determining whom should be retained. The case was remanded
to Judge Gesell so that the armed services could explain their
processes.1 0° The answers were not swiftly forthcoming.
Meanwhile, two other cases were decided which indicated that the
armed services would have to allow gay men and women the opportunity to serve. In California, Roseann Saal won her case against the
Navy. The judge in Saal v. Middendorf 0 held that the Navy's regulations were unconstitutional because gay men and women were presumed unfit per se. The judge did not find a constitutional right to
engage in homosexual conduct, nor did he say that the Navy could not
discharge gay service persons. The court did hold, however, that individual service men and women had a due process right to be judged on
their individual merits and to be free of a policy of mandatory dismissal. 102 When the Navy articulated its position, originally stated in
Champagne,10 3 that no mandatory exclusion existed, the court was not
convinced and found the dismissal system to be mandatory. Saal was
appealed by the Navy and on appeal it was combined with Belier v.
Middendorf"s and Miller v. Rumsfeld' 0 5 under the name of Belier v.
Middendorf.0 6 While Belier was before the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and while the Navy and Air Force were trying desperately to meet the demands of the Federal District Court for the District
of Columbia in Matlovich and Berg,1 07 Miriam benShalom won her
case in May, 1980, against the Army. 10 8 benShalom was a status
case; 10 ' the record contained no proof that homosexual acts existed.110

100. Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 861; Berg, 591 F.2d at 851.
101. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (Schwarzer, J.), rev'd sub nom. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
102. Id. at 203.
103. See Champagne, 506 F.2d at 984. "The defendants take the position throughout their
brief and argument that the regulation does not require mandatory discharge of homosexuals." Id.
104. 4 MIL. L. REP. (PuB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2218 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affid, 632 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). A "Top Secret" security clearance showed that
Belier had contacts with homosexual groups. Belier,632 F.2d at 794. Belier later acknowledged in
a sworn statement that he had frequented gay bars and had been the president of a gay motorcycle club. Id. For these reasons, the Navy ordered Belier honorably discharged on December 18,
1975. Id. at 795. See also Gay Community News, Jan. 10, 1981, at 1.
105. 6 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 3001 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affd, 632 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
106. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905; 454 U.S. 855, rehg denied,
454 U.S. 1069 (1981).
107. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
108. benShalom, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980). See Rivera II, supra note 1, at
322-23.
109. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/4
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The Army discharged her based on her statements that she was a lesbian. The district court found that the actions of the Army violated her
first amendment rights of free speech and association, her right to privacy, and her right to substantive due process. "' The court further
held that if proof of homosexual conduct had existed, a rational nexus
would have to have been shown between such conduct and her alleged
unsuitability for military service. The court ordered her reinstated into
the Army Reserves.1 12 At that particular moment in history, gay rights
in the military seemed within reach.
Within the next six months, however, three events occurred that
reversed the trend. First, on October 23, 1980, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in Belier and, at the same time, reversed the lower court's holding in Saal."8 Second, Berg and
Matlovich reached a settlement with the Navy and Air Force, respectively, in which each relinquished his alleged right of re-enlistment. "
Last, the Department of Defense promulgated new and more strict regulations regarding homosexuality in the armed forces. 15 Simultaneously, a "nonevent" occurred. The Army disregarded the direct order
of the district court in benShalom by not re-enlisting Miriam
benShalom."16
The decision in Belier"1 7 by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit struck at the heart of attempts by gay litigators to impose a
rational nexus test on the military similar to the test imposed by the
Norton"8 court on the federal civil service. The end result of the Belier
case was particularly disheartening because at least twice in the opin-

(upholding the firing of a teacher due to his status as a gay person), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879

(1977).
110. See benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 969, 973.
11. Id. at 971-77.
112. Id. at 977.
113. Belier, 632 F.2d at 818.
114. See Gay Community News, Feb. 14, 1981, at 3; id., Dec. 6, 1980, at 1. Although most
reports in the gay press were neutral on this point, some headlines gave a distinct impression that
Berg and Matlovich had "sold out." See, e.g., Matlovich Accepts $160,000 Payoff, High Gear,
Feb. 1981, at 2. See also The Advocate, Jan. 8, 1981, at 7.
115. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
116. On May 20, 1980, the district court granted benShalom's request for a writ of mandamus, ordering the Army to reinstate her. See benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 977. The Army appealed and was granted a stay of the court's judgment. Subsequently, the Army voluntarily dismissed its appeal, and the judgment and order became final on November 24, 1980. Gay
Community News, Nov. 29, 1980, at 2. The Army, however, never reinstated benShalom. See
Order. benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, CA No. 78-C-431 (7th. Cir. Sept. 9, 1985).

117. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905; 454 U.S. 855, reh'g denied,
454 U.S. 1069 (1981).

118. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) For a discussion on the rational nexus test, see supra
note 91.
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ion the court took positions which gave some minimal recognition to
gay rights. For example, in the introduction to his decision, Judge Kennedy, speaking of the Navy policy against the retention of gay servicemembers, stated: "[W]e recognize that to many persons the regulations may seem unwise . . . ."I" He indicated that the only remedy
for such persons was to prevail on elected officials to change the policy. 20 Moreover, in his discussion of the place if homosexual conduct
in the spectrum of constitutional privacy rights, Judge Kennedy found
that "some kinds of government regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge."' 1 Additionally, in his balancing test, Judge Kennedy balanced governmental
interests against "whatever heightened solicitude is appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct."' 2 However, in the final analysis,
Judge Kennedy showed almost complete deference to alleged military
concerns and found the weight of those concerns determinative. The
focus of the Belier decision was on the "nature of the employer," i.e.,
the military, as the crucial element. The military is, by "'necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society.' ,,23 The court stated:
"[r]egulations which might infringe constitutional rights in other contexts may survive scrutiny because of military necessity."1 2 ' What was
the military necessity cited in Belier? The court accepted as the basis
for the military regulation an affidavit of the Assistant Chief of Naval
Personnel which listed six categorical statements of why gay people
could not be allowed to remain in the Navy.'2 5 The Belier court relied
on this affidavit while admitting that evidence existed indicating "that
attitudes towards homosexual conduct have changed among some
groups in society ... ."I" The court also admitted that the Navy's
blanket rule requiring the discharge of all homosexual servicepersons
was "perhaps broader than necessary to accomplish some of its goals"
and that "[u]pholding the challenged regulations as constitutional is
distinct from a statement that they are wise.' 7 Even though the court
found the discharge of the three individuals "harsh," the final decision
was that Mary Roseann Saal, James Lee Miller, and Dennis R. Beller
were discharged from the Navy.
The harshest criticism of the Belier decision came not from gay
119. Belier, 632 F.2d at 792.
120. Id.
121. Id.at 810.
122. Id.
123. Id.(quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
124. Id.at 811.
125. Id.at 811 n.22.
126. Id.at 811.
127. Id. at 812.
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rights advocates but from Judge Kennedy's peer, Judge William A.
Norris. When the plaintiffs asked that the case be reheard en banc, the
motion was denied.12 8 Judge Norris dissented from the denial of the en
banc rehearing in an eleven-page opinion. Norris reviewed the history
of the right of privacy as a substantive due process right and concluded
that a fundamental right was involved in Belier which, in his estimation, required the use of strict scrutiny. 129 This view was echoed by
Justice Boochever who stated that the Navy regulation could not survive either a strict scrutiny standard or the "heightened solicitude"
standard enunciated by Kennedy. 13 0 Justice Norris reserved his strongest criticism, however, for Kennedy's uncritical acceptance of the
Navy's reasons for the regulation: "The Belier panel was easily seduced. It accepted without critical scrutiny the Navy's statement of its
interests and the importance of those interests. The panel made no attempt to respond to the devastating observations of Judge Schwarzer
regarding those professed interests ....

."Is'

Following the lead of

Judge Schwarzer in Saal, Judge Norris reviewed in-depth, one by one,
the Navy's offered statement of interests. His reaction to the panel's
decision in Belier is terse: "Considered with proper detachment rather
than knee-jerk acquiescence, the military necessity argument is revealed not to be supported by the record in Belier.' ' 182 The Navy's
stated interests were:
(1) protection of the "fabric of military life," .
(2) preservation of the "integrity of the recruiting process,"
(3) maintenance of the "discipline of personnel in active services,"
...and
(4) assurance of the "acceptance of men and women in the military, who are sometimes stationed in foreign countries with cultures different from our own,"

. . .. 1

The Navy stated that these interests are served by a regulation
barring gay people from the service because:
(1) tension will arise between homosexuals and heterosexuals, because the "great majority of naval personnel . . . despise/detest homosexuality,"... ;

(2) undue influence caused by emotional relationships among
homosexuals will "subvert" the proper performance of duties or chain of
128.
nied, 454
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 80 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855, reh'g deU.S. 1069 (1981).
See id. at 83-86 (Norris, J., dissenting).
See id. at 80 (Boochever, J., dissenting).
Id. at 87 (Norris, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 87-88 (quoting Belier, 632 F.2d at 810-12) (citations omitted).
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command,... ;
(3) the ability of homosexuals to perform supervisory or command
duties will be "degraded" by their inability to "maintain the necessary
respect and trust,"

. .

. ; and

(4) recruiting effort will be adversely affected by parents' concerns
about their children "associating with individuals who are incapable of
maintaining high moral standards,".... 13
Norris stated that the first problem with these interests was that
"[t]he Navy is not in the business of promoting its own moral views or
shielding the moral sensibilities of Navy personnel and citizens of host
nations.1 13 5 The dissent saw the Navy's job as fighting wars and agreed
that discipline is necessary to this task. Judge Norris stated, however,
that:
Never

. .

. has the Navy offered anything to indicate that maintenance

of such discipline war-readiness requires that the private lives of Navy
members meet the approval of other members, citizens of host nations,
or the Navy itself. Intolerance is not a constitutional basis for an infringement of fundamental personal rights. Yet intolerance or a presumption of intolerance is at the very root of each of the dangers which
the Navy asserts is posed to its interests by homosexuals."3 6
Norris pointed out that none of the problems supposedly created and
listed by the Navy is confined to homosexual servicemembers. Many of
137
the same problems arise with women or minority service personnel.
For example, tensions arise between black and white sailors because
some persons in the Navy despise and detest other races. 138 Emotional
relationships develop between nongay men and women in the Navy
which can affect the chain of command. "9 Blacks and women may fail
to gain the respect of their subordinates, and a command problem
could arise. 140 Norris pointed out that the Navy could not constitutionally bar blacks or women for these reasons.'
Moreover, Norris observed that the Navy already has a well-developed system for judging
each serviceperson on their own individual fitness which the Navy uses
efficiently to handle other "problems.' 4 2 With regard to parental worries, Norris stated that parents of naval recruits can only shield their
134. Id. at 88 (Norris, J., dissenting) (quoting Beller, 632 F.2d at 811 n.22) (citations
omitted).
135. Id.
136. id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 89.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 88.
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children from incidental association with gay persons by "shielding
them from the world." 4 Lastly, Norris observed that persons in host
nations are much more likely to be offended by public behavior of our
servicepersons such as drunkenness and drug use and by outward characteristics such as race and gender than by private sexual behavior."
Not only did Norris critique the reasons advanced by the Navy, but he
pointed out that a less restrictive alternative existed. The Navy already
makes wide use of individual fitness hearings. Why not in these situations, asks Norris? While many might find Norris' arguments more cogent then the majority opinion in Belier, the majority opinion was ultimately successful. Belier was appealed to the Supreme Court which
denied certiorari."'
The Belier decision "cut the rug out" from under the remand of
Matlovich and Berg because the Belier decision was based on the same
or similar regulations that were at issue in Matlovich and Berg.'" The
armed services, however, were in a quandry. When the Air Force failed
within a reasonable time to provide an explanation as to why Matlovich
was not an "exception," Judge Gesell ordered the Air Force to reinstate him." 7 The parties were at a standstill. Under the new regulations, which did not contain an "exception" rule, Matlovich would be
discharged upon reinstatement. Moreover, the Belier decision created a
conflict between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits. On the other hand, the
Air Force failed to provide the explanation demanded by the court and
was faced with a court order to reenlist Matlovich. This failure, and
the likelihood of a similar eventuality in the Navy's situation with
Berg, may explain the settlements reached. Matlovich and Berg ac-

cepted monetary settlements from the two services and agreed not to
enforce whatever reinstatement rights they had. Matlovich settled in
early December, 1980, and Berg settled on January 19, 1981.1" The
Belier decision, reinforced by the settlements in Berg and Matlovich,
may have been the reason that the Army felt secure enough to ignore

143. Id. at 89.
144. Id.
145. Belier v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
146. In both Belier and Berg, the Navy regulation at issue was SECNAVIST 1900.9A
which states in part: "Members involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who cannot be
tolerated in a military organization. . . . Their prompt separation is essential." See Belier, 632
F.2d at 803; Berg, 436 F. Supp. at 79. The Air Force regulation in Matlovich was AFM 39-12
(change 4), para. 2-103 (Oct. 21, 1970), which provided for the discharge of Air Force personnel
found to have engaged in homosexual acts. See Matlovich, 591 F.2d at 853, 853 n.1. For a general discussion of the use of these regulations in the aforementioned cases, see The Advocate, Oct.
16, 1980, at 9. See also The Washington Blade, Sept. I1. 1980, at I.
147. The Advocate, Oct. 16, 1980, at 9. See also The Washington Blade, Sept. Ii, 1980, at
148. See supra note 114 and accompanying
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the district court's order to reinstate benShalom.' 4 9
With gay litigants in disarray,1 50 the Department of Defense issued new regulations designed to close all loopholes and provide for the
separation of gay servicemembers. The changes were initially set out in
a revision of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1332.14 in January, 1981. The changes were also incorporated in the most recent version published January 28, 1982.151 Directive 1332.14 applies to enlisted personnel in all three services: Army, Air Force, and Navy, both
regular and reserve. DoD Directive 1332.20152 applies to officers and
incorporates the same basic provisions with regard to separation for homosexuality. The main difference between the provisions applicable to
the enlisted servicepersons and to the officers is that officers have more
procedural safeguards. However, officers have less assurance of an honorable discharge absent mitigating circumstances. In addition to the
DoD Directive, each service has its own regulations to implement the
Directive, and these service regulations often differ in substantive
ways.15 3 Directive 1332.14 covers enlisted personnel separations. Section H, title "Reasons for Separation," is devoted solely to homosexuality. The section begins with a statement attempting to justify the policy
that "homosexuality is incompatible with military service": 154
The presence in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a propensity

149. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text. For a period of time, benShalom appeared to have dropped her fight for reinstatement. See OSU Lantern, Oct. 18, 1982, at 1. benShalom, however, petitioned the district court to hold the Army in contempt for its failure to
reinstate her. On June 6, 1984, the district court denied the contempt petition and instead, ordered the Army to pay benShalom $991.16 in backpay. See Order, benShalom v. Secretary of the
Army, CA No. 78-C-431 (E.D. Wis. June 6, 1984). The judge seemed, sua sponte, to substitute
damages for reinstatement. benShalom appealed the order. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial
of the contempt petition, but remanded on the damages issue. The court held that the district
court erred in awarding damages in lieu of reinstatement. The Seventh Circuit held that the reinstatement order was valid and that benShalom was entitled to an enforcement of that order by the
district court. Order, benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, CA No. 78-C-431 (7th Cir. Sept. 9,
1985). Upon remand, the district court apparently ordered reinstatement by March 1, 1986. However, on February 28, 1986, that order was stayed, pending appeal, by order of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See The Washington Blade, Mar. 7, 1986, at 1.
benShalom commented on the appeal: "I'm qualified for the work .... But they think all of
Western civilization will fall if I'm readmitted." Id.
150. See K. BOURDONNAY, R. JOHNSON, J. SCHUMANN & B. WILSON. FIGHTING BACK 13
(1985) [hereinafter cited as FIGHTING BACK]. Fighting Back is available from The Midwest
Committee for Military Counseling, 421 South Wabash Ave., Second Floor, Chicago, Ill.
606051208. This manual was written to assist counselors and attorneys working with clients who are gay
and lesbian servicemembers, veterans, or persons who are draft-susceptable.
151. Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14 (1982) (Enlisted Administrative Separations).
152. Id. No. 1332.20.
153. See id. No. 1332.14, at 30-44.
154. Id. No. 1332.14, encl. 3, § H.l.a.
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to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment
of the military mission. The presence of such members adversely affects
the ability of the Military Services to maintain discipline, good order,
and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and work under close conditions
affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the Military
Services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to
prevent breaches of security. " '
Many of the stated reasons for separation of gay servicemembers are
similar to the list of reasons given in Saal and Belier and critiqued by
Judges Schwarzer and Norris." The question is whether these justifications have any basis in fact. One difficulty in examining the statement is that the military jargon which pervades it may be hard to comprehend by a non-military person. For example, how does one insure
the "integrity of the system of rank and command"?
The new directive defines a homosexual as a person, "regardless of
sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. ' 157 A homosexual act is defined as "bodily contact, actively
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex
for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires." 158 In their determination
to close all loopholes, the drafters may have been overzealous. According to the "Kinsey Scale," only persons who are "0" on the scale, i.e.,
who have fantasized about or acted only with the opposite sex all their
1 59
lives, would not fall into the Department of Defense's definition.
Probably eighty-five percent of the American public would be covered
under this new definition. The directive's definition of a homosexual act
is similarly broad. Close reading indicates that no genital contact is
necessary nor, for that matter, sufficient. The regulation has more con-

155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 198, 201. Judge Norris finds the Navy's "reasons" to
be "so weak that they cannot possibly survive any form of heightened scrutiny, much less the
strict scrutiny which is appropriate." Miller, 647 F.2d at 88 (Norris, J.,dissenting).
157. Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14, encl. 3, § H.l.b.l. (1982).
158. Id. § ,-I.l.b.3.
159. A. KINSEY. W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623,
639 (1948) [hereinafter cited as A. KINSEY). After discussing the continuum approach, better
known as the "Kinsey Scale," the authors comment that "[not) all things are black nor all things
white . . . .Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separate pigeonholes." Id. at 639. In remarking upon the military estimates of homosexuality in the service (less
than 1% officially identified as homosexual): "The most obvious explanation of these very low
figures lies in the fact that both the Army and Navy had precluded the possibility of getting
accurate data on these matters by announcing at the beginning of the war that they intended to
exclude all persons with homosexual histories." Id. at 621. Pigeon-holes, once again!
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troversial and problematic provisions. To separate a person from military service, any of three possible findings will be sufficient: an act, a
statement, or an attempted marriage. One act is all that is required
under the regulation. The act could have been pre-service, many years
in the past. 160 Since Kinsey found that thirty-seven percent of all
American men have had a same-sex experience at one time in their
life, 161 strict enforcement could pose an interesting problem. The directive does provide an affirmative defense to the accusation of an act;
namely, the person must prove the conduct was a "fluke.""6 2 To take
advantage of this defense, one must prove that all five of the following
conditions are true:
(a) the conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior; and
(b) such conduct under all the circumstances is unlikely to recur;
and
(c) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion,
or intimidation; and
(d) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the Service is consistent with the interest of the
Service in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and
(e) the member does not desire to engage in or intend to engage in
homosexual acts.' 8
Clearly, this enumeration of specifics is designed to close the loophole
created by the circuit court's decision in Matlovich and Berg." These
conditions are the specific circumstances under which a service person
can be retained.
The older directive spoke of "homosexual tendencies." The new
directive requires the separation of persons who state they are homosexual or bisexual.165 The addition of bisexuality is new and obviously
brings a large group under the regulation. However, of more interest
from the standpoint of legal analysis is the deletion of the homosexual
tendencies section, and its replacement with statements of sexual orientation as the second criteria justifying a separation from service. This
section seems to be in direct response to the benShalom case. Miriam
benShalom was separated because she proclaimed her lesbian identity.
She was separated under the "tendencies" section.'" The district court

160.

Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14, encl. 3, § H.I.c. (1982).
KINSEY, supra note 159, at 623.
162. See FIGHTING BACK, supra note 150, at 19.
163. Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14, encl. 3, § H.I.c.(l)(a)-(e) (1982).
164. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
165. Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14, encl. 3, § H.l.c.(2) (1982).
166. See benShalom, 489 F. Supp. at 969.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/4
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ordered her reinstated because her first amendment speech rights were
violated. The new regulation does not require that a person be separated for "being" a gay person thus avoiding the status issue covered in
67
Robinson v. California."
The third basis of separation is an attempted marriage or marriage
to a person known to be of the same sex. 16 8 The regulation does not
indicate whether the situation sought to be covered is the attempt by
two gay persons to be "legally" married or is the participation in a
"gay union" ceremony. 169 If the latter is intended, surely first amendment religious rights are implicated.
The new regulation provides for the separation of enlisted personthe grounds outlined above. One crucial issue for many persons
on
nel
is the type of discharge to be given to the separated gay service person.
One change, which occurred in the 1970's, brought the possibility of
separation with an honorable discharge. Also in the 1970's, veterans
1 70
applied for upgrades of their discharge papers and were successful.
The stigma of a less than honorable discharge affected many people's
ability to obtain civilian employment for many years.17 1 Section H.2 of
the new regulation governs how the discharge will be characterized.
The regulation provides that a general or honorable discharge will be
given unless certain aggravating circumstances exist. In that case, an
"Other Than Honorable (OTH)" discharge will be given. Specific aggravating circumstances include the following conduct: (1) the homosexual act in question was by force, coercion, or intimidation; (2) the
act was with a person under sixteen years of age; (3) the act was with a
subordinate in circumstances that violate customary military superiorsubordinate relationships; (4) the act was in public view; (5) the act
was for compensation; (6) the act was aboard a military vessel or aircraft; and the last catch-all, (7) the act was in another location subject
to military control under aggravating circumstances which have an adverse impact on discipline, good order, or morale comparable to the

167. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (held that it was unconstitutional to penalize someone based
solely upon their status).
168. Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14, encl. 3, § H.l.c.(3) (1982).
169. Because marriage, as recognized by all states, is not available to gay couples, many
choose to create their own ritual or religious ceremony, which marks or celebrates the commitment each partner has to the other. See Rivera I, supra note 1, at 874. See also infra notes
375-78 and accompanying text.
170. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP. NEWS, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 3. See also Rivera II, supra
note 1, at 323-24.
171. See Judicial Limitations on Military Characterizations of Discharges: Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 10 MIL. L. REP. (Pun. L. EDUC. INsT.) 6003 (Mar.-Apr. 1982). See also
J. D'EMILIO, supra note 19, at 45; FIGHTING BACK, supra note 150, at 100.
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impact of such activity aboard a vessel or aircraft." 2 Thus, "specific
aggravating circumstances" clearly covers a number of situations which
lend themselves to broad and/or homophobic 75 interpretations. For example, since a homosexual act does not require genital contact, a kiss
given and passively received which (1) gave sexual satisfaction at some
level to either participant, and (2) which was done in public view or in
a vessel or on an airplane or in some other location under military control such as a barracks, would constitute an aggravating circumstance
allowing the discharge to be OTH.
Gay servicemembers given OTH discharges under these rules do
have recourse to challenge such discharges. Under the case of Roelofs
v. Secretary of the Air Force,' an OTH discharge is permitted only
when the conduct involved would have an adverse impact on the military mission. Thus, an OTH discharge would be permitted only when
the conduct in question actually impaired the person's performance of
duty. Basically, Roelofs extended the rule of O'Callahanv. Parker,
to administrative discharges. O'Callahan held that court martials are
prcper only when the conduct is service related. As will be evident in
the cases that follow, all the definitions and conditions can be interpreted very broadly. Whether a person receives a general discharge or
an honorable discharge depends on his or her service record. Generally,
these regulations would seem to indicate that most gay persons who are
separated will receive either general or honorable discharges. However,
one should remember that the directive also provides that a "trial by
court martial is not precluded in appropriate circumstances," '7 as in
United States v. Newak.17
One cannot leave this discussion of separation regulations without
examination of fraudulent enlistment as a ground for separation. Directive 1332.14 provides that fraudulent enlistment is a basis for separation and can result in an OTH discharge.'1 a Technically, a fraudulent
enlistment requires a "deliberate material misrepresentation, omission,
or concealment which, if known at the time of enlistment, induction, or

172.

Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14, end. 3, § H.2 (1982).

173. Homophobia is the irrational fear of homosexual persons or homosexuality. See Hudson & Ricketts, A Strategy for the Measurement of Homophobia, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 357
(1980).
174. 628 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court for the first time found that a serviceperson's
conduct must have a real impact on his or her service in order for it to be the grounds for a less
than honorable discharge).
175. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
176. See FIGHTING BACK, supra note 150, at 28.
177. 15 M.J. 541 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982). For a discussion of the Newak decision, see infra
notes 218-29 and accompanying text.
178. Dept. Def. Directive No. 1332.14, encl. 2, § E.4.a. ( 982).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/4

1986)

SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW

entry into a period of military service, might have resulted in rejection.' 7" The directive clearly contemplates that an unconfessed samesex act can be the basis of a fraudulent enlistment. A material misrepresentation can include statements regarding such pre-service homosexual conduct. As shall be seen in the discussion of Rich v. Secretary oj
the Army,1 80 a fraudulent enlistment theory can be used successfully to
separate gay servicemembers. If one combines the rather broad definition of a "homosexual" in the directive with the broad definition of
"homosexual acts," many persons could be "guilty" of an omission or
misrepresentation of facts. The issue is particularly difficult because a
person's consciousness of being gay often develops long after homosexual thoughts and actions have occurred. Moreover, many persons who
honestly consider themselves heterosexual in orientation have engaged
in acts or had thoughts which the Department of Defense would characterize as "homosexual" in nature. 181 Under the regulation, a misrepresentation or omission must not only be material but deliberate as
well. However, given the fluidity of sexual orientation as described by
Kinsey, many people could honestly consider themselves heterosexual
at one point in time and yet subsequently develop an awareness of
themselves as possessing a bisexual or homosexual orientation. In theory, such persons would not be subject to a fraudulent enlistment discharge because the misrepresentation was not deliberate.1 82 However,
given the homophobia of the armed forces, such a change in consciousness might be given little credence.
The regulation for the separation of officers is very similar to that
governing enlisted personnel and, therefore, will not be detailed here.
Each service has its own regulations implementing the Department of
Defense Directive, and such regulations at times differ substantively.
Examples of such service regulations in action will be seen in the cases
discussed below.
Many military cases dealing with gay servicepersons have a number of common components. First, civilians who rely on the confidentiality of their statements to doctors, psychiatrists, and other counselors,
including clergy, are often unaware that confidentiality does not exist
in the armed services. Many persons have revealed gay feelings to doctors, counselors, and even clergy "in confidence" only to find that their

See FIGHTING BACK, supra note 150, at 15.
735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
See A. KINSEY, supra note 159, at 656; J. MARMOR. THE MULTIPLE ROOTS OF HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 4 (1980).
182. This was precisely the issue in Rich but the serviceperson's testimony was not accepted. See Rich, 735 F.2d at 1225.
179.
180.
181.
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admissions are immediately passed up the chain of command. 183 In
Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 18 ' Carol Lauritzen told her psychiatrist she thought she had homosexual tendencies; this confidence put
her through an incredible ordeal. However, she won retention and sued
to collect her attorney's fees from the Navy, which she received as a
prevailing party under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. 8
The second common component in these military cases is the
method of investigation used to discover gay servicemembers. Investigators will often offer immunity to a person who will reveal the names
of other persons whom they know or suspect to be gay. This method
has led to purges, pogroms, or wholesale "witchhunts" in various service installations.
Probably the most famous recent purge was the allegation of
wholesale lesbianism brought against the female sailors on the Norton
Sound. Many commentators suspect that charges of lesbianism are a
"second-hand" way of ridding the Navy of unwanted women, regardless of their sexual orientation.18 6 In the Norton incident, twenty-four
women were originally charged with lesbianism. This number represented more than one-third of the women aboard the Norton Sound, a
missile test ship stationed in Long Beach, California. The charges resulted from the initial allegations of one woman and from a list of
names which was passed around the ship. Sailors were to note those
women who they believed were gay. Charges against sixteen of the
women were dropped early in the investigation. Only four of the
women were actually tried. Of these, two were acquitted and retention
recommended; two were found "guilty" of homosexual behavior at discharge hearings. Subsequent to the four trials, charges were dropped
against the remaining four servicewomen. At the actual hearings, the
woman who had made the original allegations admitted under oath that

183. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Secretary of the Navy, 546 F. Supp. 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(Lauritzen told a Navy psychiatrist that she "might have homosexua. tendencies"), rev'd sub
noma.Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984); Air Force Officer Bucks Military Policy On Gays, The Advocate, Sept. 30, 1982, at (an 18-year veteran of the Air Force, while
under treatment for hepatitis, told his physician that he was gay and doctor disclosed this information to the sergeant's supervisors even though the physician promised to protect his patient's
identity); AIDS Test May End Navy Career, The News of Columbus Gay and Lesbian Community, June 1982, at 186 (reporting that a petty officer requested testing for AIDS and was subsequently "accused" by the Navy of making an admission of homosexuality to psychiatrists who
examined him).
184. 546 F. Supp. 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d
550 (9th Cir. 1984).
185. Id. at 1229. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982).
186. See Navy's Most Recent Sex, Drug Scandal Whipping Up Stormy Seas in California,
Civ. LIBERTIES, June 1981, at 6; Podeska, Norton Sound Trials End, NOW Times, Sept. 19,
1980, at I; Columbus Citizen-Journal, Aug. 1, 1980, at _.
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she had lied. She said that the Navy investigators told her she would be
labeled a homosexual unless she accused her friends. 187 The Norton
Sound case became a cause celebre when the ACLU and NOW intervened to represent the women. Some evidence exists that the frequency
of such accusations are more common under the Reagan
administration.1 88
James Woodward's case was decided shortly after the settlements
in Berg and Matlovich and shortly after the promulgation of the new
directive. Woodward was a Navy pilot who in 1974 was released from
active service because of alleged homosexual tendencies. 18 ' This release
was upheld by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1978, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 190 Woodward, however, returned to court three years later and
asked for reinstatement and damages because, at the time of his separation, the Navy had not provided a rationale for his release from active service.191 Basing his argument on the decisions in Berg and
Matlovich, Woodward persuaded the court that the Navy had violated
due process in not providing a rationale.1 9 2 The case was remanded to
the Secretary of the Navy who was ordered to provide reasons for the
decision. 19
Obviously, in light of other decisions and the regulation changes,
Woodward's method of attack is no longer of much interest. However,
two facts from the case are noteworthy. First, Woodward was thought
to be gay because he was seen in an officer's club with an enlisted man
who, at the time, was being separated from the service because of homosexuality. 1 " Second, when questioned by his commanding officer,
Woodward admitted "homosexual tendencies."195 The military policy
against fraternization served to call Woodward to someone's attention.
His admission of "tendencies" to his commander was sufficient to cause
his release from active service.""
The "last gasp" of the "exception" doctrine used in Berg,

187.
188.

See Podeska, supra note 186, at 1.
Navy Officer's Case Signals Renewed Purge, Gay Community News, Dec. 7, 1983, at

1.
189. Woodward v. Moore (Woodward 1), 451 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1978), vacated, 25 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 695 (D.D.C. 1981). Note that this case comes under the old regulation
which used the "tendencies" standard or issue. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
190. Woodward 1. 451 F. Supp. at 349.
191. Woodward v. Moore (Woodward !1), 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 695 (D.D.C.
1981). See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
192. Woodward I1,25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 696.
193. Id. at 697.
194. Woodward 1, 451 F. Supp. at 347.
195. Id.
196. Woodward I1,25 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 696.
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Matlovich, and Woodward is represented by a case involving an Air
19 7
Force major. The plaintiff in Doe v. Secretary of the Air Force,
whose case began in 1979, was administratively discharged with an
OTH discharge. Doe was found to have had sexual relations with the
fifteen-year-old son of another Air Force officer. Because of his outstanding military record, Doe claimed that under the doctrine enunciated in Matlovich and Berg, he was procedurally entitled to an explanation as to why he was not retained as an "exception." The court held
that the explanation which he had received was procedurally sufficient,
i.e., "misbehavior aggravated by the commission of homosexual acts
with a child." 19 8 However, the court did find his OTH discharge improper because the Air Force had not introduced evidence to show how
Doe's misbehavior was service connected. Under Roelofs, in order to
give an OTH discharge, the behavior must be service connected.1 9
Nevertheless, since the Air Force regulation governing separation for
homosexuality 200 presumes that the homosexuality of a member of the
Air Force reduces the overall effectiveness of the service, a general discharge, rather than an honorable discharge, can be given. The court
ordered that Doe be given a general discharge. 0 1
The issue of fraternization, noted irWoodward, occurred again in
the case of United States v. Coronado.0 2 However, in Coronado the
accused officer received a court-martial for "conduct unbecoming an
officer." Coronado engaged in consensual sodomy in his off-base apartment with an Army-enlisted man. Coronado challenged the jurisdiction
of the military because the acts in question took place off base. Moreover, he stressed that the prosecutor in the civilian jurisdiction chose
not to prosecute. The opinion of the Air Force Court of Military Review, which reviewed the court-martial proceedings, illustrates clearly
the military's belief in the sacrosanct and separate nature of military
life. Coronado did not receive a court-martial for sodomy, which is an
offense pursuant to article 125 of the UMCJ, but was punished for
sodomy which crossed rank lines. As the court stated, he "is charged
with disgracing his position as an officer . . . [an] offense [which] is
not cognizable in civilian courts."20 3 The court held that his behavior
constituted "a direct flouting of military authority. ' '
Coronado ar-

197. 10 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 2302 (D.D.C. 1982).
198. Id. at 2304.
199. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
200. A.F. Reg. 36-w, § 8 (_
).
201. Doe, 10 MIL. L. REP. (PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) at 2304.
202. I1 M.J. 522 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981).
203. Id. at 525.
204. Id.
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gued that the off-base location of the act brought into play the
O'Callahanrule 0 5 which requires that a "service connection" be established before the military can court-martial a serviceperson. Coronado's
behavior was held to be service-connected because the court found that
"he took his rank, prestige, and authority with him when he departed
the installation. '206 The last finding of the Air Force Court of Military
Review is startling. The court found that Coronado's offense "pose[d] a
' 207 This finding
threat to both Pope Air Force Base and Fort Bragg.
was based on the court's conclusion that the ability of both men to
perform their duties was impaired. For instance, the Army-enlisted
man had been late for duty once as a consequence of his liaison with
Coronado. Also, Coronado's "fellow members of the military" showed
him less respect when his misconduct became known. The decision
reveals, however, no evidence that Coronado's abilities were impaired
before he was charged and before that charge became known. Actually,
when one examines other cases, Captain Coronado was fortunate; his
sole punishment was dismissal from the service rather than a jail sentence. 08 Dismissal from the service for an officer, however, is compara9
ble to an undesirable discharge for an enlisted person.
After deciding Belier, ° the Ninth Circuit exhibited even further
2
deference to the military in Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army. " Joseph Hatheway appealed his court martial conviction under article 125
(sodomy) to the federal courts. Lieutenant Hatheway, who had been
second in command of a Green Beret detachment for four years, was
arrested by the Army ten days before he was to receive an honorable
discharge. The evidence against Hatheway was given by an enlisted
man who was given immunity from prosecution and who claimed to
have had sex with Hatheway. At his court martial, Hatheway proffered
evidence that only homosexual sodomy was ever actually prosecuted
even though article 125 prohibited heterosexual sodomy as well. The
military judge ruled that even if those facts were shown to be true, the
prosecution still had a valid case against him. Hatheway was convicted
and dismissed from the service.3 52 The Ninth Circuit refers to Hathe-

205. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
206. Coronado, II M.J. at 524.
207. Id. at 525.
208. Id. at 523.
209. See FIGHTING BACK, supra note 150, at 27.
210. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 452 U.S. 905; 454 U.S. 855, reh'g denied,
454 U.S. 1069 (1981). See supra notes 117-45 and accompanying text for discussion of Belier.
211. 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
212. Id. at 1379. By way of contrast, in United States v. Johanns, 20 M.J. 155 (C.M.A.
1985). the court of military appeals held that an Air Force officer's engagement in mutually voluntary, private, non-deviate sexual intercourse with three enlisted women was not conduct un-
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way in the opinion as a "convicted felon." ' s"Lest one not understand,
Hatheway was and still is presumably "a convicted felon" because a
military court found him guilty of sodomy. The Ninth Circuit framed
the main issue as "whether the commission of homosexual acts is an
'impermissible' ground for selective prosecution under Article 125. ' ' 21
The court held that such acts were not! The court, citing Belier, said
that the Beller holding "was the judgment that those who engage in
homosexual acts severely compromise the government's ability to maintain . . . a [strong military] force."" " Therefore, the court held that
the military could select those cases for court-martial which involve violations "most likely to undermine discipline and order in the military."" Thus, the military's selective prosecution of homosexual sodomy is permissible because such a selection furthers an important
17
governmental interest.
Coronado and Hatheway were each officers who committed sodomy with an enlisted person, and their penalty after court-martial was
dismissal from the service. Doe was a major who committed sodomy
with a minor. His penalty was an administrative OTH discharge, upgraded by the court to a general discharge. Second Lieutenant Newak
was an officer found guilty of sodomy with an enlisted person and sentenced to dismissal, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for seven years!21a Lieutenant Newak differs from
Coronado, Hatheway, and Doe in one significant way: Joann Newak is
a woman.
Joann Newak came from Vandling, Pennsylvania. Her father is
dead, her mother is a nurse, and her sister, a school teacher. Joann
Newak went to Maywood College, a Roman Catholic liberal arts college, graduating in 1979. After graduation, at the age of twenty-one,
she joined the Air Force. For two and one-half years she rendered excellent service and was certain of promotion to First Lieutenant. She
was stationed at Hancock Field in Syracuse, New York at the time of
her court martial. 1 9 The charges against Second Lieutenant Newak
were that in her off-base apartment she smoked marijuana with an en-

becoming an officer, nor was it prejudicial to good order and discipline. Id. at 159. Although the
disciplinary articles involved were different than those used in Hatheway, the facts are such that
the different standard required of heterosexual officers as opposed to homosexual officers becomes
apparent.
213. Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1380.
214. Id. at 1381 (footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 1382.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. United States v. Newak, 15 M.J. 541, 542 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982).
219. Village Voice, Apr. 12, 1983, at 8.
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listed person, allegedly gave pills thought to be amphetamines, that
were in fact diet pills, to others, and last, but not least, engaged in
sodomy with an enlisted person. She was charged not only with sodomy
under article 125 but under articles 80,220 133,221 and 134222 as well. In
particular, under article 133, the charge specified that Lt. Newak did
"engage in conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman." Specifically, she was charged with wrongfully suggesting to an enlisted female
person of the Air Force that such person was bisexual, and for proceeding without authority to kiss the enlisted person on her neck, saying, "I
love you."223
Originally, Newak was offered a dismissal, equivalent to an enlisted persons' OTH discharge. She felt that because of her excellent
service record she deserved an honorable discharge. Naively, she went

220. 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1983). Article 80 includes charges for attempting any act defined as
an offense under the UCMJ. Id.
221. Id. § 933. Article 133 provides for punishment for conduct "unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman." Id.
222. Id. § 934. Article 134 is a general article and provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons
subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or
summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be
punished at the discretion of that court.
Id. The elements of offenses involving indecent language and indecent acts with another are
spelled out in the United States Manual for Court-Martialsas follows:
[Indecent Language:]
(1) That the accused orally or in writing communicated to another person certain
language;
(2) That such language was indecent; and
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces ...
Explanation."Indecent" language is that which is grossly offensive to modesty, decency, or
propriety, or shocks the moral sense, because of its vulgar, filthy or disgusting nature, or its
tendency to incite lustful thought. The language must violate community standards.
UNITED STATES MANUAL FOR COURT-MARTIALS, 1984, 89, at IV-131 (1984). One might add
that the explanation alone is enough to "incite lustful thought"!
[indecent Acts with Another:]
(I) That the accused committed a certain wrongful act with a certain person;
(2) That the act was indecent; and
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces. ...
Explanation. "Indecent" signifies that form of immorality relating to sexual impurity
which is not only grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, but tends to
excite lust and deprave the morals with respect to sexual relations.
Id. T 90, at IV-131.
223. Hemhoff, The Court Martial of Lieutenant Joann Newak, Village Voice, Apr. 12,
1983, at 8.

Published by eCommons, 1985

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:2

to trial. The Air Force assigned her counsel. At one point, not only was
the Air Force lawyer representing Newak, but he was also representing
two enlisted personnel, one with granted immunity, who were going to
testify against her. At the court martial, Newak's civilian counsel
pointed out that the sexual acts in question were consensual, adult, and
private, and that the acts occurred off-base, when Lt. Newak was not
on duty. Additionally, Newak argued that the acts in question were not
criminal under New York law where they took place."' Newak was
found guilty and sentenced to seven years at hard labor which the Secretary of the Navy reduced to six years. In her appellate brief, speaking
on the issue of penalty, Faith Seidenberg, Newak's ACLU lawyer,
pointed out that Newak had an exceptional military record, that several military personnel of high rank had so testified, that she had no
prior criminal record, and that no court anywhere would send such a
person to jail. The United States Air Force Court of Military Review
was unmoved. In a short opinion, the court brushed aside the arguments of improper representation. 25 Nor did the court find her sentence "excessive. '226 The concurring senior judge asserted that the arguments based on the facts that the conduct was off-base, off-duty, and
non-criminal in the civilian world, failed to recognize "'that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.' .

.

. That responsibility [of commissioned officers] cannot be

checked at the gate on the way home at the end of the duty day. '2 27 In
still another concurrence, Judge Miller wrote a nineteen-page defense
of the court-martial and military justice system. He was, he wrote,
counteracting "two innuendos" contained in Newak's appellate brief.
In summary, Miller wrote: "[S]he, as a commissioned officer, not only
destroyed her subordinate's instinctive respect and obedience for her,
herself, but, in all probability, destroyed their instinctive respect and
obedience for other officers and for the entire military system as
2 28
well.

News of the heavy sentence leaked out and became an issue in

224. This raised the distinction between civilian jurisdiction and what Justice Miller, in his
lengthy concurrence, called "status jurisdiction." Newak, 15 M.J. at 558 (Miller, J.,
concurring).
If "status jurisdiction" (i.e., a military justice system) prevails, then the law in the civilian
jurisdiction is irrelevant. Newak thus differs from cases like Coronado, where sodomy was a crime
in North Carolina, the state in which the acts took place, Doe, whose acts were with a minor, and
Hatheway, who claimed that he was selectively punished because heterosexual sodomy was not
prosecuted even though prohibited under the UCMJ.
225. Newak, 15 M.J. at 543-44.
226. Id. at 544-45.

227. Id. at 545 (Hemingway, S.J., concurring) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743
(1974)).
228. Id. at 564 (Miller, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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civilian papers. Imprisoned at Fort Leavenworth, she was at first denied
the right to write to the media. The case generated considerable publicity and public outcry from the gay community. The court martial went
to the Air Force Judge Advocate for review. The sentence was reduced
to three years. Newak has appealed to the United States Court of Military Appeals."'
The Newak case not only illustrates the military's "hard-nosed"
position against gay people but, to many, the case also illustrates discrimination against women. This case, coupled with the Norton Sound
investigation s° and other similar actions, raises the question of whether
the military is using the pseudo-issue of lesbianism to rid itself of
women. 28 '
Like the Newak case, the case of Sergeant Perry Watkins attracted considerable national attention.132 And like the Newak case, the
Watkins case has an unhappy ending. On August 27, 1967, Perry Watkins reported for induction into the United States Army. On the medical form next to the box labelled "homosexuality," Perry Watkins
checked yes. Watkins was inducted and became a company clerk and
chaplain's assistant. During November, 1968, Watkins told Army investigators that he was gay and had been since he was thirteen. He was
honorably discharged in 1970. In 1971, he reenlisted for three years. In
January 1972, Watkins was denied a security clearance based on his
1968 statements. He was again honorably discharged in 1974. He
again reenlisted, this time for six years. In 1975, proceedings were instituted against him because of his homosexuality. Watkins freely admitted he was gay. His commander called him "'the best clerk I have
known.'

"283

His sergeant testified that everyone in the company knew

Watkins was gay. A four-member review board unanimously found
Watkins suitable for retention, and this finding was approved by the
Secretary of the Army. 8 In 1977, Watkins was granted a security
clearance and began work on the Nuclear Surety Personnel Reliability
Program.238 On October 26, 1979, Watkins was again permitted to
reenlist for a three year period. On December 18, 1979, he was notified

229.

See Lambda Update, Feb. 1985, at 7, col. 2; Gay Community News, Oct. 29, 1983, at

230. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
231. See NOW Times, May 1983, at 3; Village Voice, Apr. 26, 1983, at 6, ol. 2.
232. Watkins v. United States Army, 551 F.'Supp. 212 (W.D. Wash. 1982), rev'd, 721
F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983). See The Advocate, June 12, 1984, at 11; Gay Community News, June
2, 1984, at 2; The Advocate, Dec. 23, 1982, at 2; Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 14, 1982, at A9; N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 1982, at 2, col. 6.
233. Watkins, 551 F. Supp. at 220.
234. Id. at 216.
235. Id. at 220.
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that his security clearance was going to be revoked. " 6 When he appealed the revocation of the security clearance in February, 1981, he
was told that separation proceedings were being commenced against
him. He was ordered dismissed on the ground that he admitted to being a homosexual and he was given an honorable discharge. Note that
Watkins had now been in the Army for fourteen years, had been enlisted and reenlisted four times, and had steadily, throughout the fourteen years, stated he was gay. His service record was excellent. 37
Watkins took his case to the federal district court in the State of
Washington. In October, 1982, Judge Rothstein found for Watkins in a
summary judgment proceeding under the theory of equitable estoppel. 2 8 The Army claimed that they did not know of Watkin's homosexuality. The judge called that claim "patently absurd" and said such a
claim suggested "bad faith."2 9 The Army's acts, the court found,
amounted almost to a policy of ignoring this servicemember's homosexuality for more than fourteen years.2 4 0 Finally, the court found that
Watkins had relied to his detriment on the Army's behavior.2 4 ' The
court ordered Watkins to be reenlisted and estopped the Army from
relying on the Army regulation which would bar him.2 2 After the order of reinstatement, the Army attempted to circumvent the order by
directing Watkins to appear at a reenlistment hearing. At the hearing,
the Army attempted to get Watkins to answer questions about past
homosexual acts, current intentions, and other such matters. 43 Their
claim was that such acts would bar his reenlistment. The court called
this attempt "transparent," and the "consequence unjust," and ordered
24
the reenlistment of Watkins. 4
The Army appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit of Belier infamy.2 43 The court pointed out that new regulations had been promulgated since Belier.1" The court characterized

236. Id. at 216.
237. Id. See Civ. LiBERTIEs, Nov. 1981, at 3.
238. Watkins, 551 F. Supp. at 220-23. Equitable estoppel precludes someone (i.e., the
Army) from changing its position or policy when another person (i.e., Watkins) relied on that
position or policy to his or her detriment. Id. at 219-20. Because Watkins had told the service that
he was gay when he originally entered the service and because the service continually reenlisted
him, the Army was estopped from asserting that Watkins was unfit for the military because he
was homosexual. See id. at 220-23.
239. Id. at 220.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 223.
242. Id. See also Army Reg. 601-280, 1 2.14(c) (1982).
243. Watkins, 551 F. Supp. at 223.
244. Id. at 224.
245. Watkins v. United States Army, 721 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983).
246. Id. at 689.
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the language of these regulations as "stark."" 7 Retention of an admitted homosexual serviceperson, the court noted, is not permitted absent
an express finding that the soldier in question is in fact not gay. 4 8 The
new regulation "made clear," the court said, "that the Army's new policy immediately disqualifies any homosexual person from continued
military service irrespective of the character of the soldier's past service." 2 ' Looking at the district court opinion, the Ninth Circuit said
that the district court was, in effect, ordering Army officers to disobey
Army regulations.' S Such a course would be a serious threat to Army
discipline. Only if the district court had found those regulations repugnant to the Constitution could the court have made that order.25 Since
the district court did not find the regulations unconstitutional, its opinion was reversed and remanded.
Judge Norris, who dissented when the Ninth Circuit refused to
hear Belier en banc, concurred because he was bound by Belier. 1 '
Norris, however, had some strong words about the Army and the
Court.2 5 3 In regard to the Army, Norris asserted:
The Army rewarded Sgt. Watkins' years of outstanding service by
destroying his chosen career. When he needed only five more years to
qualify for retirement benefits, he was discharged solely because the
Army decided to purge all homosexuals . .

.

.[T]his regressive policy

demonstrates a callous disregard for the progress American law and society have made toward acknowledging that an individual's life style is not
the concern of government, but a fundamental aspect of personal
liberty.2"
In regard to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Norris had this to say:
[O]ur court abdicated one of its primary duties: to safeguard individual
rights against intrusions engendered by governmental insensitivity or bigotry. To me, the Army's current bias against homosexuals is no less repugnant to fundamental constitutional principles than was its long-standing prejudice against minority servicemen.' 55
The case of Rich v. Secretary of the Army'" illustrates the use of

the fraudulent enlistment theory to separate gay persons from the
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id. (citing Army Reg. 635-200, 15-3(b) (1982)).
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 691 (Norris, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
516 F. Supp. 621 (D. Colo. 1981), afrd, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
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Armed Services. Roger Rich served in the Army from 1968 to 1974
and was honorably discharged. During his tour of service, he met and
married a woman from Turkey, and they had a son. His wife and son,
however, did not accompany him when he returned to the United
States in 1971. In March, 1976, his wife and child were killed in an
auto accident. In August, 1976, Rich applied for reenlistment in the
Army. During the reenlistment process, he answered in the negative
when responding to questions about homosexuality. He went on active
duty on August 24, 1976. In October, 1976, he was solicited by another
male; he did not participate in any sexual acts but did discuss homosexuality with the person. As a consequence, he thought and read about
homosexuality. Rich was hospitalized in March, 1977. During his illness he called his first sergeant and told her that he was gay and would
have to be discharged. Sergeant Nichols had a "counseling" session
with Rich during which he told her he had been a homosexual for a
number of years. On May 24, 1977, the commanding officer recommended that Rich be discharged for unsuitability under chapter 13.11"
Then, three days later, the commanding officer changed the charge to a
chapter 141 8 charge for fraudulent enlistment. The claim was that
Rich had concealed his homosexuality at his reenlistment. In June,
1977, Rich was honorably discharged under chapter 14.25"
Rich went to federal court to protest that he should have been
separated under chapter 13 for unsuitability rather than chapter 14 for
fraudulent enlistment. 60 Rich claimed that when he entered the service
he had had some same-sex experiences but that he had also had many
opposite sex experiences and considered himself a "heterosexual." He
said, therefore, that he had not "deliberately" misrepresented himself.
The court upheld the decision of the Army to separate Rich for fraudulent enlistment. 6 The judge stated that "the choice made in approaching a particular case is a command decision." ' Judge Matsch pointed
out that "the justifications for the exclusion for homosexuals are applicable regardless of the level of sexual activity involved. 2 63 The judge
noted that "[t]he principle reason for the Army's rejection of homosexuals is the belief that societal intolerance will be reflected in peer behavior which will be inimical to the legitimate governmental interests

257. Id. at 623. See Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 13 (1973).
258. Rich, 516 F. Supp. at 624. See Army Reg. 635-200, ch. 14 (1973).
259. Rich, 516 F. Supp. at 625.
260. Id. at 624-25.
261. Id. at 629.
262. Id. at 627.
263. Id. at 628.
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in discipline and morale."'"
Rich illustrates a number of principals previously discussed. First,
confidentiality does not exist in the Army; the Army's meaning of
"counseling" differs significantly from common usage. Secondly, many
persons who at enlistment view themselves as heterosexual can be
caught by the broad definition of homosexuality used by the Armed
Forces and may later find themselves, as Rich did, facing discharge for
fraudulent enlistment. Finally, the Army's varying reasons for excluding gay people have at last been refined to only one reason-the
problems allegedly created by the "social intolerance of peers." No
longer are gays erroneously portrayed as incompetent or security risks.
Now, the justification is clear and simple.
Rich appealed to the Tenth Circuit.265 The court of appeals upheld
the district court's opinion and added nothing new to legal precedent.
The decision essentially relied on Belier and followed the same rationale. The only item of note was a specific finding that sexual orientation
is not a suspect classification. ae
Probably no case in recent years has caused as much consternation
as Dronenburg v. Zech. aa On its face, Dronenburg should have been
just one more in the long line of cases where a gay serviceperson who
sought to be reinstated was denied a remedy in federal court. At the
district court level, Dronenburgwas routine. The court denied a preliminary injunction to allow Dronenburg to stay in the Navy pending the
outcome of the case. Subsequently, the district court granted summary
judgment for the Navy.'" The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Leonard Graff of the National Gay
Rights Advocates, one of Dronenburg's lawyers, said shortly after the
summary judgment, "if we can't win it in the District of Columbia

Circuit, we can't win

. . .

at all.''

e

Allegedly, the case was brought in

the District of Columbia, rather than in California, to obtain a more
liberal bench. 7 0 Probably, the litigators also wanted to get away from
the Ninth Circuit of Belier fame.
Many thought Dronenburg was a particularly strong case for gay
rights in the military because of Dronenburg's excellent record with the

264. Id.
265. Rich, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
266. Id. at 1229. A "suspect" classification is one accorded special constitutional protection,
namely "strict scrutiny," on the basis that one is discriminated against because of an immutable
characteristic that has historically been discriminated against and that legislative action has failed
to address adequately.
267. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
268. Id. at 1389.
269. The Washington Blade, Oct. 15, 1982, at 1.
270. News of the Columbus Gay and Lesbian Community, Apr. 1982, at 4.
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Navy.2 71 James Dronenburg enlisted in the Navy immediately after
completing high school. When discharged, he was a petty officer and
had served nine years. He was a naval linguist and cryptographer with
a top secret clearance. Shortly before his discharge, he reenlisted, lured
by the $12,000 reenlistment bonus offered by the Navy.27 2 Even the
appeals court described Dronenburg in a complimentary fashion: "During [his tenure, Dronenburg] maintained an unblemished service record
and earned many citations praising his job performance. 2 73 While superficially, because of his service record, Dronenburg seemed to be the
right person for a test case, the circumstances under which he was discovered weakened the case. Dronenburg, a noncommissioned officer,
was named as a sexual partner by a nineteen-year old enlisted man.
The enlisted man had decided that he wanted to get out of the Navy by
admitting to homosexual behavior as his justification. As was typical,
Navy investigators pressured him into naming his sexual partners, one
of whom was Dronenburg.2 74 The sexual behavior in question not only
crossed ranks but occurred in the naval barracks. A stronger case may
have been presented had the sexual behavior occurred, as it did in other
cases, off base and between peers. However, given the vehemence of the
opinion of the court of appeals, a more attractive fact pattern would
not have changed the decision.
The decision of the court of appeals ieft gay litigators stunned. 5
The case was heard by a three-judge panel, which included Robert
Bork and Anthony Scalia, both Reagan appointees to the bench and
noted for their reactionary jurisprudence. 76 The Navy's action was upheld. This decision was hardly a surprise given other decisions in this
area. What came as a surprise was Judge Bork's decision to deny, in a
lengthy and strongly worded dictum, constitutional privacy rights to
persons on the basis of their homosexuality. Bork's decision placed
heavy reliance on the Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney2 7 decision and
ignored significant privacy cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird278 and

271. Why this was emphasized, in view of this especially strong case, is odd; almost all the
gay service members involved in major military litigation had excellent service records. See, e.g..
Matlovich, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1977), vacated, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
272. The Washington Blade, Oct. 15, 1982, at 1.
273. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
274. The Washington Blade, Oct. 15, 1982, at 1.
275. Lambda Update, Nov. 1984, at I.
276. Dronenburg v. Zech, No. 81-0933 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file).
277. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (upholding a Virginia statute making it a criminal offense to
engage in private consensual homosexual conduct on the basis that the right to privacy extended
no further than to matters of marriage, procreation, or family life). Doe was most likely a decision
based on standing, but Bork dismissed that point. See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
278. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to privacy to unmarried couples and individ-
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Stanley v. Georgia.'" In discussing the line of Supreme Court privacy
cases Bork stated, "The Court has listed as illustrative of the right of
privacy such matters as activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships and child rearing and education. It
need hardly be said that none of these covers a right to homosexual
conduct.."'8 0 This remark parallels a similar remark made in Doe almost ten years earlier.2 a1 Bork declared that legislation may implement
morality and concluded, therefore, that the military regulation separating gay servicemembers had a rational relationship to a permissible
end.'8 2 Even if a rational relationship is demanded not to morality but
to some other legitimate purpose of the Navy, Bork concluded that
such a relationship still existed: "The effects of homosexual conduct
within a naval or military unit are almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline. The Navy is not requiredto produce social science
data or the results of controlled experiments to prove what common
sense and common experience demonstrate."8
Dronenburg requested that the case be reheard en banc. This request was denied."" However, four judges took the opportunity to take
exception to Bork's decision in the case. In particular, the four dissent8 They
ers stated that the emphasis placed on Doe was improper.
maintained that the decision in Doe was not determinative of the issue
of homosexual conduct under the rubric of a privacy right. Moreover,
they submitted that the footnote in Carey286 indicated that the question
was still open. Using the same criticism advanced by Judge Norris in
Belier, the four dissenters criticized the lack of analysis of the Navy's

uals by requiring access to contraceptives for both married and unmarried people).
279. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (recognizing constitutional protection for privacy in the home).
280. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396-97 (emphasis added).
281. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (1975) ("With no authoritative judicial bar to the proscription of homosexuality---since it is obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life-the next question is whether there is any ground for barring Virginia
from branding it as criminal."), affd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). With a lead-in like that, is it any
wonder that the answer to the question in Doe was no?!
282. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398.
283. Id. (emphasis added).
284. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
285. Id. at 1580 (Robinson, III, C.J., dissenting, joined by Wald, J., Mikva, J. & Edwards,

J.).
286. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977). As Justice Brennan
stated:
Appellees argue that the State's policy to discourage sexual activity of minors is itself
unconstitutional, for the reason that the right to privacy comprehends a right of minors as
well as adults to engage in private consensual sexual behavior. We observe that the Court
has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regarding such behavior among adults.
Id. See Dronenburg, 746 F.2d at 1580.
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justifications for the regulation:
There may be a rational basis for the Navy's policy of discharging all
homosexuals, but the panel opinion plainly does not describe it. The dangers hypothesized by the panel provide patently inadequate justification
for a ban on homosexuality in the Navy that includes personnel of both
87
sexes and places no parallel ban on all types of heterosexual conduct.
Furthermore, the dissenters argued that the case called for serious
equal protection analysis. The one judge who could have subjected the
case to a rigorous equal protection analysis chose strangely to deny the
en banc hearing on the basis of Doe. Ruth Bader Ginzberg, for years a
leading feminist litigator and champion of equal rights, voted with
Bork to deny an en banc hearing. 8 8 Dronenburg decided not to seek
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Dronenburg case has been the
subject of much discussion and analysis both in and out of the legal
world. 8 9 Dronenburg certainly is the capstone on a trend of cases
blocking categorically the participation of known gay people in the military. Until new regulations are added or until an extreme change occurs in the judiciary, a change seems unlikely.
For a short time, the case of Matthews v. Marsh 90° seemed to portend a loophole in the new regulations issued by the armed services to
implement Department of Defense Directive 1332.14. The case of Diane Matthews drew national attention.2" After high school, Diane
Matthews joined the Army. She earned a good conduct medal, a certificate of achievement, and a distinguished soldier's award before she
switched to the Army Reserves while going to college. She was a sergeant in the ROTC at the University of Maine when she inadvertently
became a "celebrity." When asked, Matthews told her superior she was
lesbian. She had sought permission to miss a drill to attend a student
government meeting where the funding for a gay student group was at
issue. After losing her position both in the Army Reserves and ROTC,
Matthews filed suit in federal court. The district court stated the issue
was: "Does a person's statement that she is homosexual constitutionally
justify exclusion from the Army's Reserve Officer's Training Corps

287. Dronenburg, 746 F.2d at 1581 (Robinson, 111, C.J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Ginsburg, J.).
289. See, e.g.. Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory, Practice, and Dronenburg v. Zech, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 767 (1985). Richard Saphire's
work appeared in the same volume as Part I of this article. See generally Symposium, The Legal
System and Homosexuality-Approbation,Accommodation, or Reprobation?, 10 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 445 (1985).
290. No. 82-0216P (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984), vacated, 755 F.2d 182 (lst Cir. 1985).
291. Keerdoja & Zabarsky, A Gay Soldier's Fight to Serve, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23, 1984, at
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program?" '2 9 Specifically, the court said that no actual homosexual behavior had been alleged or proven."' The case thus hinged on the constitutionality of the Army regulations which implemented the new Department of Defense Directive 1332.14.
The regulation required the separation of a person who "stated
that he/she is a homosexual," with homosexual defined as a person
"(1) who engages in, (2) desires to engage in, or (3) intends to engage
in homosexual acts."'" Matthews challenged the regulation as an infringement of her right to free speech.'" The court was not persuaded
by the Army's argument that no free speech issue was present. In particular, the court focused on the Army's justification for the regulations. Army witnesses admitted that "homosexuals can be effective
soldiers." Homosexual soldiers, admitted the Army, are only a threat to
the Army when they "come out."'" According to the court, the Army
made it clear that "what it seeks to prevent is the identification of homosexuality."'9 The court characterized Matthews' statement, "I am a
lesbian," as a statement of self-identification of a certain element of her
personality. 9 This statement was an "expression of what one stands
for." The court saw as important that Matthews' statement was elicited
while she was engaged in student political activity. The Army argued
that Matthews' speech was irrelevant, that she was disenrolled because
of what she was rather than for what she said. The statement for the
Army only proved her status. The court said that if that were so, then
Matthews was disenrolled for "unuttered intent or desire." Viewing her
situation either way, the court found a first amendment interest.'" The
court, however, also concluded that the military interest was to be accorded special deference. The issue, therefore, was to be resolved
through a balancing of military interests against first amendment interests. The military interest as reformulated by the court was "to eliminate the presence of persons who, by their statements, demonstrate a
propensity to engage in homosexual conduct."3 00 Thus, "with the goal
of eliminating homosexual propensity, the Army has prohibited the expression (or existence, if the Army's argument is accepted that statements are irrelevant) of desire or intent to engage in homosexual acts,

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Matthews, No. 82-0216P, slip op. at 1.
Id.
Army Reg. 135-175 (
I); 635-100 (
Id.
Matthews, No. 82-0216P, slip op. at 2.
Id., slip op. at 14.
Id.
Id., slip op. at 15.
Id., slip op. at 30.
Id., slip op. at -
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regardless of whether the desire or intent is ever consumated." 3 0 1 Why

is this expressed propensity forbidden? It is not a concern that homosexuals are poor soldiers. Indeed, the Army admitted that "homosexual
persons make fine soldiers and leaders so long as they are not known to
be homosexuals.

3 0°2

Rather, the Army's policy arises from its expressed

concern for the reaction of other personnel and potential recruits to the
presence of homosexuality. The Army, the court found, rejects gay
soldiers because of the belief that societal intolerance will be reflected
in peer behavior which will affect morale and discipline."'
As a result of the court's recognition that the case involved not
only the interests of Matthews and the Army, but also the interests of
the other soldiers, the issue involved was reformulated. The court
asked, "If as a result of Matthews' self identification other soldiers react as the Army fears they will, must the Army suffer the presence of
Matthews and deal directly with the reactions of others or may it exclude Matthews instead?" 304 The court concluded that the first amendment right of Matthews outweighed the Army's interest. The regulation was not narrowly drawn but was a prohibition at every time, in
every place, and under every circumstance. The prohibition was clearly
content-discrimination. If the Army's action was upheld, a particular
subject of expression would be eliminated from the vocabulary of servicemembers. Moreover, the Army sought to exclude persons "for even
harboring the thought or emotion, regardless of the expression.1' 3 01 In a

striking analogy, the court suggested that the Army, through discipline
and education, controls the reaction of others "[a]s it has done with
racial integration." ' 6 The district court ordered Matthews
reinstated.07
The Army appealed to the First Circuit.30 8 The decision was most
unusual. The court of appeals vacated the order of the lower court and
remanded in light of new evidence as to actual homosexual conduct.30,
After the district court's order to reinstate her, Matthews had reapplied. In the course of her processing, she indicated on her application
that she had engaged in homosexual conduct in the distant and recent
past. This application apparently was appended to the Army's appellate
brief. The court of appeals, in a very unusual decision, remanded be-

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id., slip op. at -.
Id., slip op. at -.
Id., slip op. at 25.
Id., slip op. at -.
Id., slip op. at -.
Id., slip op. at -.
Id., slip op. at 29.
Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182 (ist Cir. 1985).
Id. at 184.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/4

1986]

SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW

cause the proof of homosexual acts "might supply alternate grounds for
disenrollment. ' 3 10 The appellate court also noted that the trial court
had denied discovery regarding Matthews' sexual conduct. The appellate court questioned why such discovery had been denied, opining that
"Matthews' actual conduct would be highly relevant to the disposition
of this case."3 11 The court of appeals admitted that taking notice of
facts not in the record was ordinarily improper." 2 The court, however,
preferred to resolve the case on the grounds of actual conduct, "rather
than to undertake a review of the serious constitutional issues presented
. . ,"" The reasons the court gave for this unusual action were that
Matthews could not be reinstated and, therefore, any decision would be
31
a merely impermissible advisory opinion. '
15
The situation is similar to that which confronted Perry Watkins.
When Watkins was ordered reinstated by the district court, the Army
attempted to use the reenlistment process so that Watkins could be denied enlistment on a new set of facts.3 16 The district court in Watkins
labeled this maneuver as a ruse and ordered reinstatement, barring the
3 17
Apparently, the Army
issue of homosexuality as a ground for denial.
in Matthews used the same method. The application process for reenlistment was used to secure admissions of same-sex sexual conduct so
that the Army could get around the fact that Matthews had originally
been disenrolled for her statements or status. The court of appeals
"bought into" the Army's methodology. What had been a perfect test
case became problematical. The method used by the Army to get
around the Matthews issue had been predicted in the Military Law
Reporter.3 16 In a section entitled An Easy Way Around Matthews the

reporter stated:
Even though Matthews is only an East Coast district court's opinion...
its importance has been quickly dissipated. Service declarations of homosexuality, if contradicted by the enlistment application, are readily proceeded against under Chapter 14 [fraudulent enlistment] rather than
Chapter 13. The absence of a right to a hearing requires only that the
military find some preservice homosexual activity upon which it can base

310. Id. at 183.
311. Id.
312. Id. (citing Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 607 F.2d 1014, 1017 n.6 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980)).
313. Id. at 184.
314. Id.

315. See supra notes 232-55 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
317. Watkins, 551 F. Supp. at 224.
(PUB. L. EDUC. INST.) 1081 (July-Aug. 1984).
12 MIL L. REP.
318. See
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a reasonable finding of a fraudulent declaration.'"
In his opinion, Judge Hornby of the federal district court was extremely precise in his delineation of the issue as involving a nonconduct
situation. Moreover, his opinion was lengthy and carefully crafted. In
one sense, the appellate court essentially said, "You wasted your time;
go back and do it the easy way!"
For gay rights litigators, getting the proper issue before the proper
court with the best plaintiff and the best facts remains an elusive goal.
Perhaps Pruitt v. Weinbergers2 ° will be the case in which this goal is
realized. The attorneys for Pruitt include the ACLU of southern California. In the last two or three years, the ACLU has become more
active in gay rights litigation. Dusty Pruitt, the plaintiff, is also Captain Dusty Pruitt, United States Army Reserves and Reverend Dusty
Pruitt, pastor, Metropolitan Community Church. As a captain in the
Reserves, Pruitt was assigned for two weeks each year to the United
States Army Reserve Component Personnel Administrative Center in
St. Louis, Missouri. Captain Pruitt joined the Army in January, 1971,
served five years on active duty and served seven years in the Reserves.
In May, 1982, Captain Pruitt was promoted to major, effective February 6, 1983. However, a major she was not to be. On January 27, 1983,
the Los Angeles Times reported on her activities as a pastor of the
Metropolitan Community Church of Long Beach, California and on
her status as a lesbian. Her promotion to major was withdrawn and she
was told she had been investigated for possible separation on the basis
of homosexuality.32 1 Pruitt filed suit in federal district court.
The Army argued that the suit should be dismissed because Pruitt
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. a2
" Pruitt by stipulation
and by affidavit admitted she was a lesbian. She argues that using the
administrative methods of the Army would be futile because the policy
of the Army is clear and has no exceptions: gay people are required to
be separated. The Pruitt court attempts, as did the court in Matthews,
to bring a pure speech issue before the court. The Army disputes any

319. Id.
320. No. 83-2035 WPG (C.D. Cal. filed July 8, 1983).
321. Letter from Major Michael Brawley, Judge Advocate General's Corps, to Dusty Pruitt
(May 18, 1983). Major Brawley had been approved to "conduct a preliminary inquiry and report
...findings . . . on the question of whether [Pruitt was] a homosexual as defined by paragraph
2-38, AR 135-175 ..... Id.
322. The issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is often raised by the Armed
Forces. A defense to this claim is that exhaustion would be futile. Mel Dahl's case against the
Navy was dismissed by a district court in Chicago on the grounds that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The dismissal was on November 2, 1984, and the issue still lays before
the Board for Corrections of Naval Records as of May 8, 1985. Letter from Joseph Shuman,
Dahl's attorney, to Rhonda Rivera (_).
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first amendment issue by contending that speech and thought are conduct which permit separation of gay persons from the armed services.
In some ways, the issues are a replay of Matthews in a different arena.
The added twist is that the location is California. Pruitt, in her Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,) argues that her remarks
are protected speech in its purest form. "Coming out of the closet" has
been held in California to be political speech.324 Pruitt argues that this
political speech will be chilled if the Army can continue to separate
soldiers for homosexual tendencies, rather than for conduct. This argument seems particularly apropos given the Army's testimony in Matthews that self-identification is what it wishes to prevent.
In support of her position, Pruitt's brief quotes at length from the
infamous Crittenden Report, using the Navy's report to undermine the
Army's arguments. Pruitt also asks the court to consider that the regulation impinges on a fundamental right and thus requires the application of a compelling state interest standard. Pruitt asks the court to
reexamine the Belier issues and opt for the dissenting argument of
Judge Norris. Pruitt calls the policy of the Department of Defense "a
policy without empirical foundation, rooted without shame, in historical
bigotry." The brief delineates the varying and contradictory positions
taken over time against gay people in the military and cites the military's own studies to refute the positions taken in various cases.3 2 8 The
argument is impressive but whether the district court will "buck" the
current trend remains to be seen.
Two issues are raised by Pruitt that need to be examined before
the subject is exhausted. First, some discussion of the Crittenden Report and other military studies is needed. Additionally, Pruitt raises the
issue that gay talent in the military is being squandered. The extent of
that "squandering" merits some attention.
Over the past ten years, as I have written in this area, I have
heard reports of a military study which had conclusions contrary to the
military's announced policy. Now, under the Freedom of Information
Act, gay rights litigators have obtained at least part of the Crittenden
Report, a Navy report dating back to 1957.326 The report is also used
by the plaintiffs in the case of High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial

323. Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 35, Pruitt v. Weinberger, No. 83-2035
WPG (C.D. Cal. filed July 8, 1983).
324. See Gay Law Student Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592,
156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
325. Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 47-49. Pruitt v. Weinberger, No. 832035 WPG (C.D. Cal. filed July 8. 1983).
REPORT, supra note 40.
326. CRITTENDEN
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Security Clearance Office 2 7 and also is used extensively in the Pruitt
briefs. The report is fascinating and amazingly open-minded considering that the time of its origin was 1957.828 One conclusion of the Crittenden Report was that "it is not considered to be in the best interest of
the Military departments to liberalize standards ahead of the civilian
climate. 3 29 Yet, when the report was written, not one state had
decriminalized same-sex sexual conduct; at present, twenty-six states
have. The Crittenden Report, written in the 1950's, the years of McCarthy and communist "witch-hunts," found no data to prove or disprove that gay people were more of a security risk than nongay persons.
The report even cited to information about gay long-term monogamous
3 30
relationships.
Probably one of the most telling pieces of information in the report
is the recognition of the frequency of homosexual behavior in the general population and the recognition that only a small percentage of the
homosexual military personnel is ever recognized and discharged. The
drafters of the report accepted the Kinsey figures. The report also listed
"fallacies concerning homosexuality," including that gay people are
recognizable from exterior appearance and mannerisms. The report
candidly admits that one fallacy is that homosexual individuals cannot
acceptably serve in the military. Another section to the report is entitled Deficiencies of Knowledge; the report again admits to the lack of
information in 1957. Interested parties should read the report. One
must ask how the Armed Forces in good faith have made and still
make statements before the courts about gay persons which are contrary to the military's own Crittenden Report. One other military writing cannot be ignored. In 1960, over twenty-five years ago, in the JAG
bulletin of the Air Force, a member of the bar working for the Air
Force wrote: "[T]he service record of homosexuals disclose generally
that homosexuality per se has no relationship to ability to perform good
military service." s1
When one looks at the cases on a case-by-case review, the harshness of the results on the individual is manifest. That case-by-case re-

327. See Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, High Tech Gays
v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, No. C-84-6078 TEH (N.D. Cal. filed
Feb. 16, 1985). See
also supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
328. In the 1950's, "in the atmosphere of heightened concern about national security, the
military . . . worked overtime to purge homosexuals." J.D'EMoLIO, supra note 19, at 44. During
the late-1940's discharges for homosexuality averaged slightly more than 1,000 per year. Separations averaged 2,000 per year in the early 1950's and rose by another 50% by the beginning of the
1960's. See id.
329. See CRITTENDEN REPORT, supra note 40.
330. See id.
331. 11 USAF. J.A.G. BULL., Nov. 1960, at 20.
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view, while illustrative, can obscure the magnitude of the issue. Before
October, 1984, the exact number of gays discharged was difficult to
ascertain. D'Emilio estimated in his history that 40,000 to 50,000 persons were separated from the armed services for homosexuality between 1950 and 1970.332 Another estimate was 2400 per year in the
1950's and 1960's. 3 In 1978-79, the Navy admitted releasing seventysix women and 778 men.33" Given the percentage of women in the serin
vice, the proportion of women released seems greater. The Navy,
33 5
officers.
twelve
including
persons,
1067
released
1983,
year
fiscal
These piecemeal statistics became outdated in October, 1984,
when the Government Accounting Office (GAO) completed a study of
the military release of gay service members.3 36 The report revealed that
between 1974 and 1983, 14,111 persons were discharged from the military for homosexuality. These figures may still be low and inaccurate
because gays are often discharged for other reasons than are given. The
ten-year record shows a steady increase over the period. The report
indicated that over fifty percent of the discharges were from the Navy.
Of the number reported discharged, 191 were officers. Of more interest
to pragmatists are the figures on the cost to the military and, ultimately to the taxpayer, of the military's policy against gays. The GAO
estimate is that twenty-three million dollars is wasted each year because of the policy. Each year the cost of recruiting and training the
approximately 1800 persons who will ultimately be discharged is approximately twenty-two and a half million dollars. The cost of processing the discharges each year is approximately $370,000. The study
showed that the average recruit stays in the service after training for
over five years, while the gay servicemembers average only three years.
Thus, for the money spent on training, the services get less productivity
from gay soldiers and sailors because they are discharged. In addition,
the twenty-three million dollar figure does not include other costs of the
military policy such as all the attorney fees paid to fight legal challenges nor does it include the cost of the investigations into alleged homosexuality. Whatever one may think of the policy of separating gay
servicemembers, one can only wonder at the waste that results. Consider the cost of discharging 14,311 persons whom the Army admits
332. See J. D'EMIL1O, supra note 19, at 40-53.
333. Gay Community News, Dec. 7, 1983, at 1. Figures quoted were in a story about Commander Vanderwier, a decorated Vietnam veteran, who was convicted of sodomy in 1983, ordered
dismissed from the Navy, and stripped of his retirement benefits.
334. Columbus Citizen-Journal, Aug. 1, 1980, at 9.
335. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1983, at 13.
336. See National Gay Rights Association Newsletter, Spring 1985, at I; For The Record:
A Review of Gay & Lesbian News for the Period Ending Nov. 2. 1984, The Advocate, Nov. 27,
1984, at 3.
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are quite capable of carrying out their military duties and who are no
more likely to be security risks than are any other group.
III.
A.

FAMILY LAW ISSUES

Marriage

For a number of years, gay persons have attempted to "marry" or
seek the legal sanction of their union from the state. In each and every
case where this issue has been tested, marriages between persons of the
same sex have been declared impermissible or invalid.3 37 Most of the
cases involving the marriage issue arose in the early 1970's. Since
1980, when the attorney general of Connecticut issued a formal opinion
letter on the subject, 38 few published cases or official actions have
come to light.339 However, this area of the law is not totally devoid of
judicial activity.
Irwin v. Lupardus3" was decided by the Ohio Court of Appeals
for the Eighth District in 1980. Two women filed a divorce action alleging a common law marriage. They listed a second cause of action: that
the parties had contracted toward each other an obligation of mutual
respect and support and mutual ownership of assets, and that this contract had been breached. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure
to state a cause of action and the appeals court affirmed.34 1 Not surprisingly, the court found that marriage is, by definition, a heterosexual
relationship.3 42 The court found that no violation of the equal protection clause followed because the purpose of marriage was the perpetuation of family groups and that capacity was lacking in same-sex relationships3 43 The court also dismissed the contract action saying that
the parties could not do indirectly what they could not do directly.34"
The case illustrates a growing legal problem: The lack of a legally
337.
338.

See Rivera II, supra note 1, at 324-25; Rivera 1, supra note 1, at 874-75.
See Letter from Carl J. Ajello, Connecticut Attorney General, to the commissioner of

the Connecticut Department of Health Services (June 17, 1980). See also Connecticut Defines
"Marriage" to Exclude Same Sex Couples, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2737 (Sept. 12, 1980) (con-

taining text of opinion letter).
339. A number of articles, however, have appeared or have been discovered on the subject
since Rivera II, supra note 1. See Ingram, A Constitutional Critique ofRestrictions on the Right
to Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George--or Mary and Alice at the Same Time?, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 33 (1984); Lentz, Marriage Rights: Homosexuals and Transsexuals, 8 AKRON L. REV.
369 (1975); Comment, ConstitutionalAspects of the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage License,

12 J. FAM. L. 607 (1972-73).
340. No. 78-D-97925 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. June 26, 1980) (on file with University of
Dayton Law Review).

341.
342.
343.
344.

Id., slip op. at 5.
Id., slip op. at 3.
Id., slip op. at 4.
Id.
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sanctioned method for gay couples to divorce or otherwise terminate
their relationship.
In De Santo v. Barnsley,3 ' 5 a male couple sought a divorce and
alleged a common law marriage under Pennsylvania law. Their argument was not based on a statute as in Irwin.4 6 The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the ruling of the lower court to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action.1 4 However, unlike the Ohio court, the Pennsylvania court indicated that the parties may have had a remedy under
Pennsylvania law.4 ' The court specifically pointed out that the law did
take into account changes in social relationships and directed the litigants to Knauer v. Knauer.'" Under Knauer, agreements between nonmarried cohabitors were recognized in Pennsylvania. Therefore, Pennsylvania may provide a remedy in contract for divorcing gay couples.
For numerous gay couples, the issue no longer centers on obtaining
a traditional marriage recognized by the state. Many gay couples now
have a religious ceremony which they understand has no legal validity.35 0 Most gay couples do not seek marriage but seek equal economic
benefits for their relationship. Some seek equality through law reform,3 5 ' others through private contracting.352 For whatever reason, the
legality of gay marriages has ceased to be as great an issue in the
1980's. Of greater concern is the legal issue regarding the creation and
recognition of the gay family. 353
B.

Divorce

Gay persons have, for a variety of reasons, "married" persons of
the opposite sex. In some cases, gay persons may not have reached a
consciousness of their sexual orientation, or they may have been striving to accommodate themselves to the social norm. Such persons may
enter the marriage with the belief that marriage will "cure" them.

345. 328 Pa. Super. 181, 476 A.2d 952 (1984).
346. In Irwin, the Ohio statute provided: "Male persons of the age of eighteen years, and
female persons of the age of sixteen, not nearer of kin than second cousins, and not having a
husband or wife living, may be joined in marriage." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Page
1980). The Irwin court defined "marriage" in its traditional sense as only including heterosexual
relationships. Irwin, No. 78-D-97925, slip op. at 2-3.
347. De Santo, 328 Pa. Super. at 181, 476 A.2d at 952.
476 A.2d at 955.
348. Id. at 349. 323 Pa. Super. 206, 470 A.2d 553 (1983). In Knauer, the court held that "agreements
between nonmarried cohabitors fail only to the extent that they involve payment for sexual ser470 A.2d at 564.
vice." Id. at -,
350. See infra notes 635-37 and accompanying text.
351. See infra note 631 and accompanying text for a discussion on domestic partnership
laws.
352. See Schultz, Contractual Ordering On Family Law, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204 (1982).
353. See infra notes 629-815 and accompanying text.
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Probably fewer gay people enter traditional marriage today than they
did five or ten years ago, however, the number is still sizeable.
Whatever the reasons for such a marriage, many of these marriages end in divorce. In the past, courts and judges found application
of the traditional fault-based grounds to the issue of sexual orientation
and divorce a difficult task. In no jurisdiction was homosexuality itself
grounds for divorce. Rather, the courts granted divorces by characterizing the gay partner's behavior as involving "cruelty." In some cases,
however, the courts were unable to accommodate the situation and
failed to grant the divorce.35 4 Two cases illustrate a more modern approach to sexual orientation as an issue in divorce. In 1978, a Louisiana
court of appeal treated mixed-sex and same-sex adultery on an equal
basis. In Adams v. Adams, 3 55 where the wife had engaged in a lesbian
affair while married, the court held that the same standards of proof
applied to adultery regardless of the sex of the partner.3 56 While that
approach may be modern, the court was rather modest in the description of the adultery. The court indicated that a lesbian adulterous affair
had gone on but stated that the "several incidents . . . need not be
detailed. ' "5 7 The lesbian affair was found by the court to constitute
35 8
cruel treatment sufficient to entitle the husband to a legal separation.
M. V. R. v. T. M. R.,3 5 1 a 1982 New York case, carried the issue
to the next logical step by addressing the issue of marital fault. In M.
V. R., the court held that an extramarital same-sex affair, like a mixedsex one, could be grounds for divorce based on adultery. s6 This holding
can be compared to Cohen v. Cohen,3 61 another New York case decided
in 1951. In Cohen the wife sought a divorce based on adultery; she
offered as proof her husband's conviction for sodomy. The court refused
to grant her a divorce holding that sodomy did not constitute adultery.36 2 The court in M. V. R., however, showed a surprising sensitivity
to gay issues. The central issue of the case was whether marital fault
could be considered in determining an equitable distribution of property. The court held that fault could not be used because it would open
"the door to evidence whose very purpose may be to prejudice judges in
impermissible ways."36 3 Justice Glen pointed out that such evidence

354.
355.
356.

See Rivera II, supra note 1, at 325; Rivera I, supra note 1, at 879-83.
357 S.2d 881 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 882.

357. Id. at 883.
358. Id. at 88243.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

115 Misc. 2d 674, 454 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
Id. at 681-83, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 78445.
200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
Id. at 20, 103 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
M. V. R., 115 Misc. 2d at 680, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (footnote omitted).
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would be particularly susceptible to bias in cases involving gay persons. 3 ' The justice admitted that "judges themselves are frequently not
free from anti-homosexual preferences .... "365 The court concluded
that if evidence of fault were allowed the husband might be punished
indirectly for his sexual orientation, an action which the highest court
in New York stated could not be done directly. 6 6
Divorce issues seldom reach appellate levels because of their factintensive nature. With divorce easily accomplished, and fault a declining problem, divorce law has few gay issues. 67 However, child custody
problems, a by-product of divorce, remain a crucial gay litigation
a"
issue 3

C.

Custody

Cases involving the custody of children of gay parents are among
the most numerous of gay rights cases.3 6' Such cases involve three different sets of protagonists: gay parent versus nongay parent, gay parent
versus nongay third party, and gay parent versus the state. Gay parent
versus nongay parent usually arises in the context of a divorce. Gay
parent versus nongay third party embraces a variety of situations including cases involving grandparents, aunts and uncles, guardians, and
others. Gay parent versus the state typically arises in instances where

364. Id. at 680-83, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 783-84.
365. Id. at 681, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
366. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980)
(New York statute criminalizing sodomy was found unconstitutional), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981). The use of Onofre in this context shows how removal of the criminal status carries over
into other areas of the law.
367. In 1982, a California superior court ruled that a surgeon must continue paying alimony of $700 per month to his ex-wife even though she was living in a long-term lesbian relationship. The Advocate, June 10, 1982, at 3. Generally, alimony payments cease when a former
spouse remarries. This situation is an instance where recognition of a gay marriage would benefit
heterosexual marriage policy. See Comment, Alimony, Cohabitation,and the Wages of Sin: A
Statutory Analysis, 33 ALA. L. REV. 577 (1982).
368. See infra notes 369-627 and accompanying text.
369. The generalizations found in the nine paragraphs that follow are supported by material
found in the following authorities: Bagnell, Gallagher & Goldstein, Burdens on Gay Litigants and
Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic,Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497 (1984); Brownstone, The Homosexual Parent in Custody Disputes, 5
QUEENS LJ. 199 (1980); Clemens, In the "Best Interests of the Child" and the Lesbian Mother:
A Proposalfor Legislative Change in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 1021 (1984); Goodman, Homosexuality of a Parent: A New Issue in Custody Disputes, 5 MONASH U.L. REV. 305 (1979);
Gottsfield, Custody Litigation: Private Lives, Public Issues, 6 FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1984, at 36;
Leitch, Custody: Lesbian Mothers in the Courts, 16 GONz. L. REV. 147 (1980); Rivera 1I, supra
note 1,at 327-36; Rivera I, supra note 1, at 883-904; Wilson, Homosexuality and Child Custody: A Judicial Paradox, 10 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REv. 222 (1985); Recent Developments,
Lesbian Child Custody, 6 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 183 (1983); Annot., 100 A.L.R. 3d 625 (1980);

Annot. Bibliography, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children, LESBIAN
(available at 1370 Mission St., 4th Floor, San Francisco. Cal. 94103).
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neglect has been charged. The gay parent is usually a lesbian mother,
although gay father cases are now arising with greater frequency.3 70
Custody cases are most often tried in courts of domestic relations
or in juvenile courts. Generally, they are bench trials; the most wellknown exception is in Texas where jury trials are commonly used. The
rules of law which guide a judge in selecting a custodian are very
broad, and the judge is permitted an extreme amount of discretion.
Probably in no other area is the presence of a homophobic judge so
likely to result in a decision which is discriminatory to the gay litigant.
In cases involving an initial award of custody, the general rule is
''
that the decision should be made "in the best interests of the child."
In a growing number of states, judges have been given precise issues
which they must consider in identifying the child's "best interests." '
A different standard is used in some custody cases after an original
order has already been entered. Thus, when the issue is of first impression, the court must apply the "best interests" test. If custody has already been granted to one parent, and a change of custody is sought, a
higher standard is mandated. In that case, the person seeking custody
must first show that a change of circumstances has occurred which affects the child's custodial situation. Once that change has been proven,
the court then considers the best interests of the child or children. In
gay custody cases, the circumstance most often alleged to have changed
is the sexual orientation of the custodial parent. Often, the sexual orientation of the parent has not really changed; the other parent has just
discovered that the former spouse is gay. Quite often, when the nongay
parent has known for some time about the sexual orientation of the coparent, the gay parent has sought unsuccessfully to estop the nongay
parent from raising the issue. Courts have rejected such estoppel arguments saying that since the sexual orientation was not initially made
known to the court, then a sufficient change of circumstances exists,
regardless of whether the other parent had previous knowledge. Custody orders are always open to challenge, and such orders are particularly open to challenge in cases where one parent is gay.

370. Fadiman, The Double Closet, LIFE, May 1983, at 76.
371. See Rivera I, supra note 1, at 886.
372. For example, the Ohio Revised Code provides that the following "relevant factors"
shall be considered in determining the best interests of a child:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents regarding his custody;
(2) The wishes of the child regarding his custody if he is eleven years of age or older;
(3) The child's interaction and interrelationship with his parents, siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
(5) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C)(1)-(5).
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Custody cases are fact intensive. As indicated earlier, the standards are vague, and great discretion resides in the trial judge to determine, in every particular set of facts, what are the best interests of the
child or children. Because such cases are so fact intensive, appeal is
difficult and success on appeal is unlikely. Few issues of law really exist, and appellate courts are loathe to overturn lower court decisions
unless a "gross abuse of discretion" is shown. Convincing an appellate
court that a "gross abuse of discretion" has occurred is difficult in the
ordinary custody case and is particularly difficult in a gay custody case.
Often litigators will have raised constitutional issues on behalf of their
gay clients at the trial level where such issues are generally ignored or
summarily dismissed. These issues do not fare any better at the appellate level. Often the gay parent will claim a first amendment infringement or a privacy claim, but in custody cases appellate courts generally
brush such constitutional issues aside. Therefore, the original trial becomes the battleground where the war is won or lost.
Gay parents are often denied custody. The reasons given boil down
to a few arguments: if gay parents have custody, they will molest the
children; if gay parents have custody, they will turn the children into
homosexuals; if gay parents have custody, they will perform sex acts in
front of the children; if gay parents have custody, the children will be
harmed because of the immoral environment. Often those parents who
are allowed to retain custody of their children do so under severe courtimposed restrictions. The most common restriction is that the gay parent's life partner may not reside in the home with the parent and the
child. The gay parent is thus forced to choose between his or her child
and an adult relationship. When gay parents lose custody, their visitation rights are also often restricted. Commonly, gay parents are forbidden from keeping their children overnight, bringing the children into
the gay parent's home unless the gay parent's life partner is excluded,
and are not allowed to take the child to a gay religious service, gay
political meeting, or any other location where the child may be around
"known" homosexuals. In some highly restrictive cases, the gay parents
may only visit their children in the presence of "certified
heterosexuals."
The number of child custody cases that have turned on the sexual
orientation of the parent is not known. Most child custody cases, regardless of the issue, never go beyond the trial level. Taking an appeal
is difficult, expensive, and usually fruitless. A good number of the cases
discussed in this section were decided on the trial level. In a sense, such
cases may be more representative of trends than would be appellate
cases. Gathering material on gay cases is made more difficult by the
use of anonymous names for the parents involved and by the penchant
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for sealing records that is often indulged in by the judiciary.
The state of the law in this area is difficult to summarize because
the cases are often state-idiosyncratic and within a state, judge-idiosyncratic. Aside from the broad rule of the best interests of the child, few
legal rules can be stated. In the gay area, the basic rule which has
developed is that homosexuality per se is not a sufficient reason to bar a
person from custody or visitation. However, even courts which claim to
adhere to that rule are often, upon close examination, found to have
made the parent's sexual orientation the deciding factor. The rule favored by gay rights litigators is a "nexus" test: the homosexuality of a
parent should only be an issue insofar as the parent's sexual orientation
can be proven to have harmed the child. The application of the "nexus"
test is problematic in those states that do not statutorily require a
showing of present harm but rather base the decision on the potentiality of future harm to the child. Where gay parents have shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that no present harm exists, judges have
shown a strong tendency for speculating as to potential harm.
In response to the multitude of adverse decisions against gay parents, a litigation strategy and methodology have developed. Also, supportive social scientists have undertaken numerous studies to ascertain
if any of the accusations against gay persons as parents have a rational
basis. Some of these litigation strategies and studies will be discussed
at great length through the remainder of this article.
1. Pre-Eighties Cases
In this author's previous articles, approximately forty-five cases involving custody were reported between the years 1947 and 1980, with
over forty of the discussed cases falling between 1970 and 1980.'7' This
chapter will chronicle more than fifty additional cases in this area. 37

373.

Rivera, Book Review, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 391 (1984) (reviewing J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL

POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES:

THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED

STATES. 1940n 1970 (1983)). In this book review, the author compares legal events with the socio-

economic observations made by D'Emilio, and analyzes the type of cases appearing in a particular
historical period.
Note that the use of the word "reported" in the instant article refers to cases discussed in this
article and in Rivera I and Rivera 11, many of which are unpublished cases. Discovering case
information is an arduous process. Often, the first clue is provided by a small gay newspaper
article which may indicate only a state name or possibly one or more of the parties' initials. The
possibility that the case involves gay people is sometimes only an inference. Next, we write or call
the known or logically deducible court, organization, or attorney. Some of the information gathered at this stage is helpful and correct; some is not. In some instances, we have to make several
contacts before finding useful and accurate information. When possible, we obtain pleadings,
briefs, and unpublished decisions. While this chapter represents the addition of over 50 cases to
prior efforts, more than 25 cases are still in the throes of the investigation process described above.
374. A number of cases that mention homosexuality and have some relationship to child
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/4
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Improved research techniques, combined with even greater diligence,
have turned up a variety of cases, including thirteen which were decided prior to 1980. These older, but newly found cases, illustrate many
of the general statements made above as well as in my previous articles. For example, in the very early cases and continuing in some instances into the present, judges, in their written opinions, either made
no direct reference to the sexual orientation of the parent or cloaked
their references in euphemisms. 7 In the case of In re Mara,a7 6 decided
in 1956, the mother was permitted to keep custody of her children,
because "[tihe questionable, if not unwholesome influence in the home
[had] been removed at the court's request . . . ."- The unwholesome
influence was a female friend of the mother's who boarded at the
mother's home. Similarly, in Thabet v. Thabet, 7 8 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in 1970 awarded custody of the children to
their father because the mother was "still interested in pursuing a
course of activity that would not be conducive to having . . . custody

custody matters are not really gay custody cases. See, e.g., Mathews v. Mathews, 428 So. 2d 51
(Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (wife accused of homosexual conduct); Greening v. Newman, 6 Ark. App.
261, 640 S.W.2d 463 (1982) (past homosexual acts mentioned); Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App.
2d 166, 303 P.2d 839 (1957) (trial court transcript quoted regarding a second husband's "marginal" homosexuality); Campi v. State, 392 So. 2d 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (allegation that
children stayed overnight in a homosexual's home); Sweet v. White, i04 III. App. 3d 734, 432
N.E.2d 1098 (1982) (wife testified that husband had been given only daylight visitation hours in
divorce decree because he had homosexual tendencies); Gray v. Gray, 57 Ii. App. 3d 734, 373
N.E.2d 317 (1978) (wife accused husband of being a gangster and a homosexual); Comisky v.
Comisky, 48 III. App. 3d 17, 366 N.E.2d 87 (1977) (father accused daughter of being a lesbian);
App. 3d 479, 317 N.E.2d 681 (1974) (mother lost
Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill.
custody because of unconventional lifestyle, including "that she possibly had friends who were
_ 448
Ind. App.
homosexuals and may have been one herself"); Shanholt v. State, N.E.2d 308 (1983) (admissibility of evidence pertaining to homosexual activity an issue); Salas v.
447 N.E.2d 1176 (1983) (wife accused of having had a lesbian
Ind. App. _
Salas, relationship); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 420 A.2d 940 (1980)
(allegation of premarital homosexual act by father seeking custody mentioned in midst of grievance suit against attorney), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981); Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 245
S.E.2d 612 (1978) (one of the parents alleged to have homosexual friends in New York City).
375. Gay and lesbian invisibility has proved both a blessing and a curse: a fleeting blessing
for those who must secret their gayness and a curse for the development of a gay movement and
the achievement of civil rights. As one writer observed:
A decision to participate in the movement implied that individuals had rejected, at least in
part, the society's dominant attitude toward same-sex eroticism. But antihomosexualism
pervaded American culture, and it infected the consciousness of gay men and women no
less than heterosexuals . . . .Such a self-image would hardly propel men and women into
a cause that required group solidarity and the affirmation of their sexuality, nor would it
encourage them to entertain the idea that their efforts might create a brighter future.
J.D'EMi11o, supra note 19, at 124.
376. 3 Misc. 2d 174, 150 N.Y.S.2d 524 (Fam. Ct. 1956).
377. Id. at 175, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
378. 154 W. Va. 477. 176 S.E.2d 687 (1970).
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. "I" The court never stated that the mother was a lesbian but did
discuss her "'frequent and extended visits with her friends and acquaintances of the female sex.' "380 While the Thabet court was reluctant to label the mother, the trial court in Roberts v. Roberts 8 1 stated
clearly in its findings of fact that the mother was a lesbian."' This case
involved a gay parent versus a third party. The custody of the child was
sought by an aunt and maternal uncle of the mother. The court stated
two conclusions about the mother: she was a lesbian, and she did not
keep a fit and proper home. 83 This case falls in the irrebutable presumption category: because the parent is gay, he or she is conclusively
unfit. The custody went to the aunt and uncle who had "a suitable
home and were financially able" to care for the little girl.
In Gay v. Gay,3 84 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a lower
court opinion which had placed a child with a children's services
agency rather than with the mother or father. The court of appeals
noted that the father was clearly unfit but stated that the evidence
about the mother's alleged homosexuality was all hearsay from the father and paternal grandmother, both of whom had a stake in the outcome. The case was hardly a gay rights victory as the mother denied
that any lesbian relationship ever existed. The appellate court put aside
evidence of past behavior and awarded the child to the mother, emphasizing that no "present" unfitness existed.3 88 In Buck v. Buck,"' decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1977, another mother was
awarded custody. The supreme court held that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion when he awarded custody to the mother who admitted to past homosexual relationships and still had homosexual
friends.3 87 Perhaps, gallantry is not dead in Georgia, as a lady's word
was believed in both Buck and Gay.
Fleischer v. Fleischer 8 8 illustrates an extreme imposition of visitation restrictions against the gay parent. The lesbian mother in this case
.

379. Id. at 484, 176 S.E.2d at 691.
380. Id. at 479, 176 S.E.2d at 688.
381. 25 N.C. App. 198, 212 S.E.2d 410 (1975).
382. Id. at 201, 212 S.E.2d at 412.
383. Id.
384. 149 Ga. App. 173, 253 S.E.2d 846 (1979). Honest, that's the case name!
385. Id. at 175, 253 S.E.2d at 848. Note that although the case began as a divorce between
a mother and father, the children's services agency seemed to have intervened. Therefore, the
standard used was not the "best interests" standard but rather, it was the "fitness of the parent"
standard. What the court may have really decided was that the mother was the lesser of two evils
and that a natural parent, even a gay one, was a better option than an institution, the children's
services agency.
386. 238 Ga. 540, 233 S.E.2d 792 (1977).
387. Id. at 541, 233 S.E.2d at 793.
388. 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2044 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings County Nov. 25, 1975).
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was forbidden to visit with her daughter for three years. Three psychiatrists, including the mother's, indicated that seeing her mother would
be detrimental to the child's growth and development. The judge conducted extensive in camera discussions with the eight-year-old girl and
concluded that the child knew of her mother's lifestyle and was adversely affected by that knowledge. 3s9 The judge drew his conclusion in
part from the child's reluctance to discuss with him her dislike of her
mother. 3"
Two Pennsylvania cases involving visitation rights in the late
1970's also reveal findings against the gay parent. In Gerhart v. Gerhart,39 1 a nongay father was awarded custody rather than his former
wife. The trial court refused to believe the mother's statement that her
prior gay relationship had ended, citing as evidence, among other
things, a tatoo of her lover's name on the mother's arm. The court
found that the mother's irresponsibility was "compounded by her lesbianism." 3 92 The order did not mention any visitation for the mother. A
year later, in Scarlett v. Scarlett, 3 9 3 a mother challenged that the lower
court erred in too severely limiting her hours of visitation. While the
appeals court increased the mother's visitation times, the court left
standing a restriction that the mother "refrain 'from exposing Amy to
any improper influences, particularly her lesbian lover.' "894 As in Gerhart, the court did not place credence in the mother's statement that
the same-sex relationship was over. The court said that visitation,
under Pennsylvania case law, can only be restricted "where a parent
has been shown to suffer from severe mental or moral deficiencies that
3 No evidence was cited to
constituted a grave threat to the child." '-1
support the inference that the mother's "moral deficiences" constituted
a grave threat to the child. The court simply assumed that homosexuality was a moral deficiency.
A similar moral judgment is found in Teepe v. Teepe. 3 "e This is
one of the few cases where the father is the person associated with
homosexuality. The appellate court upheld the award of the child to
the mother by the trial court and concluded that the trial court had not
decided the case solely on the issue of sexual orientation. 39 Sexual misconduct which "affects the child" may be considered, the court

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id.
Id.
No. 535 (Pa. C.P. Ct., Lehigh County Dec. 22, 1976).
Id., slip op. at 4.
257 Pa. Super. 468, 390 A.2d 1331 (1978).
Id. at -,
390 A.2d at 1333.
Id.
271 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1978).
Id. at 744.
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stated;398 however, "immoral acts alone do not necessarily make a person unfit for custody of his or her children." 3 99 The appellate court held
that the trial court had properly considered the father's immoral acts
as one of several factors. Thus, in Teepe, as in Gerhart, the court
equated homosexuality with immorality and assumed an adverse effect
on the child. In Armanini v. Armanini, 0 0 a somewhat similar rule produced a different result. In Armanini, the court held that the mother's
sexual preference, by itself, did not make her unfit and awarded custody to the mother who was living with her life partner. 01 The New
York court did not use the term immorality. No ostensible restrictions
were placed on the mother. However, the court said it would review the
situation in three months to see whether the mother's lesbianism was
"interfering" with proper child rearing. In the mother's favor were recommendations by two social service agencies that she be named
custodian.
In the next three cases, all resolved at the trial court level in different parts of the country, custody remained with the lesbian mother.
In all three cases, the trier of fact found no harm to the children from
the sexual orientation of their mothers. The mother retained custody in
02 a Minnesota
Unglaub v. Unglaub,1
case decided in 1978. She was
described as an excellent mother. The case did not put the judge to the
ultimate test because, although the mother affirmed that she was indeed gay, she was not living with another gay person. In Prezbindowski
v. Prezbindowski,0 3 decided in Washington in 1976, the father
charged that the sexual orientation of the mother created a greater
harm than would a change of custody. The court disagreed, saying that
the only advantage of a custody change would be to remove the children from daily contact with their gay mother. Since the court could
not find any harm resulting from the mother's sexual orientation, custody was not changed. The mother was living with her life partner,
whom the court characterized as a good influence on the home. The
court also relied on psychiatric evidence that children will not become
gay simply because they are raised by a gay parent."0 The Peterson v.
Peterson40 5 case from Colorado, decided in 1978, probably comes as
close to an ideal approach to the custody issue as this author has seen.

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id. at 743-44.
Id.
5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2501 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Nassau County Feb. 16, 1979).
Id.
No. 62380 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Dist. May 31, 1982).
No. 19028 (Wash. Super. Ct., Franklin County Sept. 9, 1976).
Id., slip op. at 3.
No. D-66634 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County May 3, 1978).
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The court acknowledged that the children would either live with one
couple, the father and his new wife, or the other couple, the mother
and her life partner. Both parents were found to be fit and both partners loved and were loved by the children. The rule in Colorado, the
court stated, is not to consider conduct of a party that does not affect
his or her relationship to the child. Other than the designation of the
couples, which clearly points out that one couple is a same-sex couple,
and the one line reference to parental conduct, the judge made no reference to the sexual orientation of the mother. Basically, this court
treated the issue as irrelevant.
2.

The Eighties Cases

We shall now turn to an examination of the cases of the 1980's.
Instead of looking at the cases chronologically, we will examine them
geographically. My thesis is that the courts are currently more
homophobic in the central and southern regions of the United States
than they are nearer the east and west coasts. Why should this be so?
Gay consciousness has been elevated on the coasts since the 1970's;
that consciousness is only today penetrating the center of America. Gay
parents have been challenging and educating the courts and the bar on
the east and west coasts for over a decade. Those courts have domesticated the issue of gay parents much further than their central and
southern counterparts. The losses of the 1970's on the coasts are the
groundwork for the victories of the eighties. The losses of the 1980's in
the central and southern states are the forerunners for the cases of the
1990's.
The first three cases to be examined are from Missouri. No other
grouping of cases so clearly reveals a hostile attitude on the part of the
bench. N. K. M. v. L. E. M.40 6 was decided by the Missouri Court of
Appeals in August, 1980. In the original hearing, the lesbian mother
received custody of the daughter with harsh restrictions, namely that
the mother discontinue her relationship with "Betty" and that the
daughter not be allowed any contact with the mother's "friend." Later,
the father sought and was granted a change of custody to him because
the mother allegedly had not abided by the restrictions. On appeal, the
mother contended unsuccessfully that the restrictions were unreasonable and invalid. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision,
leaving custody with the father. 4" The analysis used by the court is
instructive.
First, the appellate court analogized the restrictions on the

406.

606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).

182.
407. Id.
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mother's friend to restrictions on a "habitual criminal, . . . sexual pervert, or a known drug pusher."'" 8 Second, the appellate court spent a
large portion of the opinion discussing the mother's relationship and the
character of the "friend." In a very stereotypic manner the appellate
court decided that the mother was "quite passive and subservient in her
relation to Betty, while Betty occupies a dominant role."' 09 Third, the
court described the mother's evidence this way: "Kathy's evidence,
since it tends not to support the judgment of the court, may be summarized.' 410 Is not the judgment of the court supposed to reflect the evidence? The evidence, which the court chose to summarize succinctly,
was the evidence of a psychiatrist who described the child as "welladjusted" and who recommended that the child remain with the
mother.' Fourth, the court seemed to believe that the child would be
influenced toward homosexuality if she remained with her mother. The
appellate court admitted that, at the then-present time, the child was
well-adjusted and normal, 1 but it justified the change of custody on
its own prediction of the future. "The court does not need to wait,
though, till the damage is done. If the child's situation is such that
damage is likely to occur as her sexual awareness develops . . ." then
custody may be changed. 43 No evidence was cited to show that any
expert predicted future harm. The opinion does not use the word "les408. Id. at 183. The court's full statement was, "Suppose the persona non grata were an
habitual criminal, or a child abuser, or a sexual pervert, or a known drug pusher? To cut off
association with such a person as a condition to the child custody would be entirely reasonable."
Id.
409. Id. at 184. The judge's "dominant-passive" remark reflects the stereotypic view that
relationships between gay couples mirror stereotypic relationships of traditional heterosexual
couples with one partner being male and dominant, the other female and passive. In fact, the view
that maleness equals dominance and femaleness equals passivity is itself a stereotypic notion that
numerous heterosexuals have had to overcome. While gay couples in the 1940-1950's did struggle
to create relationships based on their only model, that of heterosexuals, gay couples in the
1970-1980's have largely abandoned such rigid roles. Clearly the judge's attitude lags behind both
the heterosexual and homosexual times! As described by one commentator:
[T]o the ancient world of Greece and Rome, men-and it was above all a masculine society-were regarded as naturally bisexual. No distinction was made between the love of
boys and the love of women. This was simply a question of taste, about as significant as
preferring coffee or tea for breakfast. The crucial distinction in law and morality was between those who took the active roles and those who took the passive roles-the penetrators
as opposed to the penetrated. This concept effectively degraded submissive boys, women,
and slaves of both sexes, and elevated active men, regardless of their gender preference. To
us, gender preference is all-important, and the distinction between the active and passive
roles of only minor significance.
Stone, The Strange History of Human Sexuality: Sex in the West, THE NEw REPUBLIC, July 8,
1985, at 25-27.
410. N. K. M., 606 S.W.2d at 185.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 186.
413. Id.
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bian" at all and uses the word "homosexuality" sparingly. In sum, the
case is a classic: treatment of gay people as analogous to criminals, use
of archaic stereotypes, judicial voyeurism, disregard of expert testimony, and findings based not on the record but on the judge's personal
beliefs.
L. v. D.,1'1 decided two years later in the Missouri Court of Appeals, is not much different in its approach. The lesbian mother sought
a change of custody from the father to herself. This case is one of those
instances, quite common in gay custody cases, where the gay parent not
only loses but ends up worse off than before the suit was brought. Here,
the trial court not only denied the motion for change of custody but
added new restrictions to the mother's visitation." 6 The restrictions
were to prevent any contact between the children and the mother's life
partner. The appellate court upheld the trial court. Again, the decision
was not unexpected, and the methodology was instructive.
The world caught up to Missouri in the two years between the
cases. The second sentence of L. v. D. refers to the mother as a lesbian.
The mother had made certain allegations about the father. The truth of
those allegations of course is unknown. The appellate court, however,
labels them "illusory."" 6 The mother claimed that the father interfered
with her custodial rights when he moved without notifying her or giving her the new phone number. The appellate court said the father's
conduct was not so substantial as to be worth considering." 7 Although,
the children expressed a desire to stay with the mother, the court ruled
that because of their tender years their preferences were not really important. 4 8 The mother also alleged that the father was purposely alienating the children by telling them about her relationship; the father
claimed he was "educating" the children. The court ruled that the
mother had no alienation claim because the alienation had its "foundation in the conduct of the complaining parent.' 14 9 The court dismissed
oral evidence presented by two expert witnesses and dismissed the submission of various written studies and articles, all in support of the
mother's position. The appellate court said the trial court had the
power to find the witnesses not credible. To bolster this argument, the
appellate court sua sponte, took judicial notice of anti-gay evidence
given in another Missouri trial four years earlier which dealt with rec-

414.
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630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
Id.at 241.
Id.
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ognition of gay student groups, not with a custody matter. 2 ° The court
also cited to and quoted from N. K. M. v. L. E. M."2 1 for the proposition that current harm need not be shown. Finally, the court cited
Bezio v. Patenaude,'22 and admitted that a situation might exist where
the court could allow children in the custody of a "practicing lesbian. ' '4 2 8 This case, however, was obviously not the one!
The last of the Missouri cases deals with a gay father. J.L.P. (H)
v. D.L.P.124 was decided twenty-seven months after N. K. M. v. L. E.
M. The gay parent in this case was labeled an "avowed homosexual."
The trial court had given the gay father visitation with restrictions,
namely, no overnight visits, no gay church meetings, and no gay social
meetings.4 15 Lambda Legal Defense attempted to file an amicus brief
in this case, but the court denied permission.42 6 The father's principal
argument was that the uncontradicted expert evidence was totally ignored. The evidence was that the child had not been harmed at the
then-present time. The appellate court brushed this contention aside,
stating that the trier of fact is not bound by expert testimony. 27 The
court commented on the testimony at length. One expert's opinion on
the etiology of homosexuality was derided by the court which said that
the fact the father had had a heterosexual relationship with the mother
proved the expert wrong. The testimony about child molestation was
also labeled "suspect" because "[e]very trial judge . . . knows that the
molestation of minor boys by adult males is not as uncommon as the
psychological expert's testimony indicated.' 42 The appellate court affirmed, relying on the "potential" for harm. The father in this case
took an unusual position. Usually gay parents testify that they do not
want their kids to grow up to be gay. The father in this case said he
wanted his son to be gay. The author suspects that this enraged the

420. Id. (citing Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Mo. 1976), rev'd, 558
F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977)). The judge does not mention that the anti-gay testimony was not considered credible by the Eighth Circuit.
421. 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). See supra notes 406-14 and accompanying
text.
422. 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980). See infra notes 571-79 and accompanying
text.
423. L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d at 244.
424. 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
425. Id. at 866.

426. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund is a national gay legal defense fund. The
Lambda brief probably would have been an educational brief, as it contained a discussion of
stereotypical beliefs about gay persons and gay parents with information regarding research and
testimony dispelling those myths. The appellate court, however, apparently chose not to be confused by additional facts. See id. at 867.
427.

Id. at 868.

428. Id. at 869.
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judges. At the end of the appellate decision, the court warned the father that if he "persist[ed]" in this position and harm resulted to the
child, even greater restrictions were in store for him."
In all three of these cases, an examination of the opinions and
other documents indicates that all of the gay parents, like the nongay
parents, were imperfect humans in their parenting abilities. However,
for the most part, those issues were never discussed and balanced. Because the courts focused on the sexual orientation of the parents, the
parent-child relations were never fully explored, and the best interests
of the children, whatever they may have been, were never the central
issue.
Missouri authority has held that expert opinions are not binding
on the trier of fact;430 one assumes that the Missouri lawyers were
aware of this rule. My observation is that lawyers who are not experts
in gay custody litigation are basically unprepared for the hostility or
ignorance which will be met from the bench. In some cases, better advice would have counseled the litigant not to have appealed, as many
cases show instances of appeal leaving the gay parent in an even worse
position.
Two Iowa cases illustrate situations where the parent had to make
a hard choice in legal strategy. In Eaganhouse v. Eaganhouse"' the

lesbian mother returned from another state and brought the child with
her for the sole purpose of contesting a custody modification motion
made by her former husband. The court awarded the child to the exhusband, citing the mother's instability of residence, including the
move from out-of-state, as a reason for the change of custody. 32 The
case illustrates two common phenomena in gay custody cases. First, the
nongay father brought the case shortly after he remarried. Interestingly, remarriage of the nongay parent seems to trigger custody suits.
Second, the court in this case disclaimed any prejudice stating "there
was much testimony concerning the parenting of respondent [mother]
in particular and of lesbians in general. The court in this case was of
the opinion that this phase of the matter was greatly overemphasized
by both parties. The court accepts that a person's ability to parent is
not necessarily affected by their sexual preference. ' 433 Yet, even with
the disclaimer, one comes away from the opinion with the intimation
that a nongay mother would not have lost custody in the same

429. Id. at 872.
430. See Note, Visitation, 22 J.FAM. L. 185, 187 n.14 (1983-1984).
431. CD 78-1176 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Jones County Aug. 29, 1980).
432. The court also denied custody based on the mother's admission of marijuana usage,
even though she agreed to stop smoking marijuana if it would impact on the court's decision.
433. Id., slip op. at 4.
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situation.
In King v. King,4" another Iowa lesbian mother appealed the
lower court's decision against her to the Iowa Supreme Court and ended up withdrawing the appeal as a matter of strategy. "3 When the
Kings were divorced, the father received custody because of the
mother's lesbianism. Four years later, the lesbian mother moved for a
change of custody on the grounds that the father had given over physical custody of the children to her. Subsequent testimony revealed that
the father was often drunk and was clearly not a fit custodian. The
mother had expert testimony from a psychiatrist indicating that no
harm existed to the children because of their mother's sexual orientation and that no future harm was foreseen. The mother had favorable
testimony from the children's teacher and from a babysitter who stated
clearly that she was a heterosexual. The mother even gave the obligatory testimony stating that it was "her duty" to bring the children up
as heterosexuals.4' After much testimony, the trial court flatly denied
the mother custody, "' stating that, "were it not for the lesbian lifestyle
chosen by [the mother] she would be awarded custody."' 8 One reading
of the judge's decision would be that he used a conclusive presumption
that Sheila King's sexual orientation was against the best interests of
her children. Sheila King, represented by the Iowa Civil Liberties
Union (ICLU), appealed the decision to the Iowa Supreme Court. The
ICLU filed an extensive brief arguing both Iowa custody law and constitutional issues. 4 a 9 The favorable language of Teepe,4 "4 decided in
1978 by the same court, was cited even though the allegedly gay father
in that case lost custody. The supreme court responded by issuing a
short order temporarily remanding the case back to the trial court. The
trial court was directed to appoint an attorney to represent the children. The attorney was directed to conduct an investigation to determine "who, other than the father, should have custody of the children
in their best interests, under all the facts including the mother's homo-

434. No. 3-66091, Mills No. 342 (Iowa Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1981).
435. Telephone interview with Naomi Mercer, of Mercer & Mercer, Des Moines, Iowa,
Sheila King's attorney (June 24, 1985).
436. Brief for Appellant at 20, King v. King, No. 3-66091, Mills No. 342 (Iowa Sup. Ct.
Mar. 9, 1981).
437. Id. at 24.
438. Id. at 24-25.
439. id. at _.
440. 271 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1978). "Such misconduct which affects the child may be given
consideration in determining child custody . . .although immoral acts alone do not necessarily
make a person unfit for custody of his or her children." Id. at 743-44. See supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text.
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sexuality."" 1 During all of the trial and the subsequent legal events,
the children had remained in the physical custody of the mother. The
father had left them in her custody and made no attempt to retake
them although technically he was the legal custodian. When the case
was remanded to the trial court, the judge appointed an attorney. The
attorney submitted a psychiatrist's report which the court refused to
accept. The apparent reason was that the report was favorable to the
mother. The court appointed another psychiatrist who was regarded by
the mother and her local attorney as extremely prejudiced against gay
people. At this point, the mother and her attorney made a strategic
decision-they asked leave of the Iowa Supreme Court to withdraw the
appeal. Although the attorney appointed by the lower court opposed
their motion, the motion was granted. Thus, the mother remained the
physical custodian of the children while the absent father remained the
legal custodian. According to her attorney, Sheila King feared that the
local judge would order the- children placed in foster care rather than
let her have physical custody. The King case ended with mother and
children united but without the protection of a proper custodial
order.4"
Lest Iowa be considered to have the only judicial system exhibiting
signs of homophobia, an analysis of the Oklahoma system produces a
similar finding. The following words are representative of the current
judicial attitudes:
It is now time to draw the line in Oklahoma so that it can take its
place in the columns (sic) where it stands on homosexual marriages and homosexual custody, so at this time I would reverse the
custody of the child and award custody to the [nongay] father,
order the8 child to be given to the father by six o'clock this
evening."
In Oklahoma, the right way and the wrong way to proceed are

441. Order Appointing Attorney to Represent Children at 1, King v. King, No. 3-66091,
-,
1981).
Mills No. 342 (Iowa Sup. Ct.
442. See Dismissal of Appeal, King v. King, No. 3-66091, Mills No. 342 (Iowa Sup. Ct.
Sept. 22, 1982); Motion for Leave to Dismiss, King v. King, No. 3-66091, Mills No. 342 (Iowa
Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 1982); Letters from G. Elizabeth Otte to Naomi Mercer, of Mercer & Mercer,
Des Moines, Iowa, Sheila King's attorney (Apr. 15, 1982, Jan. 19, 1982 & Jan. 4, 1982); Letter
from Naomi Mercer, of Mercer & Mercer, Des Moines, Iowa, to Rhonda Rivera (July 20, 1982).
443. Record at 302-05, M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982). The trial judge's
statement is contained in Note, Parent and Child: M.J.P. v. J.G.P.: An Analysis of the Relevance
of Parental Homosexuality in Child Custody Determinations, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 633, 657 (1982).
I would like to thank the note author, Marie Westin Evans, for the very helpful investigation she
performed to uncover facts not revealed in the supreme court's opinion. Not only is the article a
boon to this discussion as it highlights much of the record, but the article is well worth reading to
master the whole subject of gay child custody.
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clear. Linda Duck kept her children; 4"' Martha Potter lost hers. 4 5
When the Potters were divorced, the court awarded their two-and-ahalf-year old son to his mother. Within a year, the father moved to
change custody based solely on his wife's lesbian relationship. The wife
stipulated as to her sexual orientation. The testimony was uncontradicted that the child was healthy, well-adjusted, alert, happy, and normal. The testimony of both the father and the paternal grandparents
admitted these facts. The expert witness, a psychiatrist, not only supported this view of the child but testified that separation for the child
from his mother would be a traumatic event.446 Thus, the evidence in
this case indicated no present harm and no nexus with the mother's
sexual orientation. Nevertheless, the trial court awarded custody to the
father and restricted the visitation of the mother. The mother could not
have the child overnight if her life partner were in their home. On appeal, the mother argued that the decision was based on the judge's personal moral beliefs and that he had, in fact, created a conclusive presumption against a gay parent. She also argued that the judge was
patently biased and should have excused himself.4"4 As evidence of the
judge's bias, the mother cited his voyeurism during the trial. 448 One
third of the hearing was devoted to questioning the mother's sexual
partner, many of the questions coming from the bench. The mother
also alleged that the judge had made his decision before hearing her
testimony; she pointed out that he read his decision in part from a book
which he brought to the bench before her testimony. 4 9
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in a truly amazing opinion, upheld the decision of the trial court' 5 0 after superficially analyzing two
gay custody cases, inferring that only those two existed. First, the court
cited Bezio v. Patenaude"t which required a nexus between the parent's homosexuality and present harm. Having alluded to the Bezio
rule, a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision which was certainly relevant case law for a case of first impression in Oklahoma, the court
then ignored the rule. Second, the court also cited favorably to the dissenting opinion in Schuster v. Schuster 51 which quoted at length from
a law review article that supported the criminalization of homosexual-

444. See infra notes 458-60 and accompanying text.
445. M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 970.
446. Note, supra note 443, at 655.
447. M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 969.
448. Id.
449. Note, supra note 630, at 443.
450. M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 970.
451. 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980). See M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 967.
452. 90 Wash. 2d 626. 635-36, 585 P.2d 130, 135-36 (1980) (Rosellini, J., dissenting). See
M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 968. See also Rivera I. supra note i, at 899.
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ity because, without such sanction, young people might choose homosexuality and undermine the traditional family. 58 Not only did the theory in this article contradict all objective scientific evidence on the
etiology of homosexuality but it also contradicted the expert testimony
in M.J.P. Nevertheless, the M.J.P. court passed over the testimony of
the expert that the child showed no evidence of present harm. Instead,
the court pointed to the expert's answers to a series of cross-examination questions in which the expert was asked speculative questions
about the child's future."' The court stated that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's decision. The court explained the trial
judge's patent voyeurism by saying that the judge's questions to the
mother's partner "evidenced a desire to learn more about the home and
To the mother's other argufamily of a homosexual couple . . . .
ments of bias, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's total answer was, "we
are not impressed."" 0
Seldom do legal scholars who write about cases have information
about the facts that surround an opinion. However, in M.J.P., a newspaper story described the case. According to The Advocate, Judge
David Winslow, the trial judge in M.J.P., first awarded the child to the
mother and then reversed himself after receiving letters from local
members of the fundamentalist church to which the father belonged.
The judge himself was a part-time fundamentalist minister as well as
an elected official. Phil Frazier, lawyer for the mother, is quoted as
saying that even though his client lost he was glad that the state's highest court had "at last" established a guideline to be used by Oklahoma
courts in dealing with gay custody cases. If those remarks are correct,
one questions how zealous Frazier Was in his representation of Martha
Potter. Frazier said further that he did not think the decision was unfair because lesbian mothers chose their life-style. According to Lana
Hartig, Potter's life partner with whom Potter had gone through a gay
commitment ceremony, Potter could not handle the decision. Shortly
after the decision, Potter denounced lesbianism, married a man, and

453. See Schuster. 90 Wash. 2d at 635-36, 585 P.2d at 135-36 (Rosellini, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 563, 691-96 (1977)).
454. See M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 968-69. For example, the opinion states: "On cross-examination, Dr. W. acknowledged that it is in a child's best interests to be taught the prevailing morals of
society, and that it is generally considered immoral for two women to engage in a homosexual lifestyle." Id. at 969. "Dr. W. concluded: 'Probably the greatest problem with it will be in early
adolescence when he is very much aware of society's feelings. If he has been taught in some way
that it is very sinful and he becomes aware of it, that could be as traumatic as growing up with it
Id.
being somewhat normal and then finding out that society considers it wrong .... .
455. Id. at 969.
456. Id. at 970.

Published by eCommons, 1985

344

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11:2

moved out of state without leaving a forwarding address. The child
over whom the father battled so hard lived primarily with his paternal
grandparents. Hartig, who lived with the child for three years, is not
allowed to see him, although her twelve-year-old son is permitted to
457
visit.
Rather than admit her lesbianism, Linda Duck, with her attorney,
pursued another strategy in a similar situation. Duck was awarded custody of her children by another Tulsa, Oklahoma judge just one week
after the decision in M.J.P. Duck fought a three-year battle for her
children and maintained throughout the struggle that she was not a
lesbian. She lived with another woman named Marilyn. Duck told her
husband and the court that she and Marilyn had had a brief affair and
nothing more. She admitted to a reporter from The Advocate that she
had lied but said she "had to play the game. '4 58 She said, "But what
do you want? Do you want to be honest and have your whole life but
lose your children, or be dishonest for a few years and keep your children?" 459 Duck's position seems to have been a matter of chosen trial
strategy. According to C.B. Savage, Duck's attorney, "[I]n my initial
conversation with Ms. Duck, I advised her she had a choice to make.
Did she want her children, or did she want to focus the attention of the
case on the question of lesbians' rights? She wanted her children. 46 0
The decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Jacobson v.
Jacobson46 1 corresponds with the Oklahoma and Missouri decisions.
However, in Jacobson, the trial court had awarded custody of the children to their lesbian mother only to be overruled by the supreme court.
The trial court judge said that he had extensively researched the available case law. His conclusion was that the cases are divided into two
categories: " '[T]hose in which courts, without explaining the reasons
for their conclusions, determine that homosexuality is a factor to be
considered in awarding custody; those in which, based upon expert tes-

457. The Advocete, Mar. 18, 1982, at i.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Letter from C.B. Savage, of Savage, O'Donnell, Scott, McNulty & Cleverdon, Tulsa,
Okla., to Rhonda Rivera (July 19, 1982). Savage also wrote:
What we were able to do with the testimony of several expert witnesses and the parties
involved was to convince the court that the best interests of the children would be served by
placing their custody with Ms. Duck, their mother . . . not Ms. Duck, a lesbian. To my
way of thinking, it is a question of trial strategy.
Perhaps the reason some lesbian mothers have not been so fortunate in retaining custody of their children is that they have been more concern [sic] with being militant about
their lesbianism when they should have presented themselves to the trier of fact as being
militant about their motherhood.
Id.
461. 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981).
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timony, the courts conclude that the subject is irrelevant.' ", The trial
judge found sexual orientation to only be one of many- factors to be
used in determining the best interests of the children and then, only if
some legitimate method of weighing those factors was found. Approaching the problem in this fashion, the trial judge determined that
both parents were fit. He decided that less disruption would occur in
the children's lives if they remained with their mother. This decision
was, according to the North Dakota Supreme Court, a clear mistake.
For the highest court, "the homosexuality of Sandra [the mother] is
the overriding factor." "4 The court stressed that when the mother lived
with her lover the relationship would not be a legal one. Additionally,
the court hypothesized, without evidence, that the relationship might
not be stable either. The court stated that "Sandra's homosexuality
may, indeed, be something which is beyond her control.""' The court
said, however, she could control with whom she lived, and she should
make that sacrifice to keep her children. The North Dakota Supreme
Court would seem to fall into that small group which makes a parent's
homosexuality conclusively "not in the best interests" of the child. The
court's emphasis on the lack of a legal relationship and the comparison
to heterosexual cohabitation 465 puts gay persons in a "Catch 22" position. Since same-sex marriage is forbidden, gay persons can never legalize the relationship---heterosexual cohabitors have a choice.
While the hostility of the courts in the central states seems fairly
evident, the attitudes of midwestern courts are less capable of categorization. In D.H. v. J.H.,46e decided by an Indiana appellate court in
1981, the original order giving custody to the father was upheld. The
appellate opinion stated that "homosexuality standing alone without evidence of any adverse effect upon the welfare of the child does not
render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have custody
of the child."' "6 7 However, even with that fine statement, the court decided that sufficient evidence existed to support the award to the nongay father. The evidence mentioned in the appellate opinion as dispositive included the mother's poor housekeeping and a father who

462. Id. at 79 (citation omitted in original).
463. Id. at 80.
464. Id. at 81.
465. See id. (citing Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979) (residence of
mother's "paramour" found to have possible adverse affect on the moral and emotional health of
three daughters), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980)). The Jacobson court wrote: "Here, although
Sandra was not residing with Sue at the time of the hearing on custody, her intentions to do so in
the future were plainly announced to the trial court . . . . It is this particular fact which we
believe to be material in this instance." Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 81.
466. 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
467. Id. at 293.
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prepared meals and helped the kids with their lessons while his wife
"was out running around . . . ." a The Indiana court placed great emphasis on the trial judge's perspective, as the judge was in a position to
see the parties and observe their conduct. No manifest abuse of discretion was found.
The cases from Michigan in the 1980's are a curious group. Michigan, unlike Indiana and the other central states, had a number of gay
custody cases in the years before 1980. People v. Brown, 69 decided by
the Michigan Court of Appeals in 1973, has been often cited as the
landmark neglect case in the custody area. Brown pitted a lesbian
mother against the state; therefore, the standard applied by the court
was not the "best interests" test but the stricter parental "unfitness
test." The Brown court stated that there was little evidence to support
the conclusion that the lesbian relationship would render the home an
unfit place for children.' 7 The opinion also seemed to require a nexus
between parental homosexual conduct and harm to the children.
Two Michigan circuit courts rendered decisions rather favorable to
lesbian mothers in 1975 and 1976. These decisions were based on the
Michigan Child Custody Act which sets out ten specific criteria to be
used to determine the best interests of the child. One of those criteria is
the moral fitness of the parent. In Stamper v. Stamper,"" the judge
treated the partner of the lesbian mother on an equal plane with the
woman cohabiting with the father. In S. v. S.,7 2 the court also allowed
children to remain with a lesbian mother with a live-in life partner.
In 1979, Miller v. Miller,47 a lesbian mother case, reached the
Michigan Supreme Court. Both the trial and appellate courts had rendered decisions unfavorable to the lesbian mother. The Michigan Supreme Court remanded, saying that clear and convincing evidence had
not been shown in support of a change of custody from the mother.
This case presents an interesting precedential problem. Both appellate
opinions are extremely short, and neither describes any of the evidence

468. Id. at 296.
469. 49 Mich. App. 358, 212 N.W.2d 55 (1973). For an extensive analysis of this case, see
Rivera I, supra note I, at 888.
470. Brown, 49 Mich. App. at 212 N.W.2d at 59.
471. No. 75-054-550-DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County June 15, 1977). For an extensive
analysis of this case, see Rivera 1, supra note I, at 900.
472. No. 75-16125DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Washtenaw County Dec. 6, 1976). The court applied the Michigan Child Custody Act of 1970. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.21-.29
(West Supp. 1985). The case is unpublished and records are suppressed. The opinion and order
are in the author's files by permission of the court. It is unfortunate that this opinion was not
published because of the careful, systematic method in which the court evaluated the custodial
alternatives against the criteria embodied in the statute.
473. No. 77-2631 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1979).
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involved in the case. Nevertheless, gay rights litigators regarded the
Brown and Miller decisions as putting Michigan among the states requiring a clear nexus between the parent's sexual orientation and current harm to the child. However, two cases decided in 1980 disabused
them of such a conclusion.
In Irish v. Irish,47 the Michigan Court of Appeals ordered a restricted visitation schedule for a lesbian mother. The visitation could
only take place "provided that while the children were visiting plaintiff
no intimate sexual contact was to take place between plaintiff and her
lover in the children's presence and that the children could not remain
overnight if plaintiff's lover were present overnight.' 7 5 On appeal,
plaintiff argued that the trial court had utilized an erroneous standard
of proof. The mother claimed that the trial court had not, by clear and
convincing evidence, found the modification of visitation to be in the
best interests of the children. The appellate court found that the clear
and convincing standard was unnecessary; a mere preponderance of the
evidence was sufficient. The court stated that since a modification of
visitation rights was not a change in the children's custodial arrangements, a lesser standard of evidence was applicable. 47 6 Because the issue was not custody, the trial court did not have to make a finding as to
each criterion enumerated in the Michigan Child Custody Act. The
appellate court noted that the only real change resulting from the trial
court's order was not the amount of visitation which the mother was
allowed but the amount of time the children would have in the presence
of their mother's "lover." The court then said, "Based on the mores of
our society, we do not consider the continued presence of the lover of
the children's mother as an element of the children's custodial environment which must be preserved and protected by the high standard of
proof required by [section] 7(c) [of the Child Custody Act]. '
Hall v. Hall,47 8 decided in the same year, was also a clear defeat
for the lesbian mother. After losing custody of her children at the trial
level, Sharon Hall argued on appeal that the trial court had adopted a
conclusive presumption that she was unfit because of her sexual orientation. The appellate court said that the trial court had correctly regarded her sexual orientation "as only one factor in its determination
of moral fitness.' 7' However, the other evidence, said the appellate

474. 102 Mich. App. 75, 300 N.W.2d 739
475. Id. at 78. 300 N.W.2d at 741.
476. Id. at 79, 300 N.W.2d at 741.
477. Id. at 79-80, 300 N.W.2d at 741.
478. 95 Mich. App. 614, 291 N.W.2d 143
479. Id. at 615, 291 N.W.2d at 144. Note
determining the best interests of the child under
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court, was a finding by the trial court "that, given a conflict, the plaintiff would unquestionably choose the relationship over the children."4 80
Thus, the appellate court held that "the interests of the children could
well be subverted by the plaintiff's relationship ..... "I The opinion
does not reveal the mother's exact words nor the context of her statement. However, one must ask whether heterosexual mothers should be
asked to give up their lovers or new husbands for their children? In this
author's seventeen years as a domestic relations litigator, I have never
heard such a question asked. The human need for adult companionship
is viewed as a separate and distinct need from that of a parent-child
relationship, and the two are not seen in conflict except in the instances
of gay families. This emphasis on removal of the same-sex adult from
the children's world is clearly misplaced. Studies now show that children thrive best in a home with two caring adults regardless of their
4 82
gender.
The acceptance of gay custody is not much better in Ohio. Ohio
has probably the earliest gay custody case resolved by the imposition of
8 3 decided in
restrictions. In Holland v. Holland,4
1947, a woman who
was presumably gay was allowed to retain custody of her children if
her female friend left the home. Later, in 1974, Ohio was the location
of what may be the first gay parent case to use expert testimony to
8 4 As a result,
educate the court-Hall v. Hall.4
the mother retained
485
custody. Towend v. Towend,' decided by an Ohio appeals court in
1976, was as blatant a case of judicial homophobia as one is likely to
find; the mother lost custody to the paternal grandmother. And in
1980, Haton v. Haton4 86 was decided by an Ohio court of appeals. The
trial court had ordered change of custody to a nongay father from a
lesbian mother. On appeal, the mother argued that the court had not
properly found that the child's present environment endangered the
child. Ohio statutorily requires a showing of present harm 4' 7 before a

§ 722.23(0 (West Supp. 1985).
480. Hall, 95 Mich. App. at 615, 291 N.W.2d at 144.
481. Id.
482. See Kirkpatrick, Lesbian Mother Families, PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 12(9) (Sept. 1982);
Kirkpatrick, Smith & Roy, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children:t A Comparative Study, 5 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 51:3 (1981); Presentation by M. Hotvedt, R. Green & J. Mandel, The Lesbian Parent: Comparison of Heterosexual and Homosexual Mothers and Their Children, American Psychological Association Annual Meeting (Sept. 4, 1979).
483. 49 Ohio L. Abs. 237, 75 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947). See Rivera II, supra note
1, at 328 n.146.
484. No. 55900 (Ohio C.P. Ct., Dom. Rel. Div., Licking County Oct. 31, 1974).
485. No. 639 (Ohio Ct. App., 11 th Dist. Sept. 30, 1976). For an extensive discussion of this
case, see Rivera 1, supra note 1, at 902.
486. No. W.D.-80-30 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Nov. 21, 1980).
487. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(B)(1)(c) (Page Supp. 1984). The statute prohttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol11/iss2/4
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prior custody decree is modified. The Haton court identified ten of the
thirty-four findings of fact as evidence that the plaintiff's homosexuality had a present adverse impact. A number of the findings are merely
statements of facts which prove nothing in and of themselves about adverse impact.4'8 8 However, a majority of these findings focus on the
"open sexuality" of the mother and her lover. A psychiatrist found the
openness to be harmful. The mother's statement to the court that, having realized the alleged harm, she would comport herself differently,
was to no avail. One hard question would be whether similar incidents
between a heterosexual couple would have been seen as "open sexuality." Certainly, the court's emphasis focused on the open nature of the
behavior in the presence of the child.48 '
4 90 tried in Columbus,
Hercenberg v. Hercenberg,
Ohio, in late

1982, clearly illustrates how positive results for the gay parent can be
obtained when the lawyer is familiar with gay custody law and trial
strategy. After a record hearing, the trial court left the children in the
custody of their lesbian mother. The father had sought to change custody to himself because of the mother's sexual orientation. The court
found that although a change of circumstances had occurred, no present endangerment was proven. Even the father admitted that his concerns were prospective. An expert testified that the children exhibited

vides in pertinent part:
[T]he court shall retain the custodian or both of the joint custodians designated by the
prior decree, unless one of the following applies:
(c) The child's present environment endangers significantly his physical health or his
mental, moral, or emotional development and the harm likely to be caused by a change in
environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child.
Id.
The court in Whaley v. Whaley, 61 Ohio App. 2d 111, 399 N.E.2d 1270 (1978), in construing the statute, notes "one other difficulty with the Ohio standard which requires that a direct
adverse impact be shown. This means that a court may not act to change custody until the harm
has, or probably has been done." Id. at 118, 399 N.E.2d at 1275. The court went on to state that
the modification of a prior custody order is likely to harm a child in light of the needs of a child
for a stable environment. The modification of a prior custody order under the statute can only be
made where the harm caused by the change is outweighed by the advantage of such change. A
court's inquiry into the moral conduct or standards of a custodial parent is limited to a determination of the effect of such conduct on the child. Id. at 119, 399 N.E.2d at 1275 (quoting Lauerman,
Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 647, 681 (1977)).
488. E.g., "No. 13. That the defendant is a homosexual and has had homosexual relationships with others since a time preceding [sic] their dissolution of marriage." Haton, No. W.D.-8030, slip op. at 2; "No. 14. That the Defendant has had homosexual relationships with individuals
who were, at one time or another, students of the Defendant at Lakota High School." Id.
489. Examples of openness included walking naked in the house, lying on the bed with
another woman and allowing the child to jump in bed between them, and displays of physical
affection for others. Id., slip op. at _.
490. No. 76DC-02-427 (Ohio C.P. Ct., Dom. Rel. Div., Franklin County Mar. 10, 1983).
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no present harm. The father appealed but subsequently withdrew the
appeal after an out-of-court settlement which provided that custody of
the teenage son would go to the father with custody of the daughter
remaining in the mother.
Turning to the southern United States, prior to 1980, very few
cases were reported: three cases were reported for Georgia,"' three
cases for North Carolina,4 92 one for West Virginia, 93 two for Texas,4 94
and one for Kentucky. 9 5 Moreover, the 1980's have not brought a rash
of new cases. The sole Texas case since 1980, In re T.L.H.,' 96 seems to
be in the "gallantry is not dead" mode. 97 The case was tried to a jury,
as is usual for Texas custody cases.' 9 8 On appeal, a nongay father who
was denied custody, alleged that the trial court had committed error by
refusing to admit evidence of the mother's lesbianism. The appellate
court stated that the trial court had not prohibited introduction of evidence about the mother's alleged homosexual acts but rather, it had
prohibited only evidence which labeled the mother and her friends as
lesbians.' 99 The mother not only retained custody but was awarded her
attorney's fees. The court's decision may have been influenced by the
fact that the father's allegations of sexual abuse of the child were totally unsupported by the evidence. 00
A Kentucky lesbian mother won custody of her children in Gerde
v. Butler,50 1 but she paid the price imposed in homophobic courts: her
custody was restricted. The mother had to maintain a home without a
life partner present, was to refrain from allowing her children contact
with gay persons, and was to use only a heterosexual babysitter when
such services were required.
On the other hand, Peyton v. Peyton,501 a 1984 Louisiana case,
placed no restrictions on the lesbian mother. Like Michigan, 503 Louisi-

491. Buck v. Buck, 238 Ga. 540, 233 S.E.2d 792 (1977); Bennett v. Clemens, 230 Ga. 317,
196 S.E.2d 842 (1973); Gay v. Gay, 149 Ga. App. 173, 253 S.E.2d 846 (1979).
492. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918
(1974); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979); Newsome v. Newsome,
42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979).
493. Thabet v. Thabet, 154 W. Va. 477, 176 S.E.2d 687 (1970).
494. In re Risher, 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2715 (Tex. Ct. Dom. Rel., Dallas County Apr.
16, 1976); In re Nelson, No. 951, 546 (Tex. Ct. Doam. Rel., Harris County May 24, 1973).
495. S. v. S., No. 79-CA-1588-MR (Ky. Ct. App., Jefferson County July II, 1980).
496. 630 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
497. At least two other cases exist where the "lady's word was believed." See Buck, 238
Ga. 540, 233 S.E.2d 792 (1977); Gay, 149 Ga. App. 173, 253 S.E.2d 846 (1979).
498. See T.L.H., 630 S.W.2d at 443.
499. Id. at 445-46.
500. Id. at 446-49.
501. No. 80-CI-2230 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Kenton County Sept. 30, 1981).
502. 457 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
503. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 722.21-.29 (West Supp. 1985).
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ana requires that specific criteria be considered in child custody cases
with one of those criteria being moral fitness.5' In the Peyton case, the
appellate court said in essence, "a plague on both your houses." The
appellate judges noted that where the father was cohabitating openly
with a female and the mother was engaged in discreet lesbian affairs,
"the trial judge did not see fit to favor one form of adultery over another ... ."505 The trial judge decreed a joint custody arrangement,
and the appellate court affirmed. The evidence included testimony of a
social worker that the child showed no signs of disturbance and had a
good relationship with both parents. 5 " Actually, the appellate court
seemed more disturbed by the open nature of the father's cohabitation
than by the mother's lesbianism.'
A 1982 southern case, more in the tradition of the Oklahoma-Missouri mold, is the Tennessee case of Dailey v. Dailey.50 8 As in the
Jacobson case in North Dakota, 50" the appellate court in Dailey decided to render its own decision, disregarding the facts found (or in this
case, not found) by the trial court and deciding issues not raised by
either party at trial or on appeal. Lesbianism was very much at issue in
the custody hearing despite the trial court's finding that the "admitted
lesbianism of the respondent (mother) is not per se a sufficient change
in circumstances as to warrant a change in custody . ... ,'10 The trial
court changed custody from mother to father but granted the mother
liberal visitation, including weekends. Nevertheless, a close look at the
facts leads one to conclude that the trial court harbored strong negative
feelings against a lesbian home. The little boy in question had cerebral
palsy. His mother had moved from a small rural town to Nashville
where the child could attend, without charge, a school for children with
similar problems and in that same school receive, on a daily basis, special speech and physical therapy which the record showed he
desparately needed. The judge chose to have the child remain in the
small town where he attended a small Christian school with no other
handicapped children, which could not provide any speech or physical
therapy required by the child. This therapy was available only by going

504. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West Supp. 1984).
505. Peyton, 457 So. 2d at 324.
506. Id. at 322.
507. As the appellate court observed, "Furthermore, although the mother and Ms. Greenwood are still roommates, the presumptions society makes when an unmarried man and woman
share living quarters do not apply in situations where members of the same sex are roommates."
Id. at 325.
508. 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
509. See supra notes 461-66 and accompanying text.
510. Dailey v. Dailey, No. 7885, slip op. at (Tenn. Cir. Ct., Bradley County Apr. 7,
1981).
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to two other schools, twice a week, at a cost of over $160 per week. If
the mother was a fit parent, which on the record seems a safe inference, the best interests of the child probably would have best been
served by residence in Nashville with his mother. One could assume the
court, and even her ex-husband and his relatives, regarded her as fit
because she was permitted to retain custody while awaiting all the
many hearings pending the decision and was subsequently granted liberal visitation by the trial judge. The mother's appeal of the trial court
decision was, in hindsight, dreadful strategy.
The appellate court not only upheld the trial court's custody decision but sua sponte remanded with directions to incorporate highly restrictive visitation rules on the mother. She was prohibited from having
her son in the home where she lived with her life partner. She was also
prohibited from having the child in the "presence" of her life partner
or with "any other homosexual with whom the [mother] may have a
lesbian relationship."' 5 11 The appellate court's reasoning was that "[t]o
permit this small child to be subjected to the type of sexually related
behavior that has been carried on in his presence in the past . . . could
provide nothing but harmful effects on his life in the future."5 1 2 The
appellate court characterized the mother as "flagrantly flaunting" her
sexuality in front of her child. Yet, the trial judge never found that
such sexual behavior had occurred; the psychologist witness, a former
roommate witness, and the mother herself testified to her extremely
discreet behavior. Not even the father, his parents, nor her parents, had
testified of any open sexual behavior. Only a brother of the mother,
whose credibility was highly suspect, made any accusations. The trial
judge obviously discounted his testimony. Yet, the appellate court
seemingly structured its decision around the brother's charges. Three
psychologists testified. The appellate court ignored two of them and focused on the father's expert who not only admitted prejudice against
gay persons, but had never seen the child in the company of either of
the two parents.51 a The behavior of the appellate court becomes legally
stranger and less explicable in rational terms when one remembers
that, in child custody cases, appellate courts generally defer to the trier
of the fact on issues of credibility. The trial judge had found no open
sexuality nor any possible problems with letting the child visit his
mother in Nashville. Yet the appellate court mandated restrictions.
The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in February, 1982. By August, 1982, the father had left for Peru to search for

511.
512.
513.

Dailey, 635 S.W.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. at 393-94.
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gold. The maternal grandparents were then considering filing for custody."" The Dailey case also illustrates the approach of homophobic
courts towards constitutional arguments: the court dismissed the constitutional issue in one sentence as "without merit."5' 5
The last of the southern cases come from Virginia and seem
facially contradictory. In the 1981 case of Doe v. Doe,516 the Virginia
Supreme Court refused to grant an adoption petition which would have
stripped the lesbian mother of all parental rights. The case was treated
by many as a victory for gay parents and as portending a reasoned
approach to other gay custody issues in Virginia. Those optimists were
disabused of such a notion by the same court's decision in Roe v.
Roe,5 " four years later. In Roe, the Virginia Supreme Court overruled
a trial court award of joint custody and removed a child from the home
of her father and his life partner where she had previously lived for
over five years. The decision was based solely on the father's sexual
orientation. The Roe court held, "as a matter of law," 518 that the gay
father was an unfit and improper custodian because he continuously
exposed his nine-year-old daughter to his "immoral and illicit" homosexual relationship.51 9 The Virginia Supreme Court admitted that the
trial court had found "no evidence that the father's conduct had an
adverse effect on the child ... ."51o However, the court pointed out
that sodomy was a felony in Virginia. Additionally, the court called the
conditions under which the child must live an intolerable burden because of the condemnation of society. The court characterized the father, who had more than adequately cared for his daughter for over a
five-year period, as "impos[ing] this burden upon her in exchange for
his own gratification.'""I The trial court had found the little girl to be
a " 'very lovely, outgoing, bright and intelligent child . . . a very happy
child [who] seemed to be well adjusted and outgoing.' "522 Although
the father had relied on Doe v. Doe, the 1981 adoption case, the Roe
court said such reliance was misplaced. The court said that although
under Doe, parental rights would not be terminated because of homosexuality of the parent per se, the Doe court had not dealt with custo-

514. Letter from Abby R. Rubenfeld to Dana Goldstein, research assistant to Rhonda R.
Rivera (Aug. 26, 1982).
515. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d at 396.
516. 222 Va. 736, 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981).
517. 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985).
324 S.E.2d at 694 (emphasis added).
518. Id. at -.
519. Id.
324 S.E.2d at 692.
520. Id. at -,
324 S.E.2d at 694 (emphasis added).
521. Id. at -,
324 S.E.2d at 692 (citation omitted in original).
522. Id. at -
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dial rights or visitation because those issues were not raised.5 23 Having
removed the child from the father's physical custody, the Virginia Supreme Court imposed severe restrictions both on the father and his life
partner. The child was not to,visit in the home shared by the father and
his life partner if the life partner was there (where was he supposed to
go?) and was not to have any visitation at all with the life partner
present.524 We must bear in mind that the life partner had co-parented
the child with the gay father over the previous five years.
Think of the many child cust3dy cases, in a nongay context, where
continuity and stability are stressed. Think of the decisions which turn
on which custodian is the psychological parent. Think of the decisions
which automatically defer to the trial court as the best observer of the
best interests of the child. Think of Stanley v. Illinois152 wherein the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the family 526 and held
that all parents are entitled to due process in this area.5 27 Stanley forbade the use of conclusive presumptions against parents. 52 8 None of
these basic issues of child custody appear in the Roe opinion. How can
it be in the best interests of this lively, intelligent, outgoing nine-yearold child to remove her from her home of five years, forbid her to see
one of her primary caretakers, and severely restrict visitation with her
other primary caretaker, her natural father?
The 1980's cases from the courts of the southern and central
United States generally approach gay parent cases from a position of
overt homophobia. The rules have, time and again, been bent to enforce
the morals and fears of the bench as they relate to parents and children. On one hand, if the trial court has found against the gay parent,
then the appellate court decides it cannot interfere because of the
strong policy of setting aside the judgment of the court theoretically
best able to judge the participants. On the other hand, if the trial court
has allowed a gay person to keep or visit his or her child, then the
appellate court finds a clear abuse of discretion. Uncontroverted evidence of no harm is ignored. Experts are relied upon, not based on the
level of their knowledge, but based on how closely their prejudices conform to those held by the court. Often judges consider, sua sponte,
issues raised by neither party. No judge seems to consider the trauma
to the child of his or her removal from a custodial parent who happens
to be gay. Does this happen because judges actually believe gay people

523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

Id. at .. , 324 S.E.2d at 693-94.
Id. at -.
324 S.E.2d at 694.
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 657-58.
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are more likely to molest their children? In trial after trial, experts
have attempted to destroy this myth with hard evidence to the contrary. Does this happen because judges really believe that the child will
become gay through association? Again, in trial after trial, expert testimony has disproved this myth. Does this happen because judges really
believe that peer-inflicted teasing will emotionally destroy the child?
Are children removed from interracial homes, Amish homes, or Moonie
homes for such reasons? One New Jersey judge stated that the only
effect he could predict would be that children of gay parents would
grow up to be more tolerant people. 2 One cannot forget the trial court
judge in Jacobson who said he had reviewed all the cases and found
them to fall into two categories: courts which held against gay parents
without a reasoned explanation and courts which decided through the
use of expert witnesses that the issue was irrelevant. °
The 1980's cases from the northeastern section of the country differ significantly from the cases previously described. 5 3 ' In 1980, a Delaware family court awarded custody to a lesbian mother and imposed no
restrictions on her living arrangement with another woman. The case,
DeBoise v. Robinson, 2 did not involve a contest between two natural
parents but rather a contest between a lesbian mother and her parents. " 8 The grandparents sought custody of their grandchild alleging
that the mother was irresponsible. The court characterized the allegation as being based "largely on the differing life styles of the parties:
namely, the grandparents are devout and fundamental Christians and
'5
the mother is not and, in addition, her sexual preference is female." 4
The hearing involved substantial expert testimony and substantial testimony by social service agencies which investigated the situation. The
court followed the recommendations of the experts and made little reference to the mother's sexual orientation.

529.
530.

See M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 438, 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (1979) (Antell, J.).
See Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 79 (N.D. 1981). See also supra text accompanying note

462.
531. Two cases dealing with alleged parental neglect in which lesbianism was an issue occurred in Pennsylvania in 1981. One case was In re Jones, 286 Pa. Super. 574, 429 A.2d 671
(1981), where the mother's lesbian relationship with a "male impersonator" was at issue. No
discussion of the relationship is found in the opinion; the case essentially focuses on an evidentiary
question. The second case is somewhat more relevant. In re Breisch, 290 Pa. Super. 404, 434 A.2d
815 (1981), dealt with the parental neglect by a mother who was described as affecting a masculine appearance, wearing men's clothing, and having a masculine-oriented marital status. Id. at
434 A.2d at 817. This author questions whether the mother was a lesbian. More likely, she
-,
was a female to male transsexual. The case has so many issues other than the sexual relationship
of the mother that the author does not categorize this case as a gay custody case.
532. No. C-9104 (Del. Fain. Ct., New Castle County Nov. 17, 1980).
533. Id., slip op. at 2.
534. Id.
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A similar result occured in Medeiros v. Medeiros,3 8 decided in
Vermont in 1982. The lesbian mother in Medeiros was awarded custody of the children, and no restrictions were placed on her relationship. The court found specifically that no evidence existed that the
mother's relationship had any negative effect on the children. The court
relied upon expert testimony that all the research on the subject indicated that children living with a parent having a homosexual relationship have no greater risk of suffering adjustment or psychological disorders than do children living with a parent in a heterosexual
relationship.5 6 One interesting facet of this case was the appointment
of a separate attorney to represent the children's interests. When the
children's attorney filed his report supporting custody in the mother,
the father sought to have the attorney dismissed as prejudiced. The
court denied the father's motion and placed great weight on the conclusions of the children's attorney. The court did make one finding directly
as a result of the sexual orientation issue. The court gave the father
permission to reopen the custody issue without showing a change of
circumstances. The court said because the research cited by the expert
was scant, a method was needed to provide for a later review of the
53
situation. 7
Approximately two years later, the father did attempt a custodial
change. One of the father's charges was that the mother had lied. She
claimed to have informed the children of the nature of her relationship
with her lover. The father stated that he told the children of their
mother's sexual orientation and that the relationship was the cause for
the divorce. He maintained he did this because "it was unwise to keep
family secrets" from the children. The father's second main allegation
was that since he had married the woman with whom he had been
cohabitating, they could now provide a better home. The mother moved
to dismiss the father's motion for change of custody. The dismissal motion was granted in a thirteen-minute hearing." One can assume that
the court did not find present harm to the children.
In the neighboring state of Maine, a gay father won a significant
visitation battle. In Stone v. Stone,53 9 the trial court had denied the
father overnight visitation rights with his two daughters unless "his
boyfriends" were not present. The appellate court reversed, finding that

535. No. 5196-80BC (Vt. Super. Ct., Bennington County Mar. 31, 1982).
536. Id., slip op. at 8.
537. Id., slip op. at 15.
538. See Judge's Activity Log, Medeiros v. Medeiros, No. 5196-80BC (Vt. Super. Ct., Bennington County Nov. 26, 1984).
539. No. 79-141 (Me. Super. Ct., Knox County July 15, 1980), rev'g, No. 71-2-D 11 (Me.
Dist. Ct.. Knox County July 26, 1979).
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the trial judge's restriction constituted an abuse of discretion." ' The
Maine court arrived at that conclusion in the following fashion. First,
visitation was defined as an aspect of custody. The court then noted
that the right of a parent to the care and companionship of his children
is a "fundamental right."'4 This parental right is an element of the
best interests of the child because the right of the parent produces a
concomitant benefit to the child. The court saw that because a custody
contest only forces a choice as to a better parent, custody issues do not
confront the constitutional issues as often as visitation issues do. A restriction in visitation cuts a parent off from the care and companionship
of the child. According to the Maine court, denial of visitation should
occur only in extreme circumstances, namely, clear physical danger.
Even parents who have been incarcerated for violent crimes are often
permitted to see their children. The Maine court's review of the law
concluded with the observation that "courts generally hold that the sexual behavior or preferences of the parents do not per se make them
unfit as parents nor require deprivation or limitation of visitation.'
However, the sexual behavior of the parent is one element of a child's
environment that should be considered. The Maine court indicated that
"courts may not simply impose their own moral judgments on the lifestyle of the parents.""s The Maine rule is as follows: "Before parental
rights are restricted, there must be a finding in each case, based upon
evidence presented, that the particular conduct of the parent is having
or will have a deleterious impact upon the particular child or children."'1" 4 The court specifically ruled out decisions based on speculation, stating, "The issue is not the possible effect of homosexuality, generally, but of appellant's specific homosexual behavior in so far as it
affects the character of the environment to which the girls were, or
would be exposed."' 4 Looking at the record, the appellate court found
that the trial court had made its decision "based on its personal dislike
of the father's sexual behavior."" 46 That being the case, coupled with
no showing or finding of adverse effect on the children, the appellate
court reversed and remanded.
The Stone case, unlike the southern or central states' decisions,
took note of the constitutional arguments implicit in custodial decisions. Further, the court applied a strict nexus test-harm must be

540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.

Id., slip op. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., slip op. at 5.
Id.
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shown before a restriction can be imposed. Finally, the court recognized that visitation arrangements are custodial decisions and should be
judged by custodial standards.
In 1980, New Jersey was the scene of two custody cases involving
mothers who were living with each other. The cases are somewhat reminiscent of the Schuster-Isaacson cases5"' from Washington but even
more reminiscent of the Oregon Koop-Driber cases.54 8 In Belmont v.
Belmont,5 4 9 the father sought a change of custody from the mother on
two grounds: First, that the children would live a better life in his suburban home than in his former wife's city home and, second, that the
mother was living in a gay relationship with Margaret Wales. Wales
also had two children. The judge said he refused to argue the merits of
one locale over another. The mother had expert testimony from Dr.
Richard Green, a well-known authority in gay custody and sexual development in children. The judge relied extensively on Dr. Green's testimony. The judge concluded that the mother's sexual orientation was
only one of many factors to be considered,5 50 taking his approach from
the 1979 New Jersey case of M.P. v. S.P.85 1 which held that deciding a
case on the basis of the parent's sexual orientation was impermissible. 552 In Belmont, the judge characterized the situation as follows:
"The children are doing well in every respect and are being raised in a
loving, though unconventional home.1 553 The court did say that "everything being equal," a heterosexual home was preferred. However, everything was not equal. The judge found the father's case so woefully
weak that his good faith in even bringing the action was at issue. Consequently, the court ordered him to pay a portion of the mother's attorney fees.
While Rosemary Dempsey Belmont was fighting off her ex-husband's attempt to change custody, her lover Marjorie Wales was fighting a similar battle in another county. Silverweig v. Wales 55" never resulted in a written opinion, as the parties settled. However, the

547. The Schuster-lssacson cases were heard on consolidation. See Schuster v. Schuster,
Nos. D-36867, D-36868 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County Dec. 22, 1974), afd in part. 90 Wash.
2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978).
548. See Koop v. Koop, No. 221097 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County Sept. 17, 1973).
affd mem., 16 Wash. App. 1006 (1976); Driber v. Driber, No. 220748 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce
County Sept. 17, 1973). For an in-depth discussion of the Schuster-Isaacson and Koop-Driber

cases, see Rivera I, supra note 1, at 894, 898-900.
549.
550.
551.

552.
553.
554.
accounts.

6 FAM. L. RaP. (BNA) 2785 (N.J. Super. Ct., Hunterdon County July 22, 1980).
See id.
No. M-16937-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. July 23, 1979).

Id., slip op. at 4.
Belmont, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) at 2785-86.
Silverweig v. Wales, although not officially reported, was made public in newspaper
See The Advocate, Aug. 20, 1981, at 5; Gay Community News, July II, 1981, at 1.
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settlement was, according to Wales and her lawyers, forced on her by
the court. The final arrangement was a joint custody agreement with
the two children living with their father during the week but visiting
their mother three out of four weekends. Newspaper accounts indicate
that the trial focused almost exclusively on Marjorie Wales' sexual orientation. Moreover, the newspaper accounts attribute the forced settlement to the pressure placed on the lesbian mother by the trial judge.
The startling facts are that the Belmont decision and the Wales result
occurred in the same state in counties that are separated by a few mere
miles.
Two cases put New York at the forefront of providing equal treatment of gay parents and nongay parents. In this article and in previous
ones, the author has reported seven New York cases. The Mara and
Fleischer cases, 5 5 coupled with In re Jane B., 5" 6 decided in 1976, put
New York among those state courts which view the homosexuality of
the parent as pathological. Recent New York cases have, however,
taken a more progressive viewpoint. In Smith v. Smith, 5 decided in
1977, the court stressed that "a causal connection between lesbianism
and its adverse effect upon the child should be shown." 58" In DiStefano
v. DiStefano,559 the New York appellate court noted the trial court's
holding that a parent's sexual orientation does not render him unfit per
se. 6° In Werneburg v. Werneburg,"1 a New York family court paid lip
service to the rule that sexual orientation does not render a parent unfit
per se, but the decision nonetheless went contrary to the gay parent. In
1979, a New York family court held that being gay does not render a
parent unfit per se and that a causal connection (nexus) should be
shown between sexual orientation of the parent and an adverse effect
on the child.6 2
In Guinan v. Guinan,"8 a New York appellate court left primary
physical custody with a mother accused of homosexuality. While in one
sense the case is not a gay custody case because the mother denied
being a lesbian, the language of the court will prove extremely helpful

555. For a discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 376-77 & 388-90
and accompanying text.
556. 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976). For a discussion of In re Jane B.,
see Rivera I, supra note 1, at 896-97.
557. 3 FAM. L. REp: (BNA) 2692 (N.Y. Fain. Ct., Richmond County Sept. 13, 1977).
558. Id. at 2693.
559. 60 A.D.2d 976, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1978).
560. Id., 401 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
561. 6 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 2280 (N.Y. Fain. Ct., Rensselaer County Jan. 29, 1980).
562. Armanini v. Armanini, 5 FAM. L. REP.(BNA) 2501 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Nassau County
Feb. 16. 1979).
563. 102 A.D.2d 963, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1984).
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to gay parents in the future. The court stated:
[W]hether defendant had sexual relationships with other women is not
determinative . . . .A parent's sexual indiscretions should be a consideration . . . only if they are shown to adversely affect the child's welfare.
Specifically, the mere fact that a parent is a homosexual does not alone
render him or her unfit as a parent."
Gottlieb v. Gottlieb,"4 decided in 1985 by the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, represents a break-through case in gay custody cases. At the trial level, the gay father not only lost custody of his
minor daughter but had severe restrictions imposed upon visitation with
his daughter. The restrictions were:
"[1] that the defendant's visitation privileges at his home are conditioned
upon the total exclusion of his lover or any other homosexuals during
such visitation periods . . .[2] that the defendant's visitation privileges
not limited to his home are conditioned upon the total exclusion of his
lover and any other homosexuals from any contact with defendant and
child . . .[3] that during defendant's periods of visitation the child will
not be taken to any place where known homosexuals are present nor will
defendant involve the child in any homosexual activities or publicity."' "
In theory, Richard Gottlieb could visit with his daughter in his
home on alternate weekends from late-Friday afternoon until early evening on Sunday and could have visitation during the month of July, not
limited to his home. However, since he and his life partner shared a
home, the restrictions meant that the other man would have to leave
his home every other weekend. The life partner was quite well-known
to the daughter because during the appeal, she visited in their home
regularly.
The court left custody with the mother, but both the dissenting
and the majority opinions called the decision "close." On appeal, the
five appellate judges all agreed on the deletion of restrictions 1 and 2,
quoted above, as well as all of 3, except for the portion providing, "nor
will the defendant involve the child in any homosexual activities or
publicity. ' " 7 Judge Kupferman said that such restrictions served "no
real purpose other than as a punitive measure against the father.""

564. Id. at 964, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 831 (citations omitted).
565. 108 A.D.2d 120, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1985).
566. Id. at , 488 N.Y.S.2d at 181-82 (citation omitted in original).
567. See id. at 488 N.Y.S.2d at 181 (Fein, J.); id.at ,488 N.Y.S.2d at 182
(Kupferman, J., concurring); id.(Kassal, J., concurring); id.
at -,
488 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (Sandler. J., dissenting).
568. Id. at _
488 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (Kupferman, J.,
concurring). Judge Kupferman was
puzzled as to why the National Organization for Women should file an amicus brief:
Understandably, the father's position is supported by an amicus curiae brief from
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Judge Kasal, one of the three judges who left standing the partial restriction in 3, quoted above, said in his concurring opinion that the restriction applied equally to heterosexual activity."6 9 Judge Sandier, who
along with Judge Carro, would strike all the restrictions, said no evidence was introduced that indicated the defendant father would involve
his daughter in inappropriate activities, and therefore the restriction
was unnecessary. Judge Sandler characterized the situation as follows:
Nonetheless, given the central reality that we are considering an issue
between two worthwhile, responsible, moral people, one of them a homosexual and the other a heterosexual, the unpleasant connotation inherent
in the special restriction on one and not the other seems to us sufficient
to justify deleting this particular restriction precisely as we have all
agreed to strike the other restrictions.""0
The Gottlieb case represents a logical trend in New York case law.
5 71
a landmark case decided by the Massachusetts
Bezio v. Patenaude,
Supreme Judicial Court, does not, however, have such historical antecedents. 572 Bezio is a case in which the natural parent was opposed by
a third party, the children's guardian. The natural parent seeking custody in this case was a lesbian whose household included her life partner. The probate judge awarded custody to the guardian even though
uncontradicted evidence established that a parent's sexual orientation
per se is irrelevant to the "parent's ability to provide necessary love,
care, and attention to a child. 5 7M The trial judge, relying on his own
beliefs rather than the evidence, concluded that a lesbian household
"'creates an element of instability that would adversely [a]ffect the
welfare of the children.' I"M The supreme judicial court reversed and

LAMBDA Legal Defense & Education Fund. Strangely, it is also supported by the NOW
. . . Legal Defense and Education Fund. While the similarity to the problem for lesbians
detailed in DiStefano v. DiStefano may certainly arouse their interest, I doubt if the majority of NOW members would object to the provision in [3] above, which the dissent
mistakenly would excise from the decree, that the father will not "involve the child in any
homosexual activities or publicity."
Id. (citation omitted). Although the judge was puzzled, this author is not. NOW recognizes the
linkage between sexual stereotyping and oppression, as was made clear in a resolution passed at
the 1981 NOW Conference, which stated in part: "WHEREAS, there is a continuing need for
consciousness-raising among our members about the undeniable relationship between lesbian
rights and feminism, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that NOW increase action and public
education at all levels of the organization on lesbian rights." 14 NOW, Oct. 1981, at _.
, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (Kassal, J., concurring).
569. Gottlieb, 108 A.D.2d at 488 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (Sandier, J., dissenting).
570. Id. at -,
571. 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980). See Note, Bezio v. Patenaude: The "Coming
Out" Custody Controversy of Lesbian Mothers in Court, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 331 (1981).
572. This author has not reported in the past on any Massachusetts gay custody cases and is
unaware that any other cases exist prior to 1980.
573. Bezio, 381 Mass. at 569, 410 N.E.2d at 1211.
574. Id. (citation omitted in original).
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remanded the case, stating that the trial judge's finding was without
7
basis in the record.5 5
The expert evidence in Bezio was particularly strong. The main
witness, a clinical psychologist and professor of psychology, testified:
"'There is no evidence at all that sexual preference of adults in the
home has any detrimental impact on children .... 1'5 The expert
witness further testified that "'[tihere is no evidence that children who
are raised with a loving couple of the same sex are any more disturbed,
unhealthy, maladjusted than children raised with a loving couple of
mixed sex.' "8577 According to both the plaintiff's expert witness and the
defendant's expert witness, sexual orientation of the parent is an irrelevant factor with regard to parenting skills and the mental health of the
57 8
children.
Not only did the Massachusetts court find that the trial judge had
abused his discretion by substituting his own beliefs for uncontradicted
evidence, even more importantly, the highest Massachusetts court
warned jurists not to impose their personal viewpoints on unconventional households. The court asserted that "[tihe State may not deprive
parents of custody of their children 'simply because their households
fail to meet the ideals approved by the community . . . [or] simply
because the parents embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds

with the average.'

"879

While Bezio is indeed a landmark case, it is not a custody case
arising between two natural parents as a result of a divorce. The case
involved a natural parent versus a guardian. Therefore, the standard
used was not the best interests of the child but rather the stricter "fitness of the parent" standard. The court placed great emphasis on the
natural bond between child and parent. The question which resulted for
gay custody litigators" 0 was whether the Bezio rule would apply in
divorce cases. The case of Doe v. Doe"' answered that question in the
affirmative. In Doe, the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld a trial
court's joint custody decision where the mother was a lesbian and involved in a relationship. The appellate court, specifically relying on
Bezio, stated that the principle of Bezio does apply to a divorce situa-

575. Id. at 580, 410 N.E.2d at 1216.
576. Id. at 578, 410 N.E.2d at 1215.
577. Id., 410 N.E.2d at 1215-16.
578. Id. at 578-79, 410 N.E.2d at 1216.
579. Id. at 579, 410 N.E.2d at 1216 (quoting Custody of a Minor (No. 2), 378 Mass. 712,
719, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383 (1979)).
580. The Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) and the American Civil
Liberities Union (ACLU) were amici curiae on Bezio.
581. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983).
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tion.5 82 The court stated that "a parent's life-style must be evaluated
'in terms of the interpersonal relationships of the persons involved as
The court relied
"85
they affect the well being of the children ....
on the expert testimony of four psychiatrists. The court, discounting the
psychiatrist who testified adversely with regard to the effect of sexual
orientation on the child, found that he was not credible because "'he
had no supporting studies and his exposure to single parent lesbians
was limited.' "584 The three other psychiatrists all testified that the
mother's life-style would not adversely affect the child. One psychiatrist
introduced into evidence a study he had conducted showing that no
differences exist in children raised by gay parents as opposed to children raised by nongay parents.
Thus, the Doe court, relying on Bezio, left standing a joint custody
arrangement for a lesbian mother. Taken together, Doe and Bezio portend the end of judicial discrimination against gay parents in
Massachusetts.
The east coast states are not the only states that have judicially
adopted a more progressive attitude toward gay parents. In several of
the western and west coast states, gay parents have achieved success in
custody battles. Both Colorado cases previously reviewed by this author
resulted in favorable decisions for the gay parent. 585 Mueller v. Mueller,5 8 6 however, did not continue that trend. The trial judge in Mueller
awarded the two children to their nongay father."' The trial judge specifically ignored the recommendations of experts, stating that "[t]he
court is not bound by the testimony of experts ... ."I" The judge
formed his own opinion, "I think the homosexuality of the mother is
severe now, with the oldest child being age ten and can't help become
more severe as the children go into puberty .... -,5 The judge found
the mother to be a fit custodian, and no finding was made of any adverse effect on the children. The case was appealed, with both Lambda
Legal Defense and ACLU filing amicus briefs. In an unpublished deci59 0 In essence,
sion, the appellate court upheld the trial court's award.
the court focused on the deference which should be paid to the trier of
'

452 N.E.2d at 296.
582. Id. at -,
583. Id. (quoting Fort v. Fort, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 415, 425 N.E.2d 754, 759 (1981)).
n.2, 452 N.E.2d at 296 n.2.
584. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 585. See Peterson v. Peterson, No. D-66634 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County May 3, 1978);
In re Hatzantopolis, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2076 (Colo. Juv. Ct., Denver County Dec. 6, 1977).
586. No. 79-DR-1246 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Jefferson County Mar. 27, 1980), aff'd, No. 80-0392
(Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1981).
587 Id., slip op. at 5.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Mueller v. Mueller, No. 80-0392 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1981).
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fact. However, the appellate court also concluded that the trial court
had found a nexus between the mother's conduct and the best interests
of the children.5 91 A review of the trial court record, however, reveals
no such nexus. The mother unsuccessfully sought review from the Colorado Supreme Court. Interestingly, neither the trial court nor the appellate court imposed restrictions of any kind on the mother's visitation.
Probably the most notorious case in recent years, Batey v. Batey,592 was partially heard in a Colorado court, although it was finally
decided in California.5 98 The Batey case began in California where
Frank and Betty Batey were divorced. In the original decree, Betty was
given custody, and Frank was granted liberal visitation. In September,
1982, the California court changed custody from Betty to Frank because Betty had repeatedly denied Frank his visitation rights. The
court also ordered the parties to go into therapy with their son, Brian.
Two weeks into the new custody arrangement, Betty took Brian for a
weekend visitation and never returned. For the next nineteen months,
Frank did not see his son.8 9' Eventually Betty was found in Denver,
Colorado. She was ordered to produce the child for the court; she refused, was found in contempt, and was jailed. The young son then
turned himself in so that his mother might go free. What caused such a
battle over a child? Betty was an extremely zealous member of the
Pentecostal church; Frank was gay. 95
When Brian turned himself into the authorities in Denver, he was
placed in a neutral setting and evaluated. The Colorado court then
honored the valid California decree and returned Brian to the Child
Stealing Unit of San Diego, California. In California, Brian was again
placed in a neutral milieu, and his case brought before the superior
court. 5 " The decision rendered on November 21, 1984 by Judge Judith
McConnell of the superior court illustrates neutrality and fairness towards the gay parent. The issue before the court was a motion for
change of custody from Frank to Betty. The court looked to see if a
change of circumstances had occurred. The judge noted that Frank had
not changed in his situation: he had the same house, the same "companion," and the same love for his son. Betty, too, was the same, said
the judge, including her harsh attitudes toward Brian visiting his fa-

591. Id., slip op. at _.
592. No. 84-DR001745 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County May 7, 1984).
593. Batey v. Batey, No. D162395 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County Sept. 22, 1982).
594. Verified Petition for Enforcement of California Custody Decree at i, Batey v. Batey.
No. 84-DR001745 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County Apr. 13, 1984).
595. Id. at 2.
596. Letter from Larry A. Sinnett, Denver Child Protection Agency caseworker, to Judge
Reed, Denver, Colo. (May 3, 1984) (reporting Brian's new location in California).
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ther. The real change, said the judge, was in Brian. The court found
that although he had aged physically, Brian had regressed intellectually, academically, and emotionally. Moreover, his views against his father had become entrenched. The judge found that many of the
changes in Brian were a direct result of his mother's actions. The judge
acknowledged that reopening the custody issue because of the mother's
she felt
wrongful actions would be inequitable to the father; however,
59 7
interests.
best
child's
the
protect
to
order
in
so
do
to
bound
Where was Brian to be placed? He could not be placed with his
father, said the court, because his ideas against his father were now so
deeply entrenched that he probably would run away. The court said
Mrs. Batey could not have custody "because despite all of the overwhelming evidence . . . of Brian's need for his father, she has willfully
deprived the child of contact with him. She has not taught him to hate
the sin, love the sinner, but . . . has consistently communicated her
59 8
Morewish to Brian that he have no relationship with his father."
provide
to
unwilling
Batey
Mrs.
was
only
not
that
noted
over, the court
Brian with therapy, but she also failed to provide Brian with an education during the nineteen months he was missing. In addition, the court
indicated that Mrs. Batey had treated Brian inappropriately, turning
him into her male protector. The judge decided that Brian would be in
"grave danger" of even greater emotional harm if returned to his
mother. The judge ordered custody to a neutral foster home. Each parent was to have equal visitation. The father's visitation would be unsupervised, and the mother's visitation would be unsupervised so long
as she encouraged Brian's visitation with his father. The judge ordered
Brian back into therapy and into a special school to restore his educational skills. Mrs. Batey was ordered not to disparage her ex-husband
or his lifestyle, and Mr. Batey was ordered not to disparage his ex-wife
or her religion. The judge told Mr. Batey he had to learn to acknowledge Brian's religious beliefs. Finally, speaking of Frank's life partner,
the judge said he presented no "danger to the child and he, of course,
9
may be present at . . . visits." 59 The Batey case made no new case
°00 but generated national media attention on the issue of the sexual
law
597. Batey v. Batey, No. D162395, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County Sept.
22, 1982).
598. Id., slip op. at -.
599. Id., slip op. at i.
600. California case law previously discussed by the author includes: Chaffin v. Frye, 45
Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975); In re Tammy F., No. 32648 (Cal. Ct. App., Sonoma
County Aug. 21, 1973), reported in 2 WOMEN's RIGH-rs L. REP., Dec. 1974, at 21; Jullion v.
Ceccarelli, No. 49874-4 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., Alameda County June 8, 1977); In re Deana
P., No. 10747-J (Cal. App. Dep't Super Ct., Sonoma County July 12, 1973), reported in 2
WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP., Dec. 1974, at 21; Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. 240665 (Cal. App. Dep't
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orientation of a parent.6 01
The state of Washington was the scene of the famous SchusterIsaacson cases which for a long period were the most famous of the
lesbian mother cases. The cases became immortalized in a film and a
book on lesbian parenting. 601 However, Schuster-Isaacson never
squarely faced the issue of sexual orientation in custody decisions. In

Cabalquintov. Cabalquinto,05 the Washington Supreme Court, sitting

en banc, almost faced the issue. Although the court established guide-

lines, it remanded the case to the trial court rather than reversing the

case outright.6 0 ' The Cabalquintos were divorced in Colorado with custody of the minor child going to the mother and liberal visitation to the
father. Shortly after the decree was issued, the mother moved to Washington, and the father moved to California. Approximately four years
after the divorce decree, the father decided he wanted his son to visit
him in California, but the mother refused to permit the visit. The father filed a motion in a Washington state court to enforce the liberal
visitation rights granted him under the Colorado decree. The trial
judge refused to grant visitation in California, and the father
appealed.6 05
The Washington Supreme Court said that, normally, decisions of
trial judges are not disturbed unless the judge has abused his discretion. The supreme court pointed out, however, that the fact Ernest
Cabalquinto was gay raised the issue of an abuse of discretion in this
case. No evidence indicated that visitation in California would be
harmful, nor was there a finding that the child was endangered. The
court admitted that the trial judge had made some "unfortunate and
unnecessary references . . . to homosexuality . . . .",0o
The supreme
court stated that, as a matter of law, "homosexuality in and of itself is
not a bar to custody or to reasonable rights of visitation." 6 The court
emphasized that "[v]isitation rights must be determined with reference
to the needs of the child rather than the sexual preferences of the parSuper. Ct., Santa Clara County June 8,1972); Nadler v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523,
63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 176 Cal. App. 2d 122, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298
(1959). See Rivera 1.supra note I. at 883-904.
601. See. e.g.. Columbus Dispatch, Nov. 22, 1984, at BI; Gay Community News, Nov. 10,
1984, at 2; The Advocate, May 29, 1984, at II; Columbus Citizen-Journal, May 2. 1984, at 1;
N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, at 11;
N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at 11.
602. See Rivera 1,supra note 1,at 898 n.604.
603. 100 Wash. 2d 325, 669 P.2d 886 (1983).
604. Id. at 329, 669 P.2d at 888.
605. Id. at 327, 669 P.2d at 887.
606. Id. at 328, 669 P.2d at 888.
607. Id. at 329. 669 P.2d at 888.
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ent." 0 Moreover, the court warned that visitation privileges are not to
be used to penalize parents for their conduct. Having established the
guidelines, the court remanded to the trial court. The majority chose to
were unable to determine whether clear abuse of
remand because they
60 9
occurred.
discretion
One of the concurring judges castigated his colleagues for not having reversed. Justice Stafford observed that "[a]n examination of the
record below leaves no doubt that the trial judge allowed his declared
6 10
views on homosexuality to color his evaluation of the evidence."
Stafford accused the majority of sweeping the problem under the rug.
Stafford asserted that nothing could be gained by remanding the case
to a judge "who clearly relied on his own personal views to arrive at
1
incorrect reasons for the ultimate ruling."' Stafford would have reversed outright.612 Regardless of the method used, the Cabalquinto
court has placed Washington squarely in the group of states which prohibits the use of a parent's sexual orientation as a determinative factor
against him or her.
6
Two Oregon cases should be noted: 613 Rudhe v. Rudhe " and
Finke v. Finke 15 are both trial court decisions that resulted in clear
victories for the lesbian mothers involved. In both cases, the lesbian
mothers were represented by one of the nationally recognized experts of
gay custody cases, Katherine English. Rudhe was initiated as a motion
to change custody of three children from the mother to the father. The
father focused on the mother's lesbianism and on the virtues of his new
remarriage. The mother countered with expert testimony. She relied on
Oregon law which mandates: "In determining custody . . .the court
shall consider the conduct, marital status, income, social environment
or life style of either party only if it is shown that any of these factors
are causing or may cause emotional or physical damage to the
child." 1 The outcome was that custody remained with the mother,

608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 332, 669 P.2d at 889 (Stafford, J.,concurring & dissenting).
611. Id. at 334, 669 P.2d at 891.
612. Id.
613. Two other Oregon cases have been previously discussed by this author: Ashling v. Ashling, 42 Or. App. 47, 599 P.2d 475 (1979) (appellate court removed harsh restrictions on lesbian
mother's visitation rights); O'Harra v. O'Harra, No. 73-384E (Or. Cir. Ct., 13th Jud. Dist. June
18, 1974) (custody taken from lesbian mother), afd. sub. nom., 0. v. 0., 20 Or. App. 201, 530
P.2d 877 (1975). See Rivera II, supra note 1,at 333-34 (discussing Ashling); Rivera I, supra
note 1, at 884-85 (discussing O'Harra).See also A. v. A., 15 Or. App..353, 514 P.2d 358 (1973)
(gay father retained custody).
614. No. D8104-62623 (Or. Dist. Ct., Multnomah County May 4, 1982).
615. No. 81-7-158 (Or. Dist. Ct., Clackamas County Jan. 25, 1983).
616. OR. REv. STAT. § 107.137(4) (1985).
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and the court ordered the father's child support payments to be
increased.
Finke was tried on a motion by the lesbian mother to modify a
joint custody arrangement to custody in herself. The court awarded
custody to the mother. The father was ordered to pay child support and
the mother's legal fees. In the author's mind, both these cases represent
the genre of cases where the nongay parent's lawyer believes all that is
needed to achieve a victory is to cry "lesbian" in the courtroom. Certainly, this tactic has won in some instances, but when the gay parent is
represented by a lawyer familiar with gay custody cases and strategy,
the result is often the unexpected. Defending a gay parent is an expensive proposition because of the absolute need for expert witnesses. In
Rudhe, the lesbian mother asked that the ex-husband be ordered to pay
for these extra costs incurred to combat homophobia. She was awarded
17
attorney fees.
May, 1985, brought a case of first impression before the Alaska
Supreme Court. In S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 1 s a nongay father sought to
change the custody of his child from the mother, a lesbian in an ongoing relationship, to himself. The trial court awarded custody to the
father. However, the supreme court dictated a nexus requirement for
use in child custody cases, ruling that the scope of judicial inquiry was
limited to facts directly affecting the child's well being.' 9 Thus, a
nexus must exist between the parent's conduct and the parent-child relationship. The father maintained on appeal that the mother's sexual
orientation had not been the issue. The court held otherwise, stating a
taint existed throughout the record. The court commented, "[I]n
marked contrast to the wealth of testimony that Mother is a lesbian,
there is no suggestion that this has or is likely to affect the child
''20
adversely.
The Alaska Supreme Court also held that "it is impermissible to
rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to the mother's
status as a lesbian."62 1 For this proposition, the court cited the recent
United States Supreme Court case of Palmore v. Sidoti.e2 2 Palmore,
which reversed a lower court decision that had removed a child from an
interracial home, provided statements by the Court which not only fit
the interracial situation but the gay custody situation as well. 2 3 The

617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.

Rudhe, No. D8104-62623, slip op. at 3.
No. S426 (Alaska Sup. Ct. May 10, 1985).
Id., slip op. at Id., slip op. at Id., slip op. at _ .
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
See infra text accompanying note 625.
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Alaska Supreme Court determined that the trial court, in changing
custody to the father, had conjectured that the mother's gay relationship might be unstable and cause possible adverse effects. The court
rejected this conclusion, stating that the trial court had relied on its
own unsupported opinion about homosexual relationships, and consequently, the case was remanded. 2 '
The Alaska case brings together two themes which occur throughout many gay custody cases and resolves the issues in a method which
treats in a neutral fashion the sexual orientation of the parent. First,
litigators have fought long and hard to prevent the use of conclusive
presumptions about gay parents. Although the obvious goal is to have
sexual orientation be irrelevant, the short term resolution is to require
the opposing party to show a nexus between the parent's sexual orientation and a proven adverse effect. The Alaska case does exactly that.
The second theme is the charge that the stigma of their parent's sexual
orientation will cause children to be harassed and will thus result in
emotional damage to the child. Gay parents have, by expert testimony,
proven time and time again that gay parents are not child molesters,
that children do not become gay because their parents are gay, and
that being gay does not adversely affect parenting skills. Lastly, in answer to the many cases in which the restrictions have been placed on
the households of gay parents by mandating exclusion of their life partners, studies now show that a loving couple of the same gender does no
harm to the children. In fact, having two parental figures, regardless of
their gender, is beneficial. Yet one issue remains: the children will be
teased.
Litigators on behalf of gay parents have tried various approaches
to counteract this last charge. For example, gay parents point out that
their children will still have a gay parent no matter who has custody.
That may be true, said one court, but if the nongay parent has custody
the issue will not be an everyday affair. Other litigators have attempted
to introduce evidence that no teasing has occurred. That method did
not remove the possibility of teasing in the future. Experts have testified that the potential harm of teasing really depends upon how the
custodial parents handle the issue and support the children. All of these
arguments fail to reach the real issue: why should the actions of intolerant people toward innocent children cause otherwise fit parents to
lose custody of their children? Palmore answers that question and the
Alaska court adopted that answer. As Chief Justice Burger stated:
624. S.N.E., No. S426, slip op. at _. A secondary issue in S.N.E. revolved around a "gag"
order issued by the trial court judge. The Alaska Supreme Court found the order an overbroad
restriction of free speech. Id., slip op. at -.
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There is a risk that a child living with a step parent of a different race
may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the
child were living with parents of same racial or ethnic origin.
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and
the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We
have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
62
indirectly, give them effect. 5
The question is, of course, how long before the words "sexual orientation" can be substituted for race? At least in Alaska, the words have
already been substituted and the analogy completed.
In summary, looking at the cases geographically, patterns of
change exist. The cases argued in the ten years between 1970 and 1980
laid the groundwork for the successes of the 1980's. In those areas of
the country where gay consciousness was sufficient to encourage parents to fight for their children in the 1970's, the results were often very
harsh on the gay parent. Unfortunately those very personal losses were
necessary to make today's victories possible. The main task of litigators
on behalf of their gay clients in custody cases has been to educate the
court. The myths and stereotypes surrounding gay persons have pervaded the bench as well as the public. Until judges could see gay
mothers and fathers as distinct human beings, rather than as erotic
monsters, few reasoned decisions were possible. Simultaneously, social
and behavioral scientists have sought to answer the questions surrounding gay parenting. These studies, coupled with a better understanding
of gay people in general, have led the courts to begin to see gay parents
in a more balanced perspective. The author does not subscribe to a
position that all gay men and women should be awarded their children
in custody battles. Rather, the author's position is that in the determination of the fitness of a parent, same-sex or mixed-sex behavior is only
relevant if a direct adverse effect on the child can be shown. When the
author has spoken of gay victories, the victory is for the principle that
sexual orientation should be a neutral factor in such decisions.
Aside from the education of the bench, the most significant factor
contributing to changes in the law has been the development of a gay
custody bar and through these litigators, the development of a litigation
strategy for custody cases involving a gay father or a lesbian mother.
This strategy has been discussed in a number of law review articles and
most completely, in the Lesbian Mother Litigation Manual published
625. Palmore, 466 US. at 433 (footnote omitted).
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by the Lesbian Rights Project. 2 Another source is Chapter 1:03 in
Sexual Orientation and the Law. 27 One of the main purposes of such
information is to convince attorneys who have never litigated a gay custody case that such a case is not a run-of-the-mill case. Too often, wellmeaning family law attorneys attempt to litigate gay custody cases only
to discover too late the complexities involved in such litigation.
While changes in the law are happening, the changes are taking
place at a discriminatory cost to gay litigants. To educate the court,
numerous experts are required and expert witnesses' fees mount up
quickly. Usually, guardians ad litem are appointed, psychological examinations of all parties are ordered, and hearings are unusually long.
Gay litigants must bear enormous costs merely to win an objective and
neutral hearing. Obviously, the emotional costs are even higher. The
time will come when the attorney for a nongay parent cannot simply
walk into the courtroom and shout "homosexuality" and expect to win.
When standards are neutral, divorcing parents, gay and nongay alike,
28
can really achieve the best interests of their children.

626. See D. HITCHENS, LESBIAN MOTHER LITIGATION MANUAL (1982).
627. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1982). See
also C. ARTHUR & K. ENGLISH, AN EXPERT TESTIFIES IN A LESBIAN PARENTING CHILD CUSTODY
CASE (1980); HARAMLAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES (19-_); WELLMAN. A THEORY
OF RIGHTS (1985); ANTI-SEXISM COMMITTEE OF THE SAN FRANCISO-BAY AREA NATIONAL LAW-

(1978); Davies, Representing
the Lesbian Mother, I FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1979, at 21; Hitchens & Price, Lesbian Mother
Custody Cases: The Use of Expert Testimony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 451 (1978-79);
Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy,
25 BUFFALO L. REV. 691 (1976); Lambe, Handling Contested Custody Cases, CASE & COM.,
July-Aug. 1983, at 2; Litwack, Gerber & Ferester, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child
Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAM. L. 269 (1979-80); Nacheman, The Gay Parent: A Special Custody
Case, I OR. ST. B.F. 1 (1979); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 4th 997 (1985); Graham, Rand & Rawlings,
Psychological Adjustment and Factors the Court Seeks to Control in Lesbian Mother Custody
Trials (Sept. 4, 1979) (unpublished manuscript presented before the 87th Annual Convention of
YERS GUILD. A GAY PARENT'S LEGAL GUIDE TO CHILD CUSTODY

the American Psychological Association).
628. As stated by one commentator in summarizing the situation:
The unknown quantity in this analysis, the effect of cohabitation on the child, is perhaps the most important. Society is changing so rapidly in the area of acceptable and
normal family patterns that the results of any particular arrangement are unclear. However, one may safely conclude that a child is influenced by many forces besides his home.
Heredity, peers, the media and society all influence the growing child. Therefore, the court
should not place too much emphasis upon any one facet of the child's life. Rather than
establishing a presumption that cohabitation of a custodial parent will wreak moral havoc,
the court must look at the advantages and disadvantages offered by each party seeking
custody. This required analysis will certainly make custody adjudications more difficult,
but custody is an important decision deserving in-depth consideration. The result the court
reaches, whether to leave the child with the cohabiting parent or to remove him, is not as
important as fully analyzing the situation. The question in these kinds of cases is not one of
abstract morality, but of the effect a custodial parent's health and character have on the
child. If the child is happy, well-adjusted, and in a stable home and the cohabitation is
having no obvious ill effect on him, it is in the child's best interest to remain with his
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Gay Family

Unrecognized Families was the title given to comparable sections
in previous articles."29 The use of the title Gay Family emphasizes two
significant changes in recent years. First, gay people, when forming
family units, ea0 are taking a more aggressive posture toward society
and the legal system. They are actively seeking recognition for those
family units. For example, in some cities gay persons have successfully
lobbied for domestic partnership acts.6 's Second, lawyers representing
such family units are seeking more sophisticated methods of protecting
these units.8 2 These lawyers also recognize that gay cohabitants do
have aims and problems that differ from those of mixed-sex cohabitants. Nongay cohabitants can always marry to protect their units,
should they so choose. Moreover, cohabitation by nongays, while some-

cohabiting parent.
Mendel, Custody and the Cohabiting Parent, 20 J. FAM. L. 697, 718-19 (1981-82) (citations
omitted).
629. See. e.g., Rivera I, supra note 1, at 904.
630. One of the myths about gay people is that they lead lonely, isolated lives, condemned
to promiscuity. In a recent book, however, two commentators concluded that gay relationships and
nongay relationships, and their variety, are more similar than diverse. See generally A. BELL &
M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUAULTIES (1978). They identify three major "classifications": close-coupled, open-coupled, and functionals. Close-coupled describes partners who are "closely bound together" and who "tend to look to each other rather than to outsiders" for sexual and interpersonal
satisfactions. These couples, when compared to other classifications in the study, were the least
likely to seek partners outside their special relationships, had the smallest amount of sexual
problems, and were unlikely to regret being homosexual. Open-coupled are described as living
with a special sexual partner but tending to seek satisfactions with people outside the partnership.
In most aspects of their social and psychological adjustment, the open-couples could not be distinguished from the homosexual respondents as a whole. Functionals are described as closest to
.swinging singles." They were least likely to regret being homosexual and were very involved in
the gay world.
Even the Crittenden Report, a study done by the Navy in 1957, recognized that gay people
often lived in long-term relationships. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. See generally
L. FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN (1981) (describing "Boston marriages," essentially unions, not necessarily sexual, between women).
631. In November, 1982, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a "domestic partnership" ordinance, introduced by Supervisor Harry Britt. It was vetoed by Mayor Diane Feinstein in December, 1982. The measure would have required that officially declared domestic partners of gay city employees be given the same treatment in areas such as health insurance and
bereavement leave that is accorded spouses of nongay employees. Gay Community News, Dec. 25,
1982, at I. Berkeley, California became the first city to give unmarried employees' "domestic
partnership" benefit coverage. The policy, fully effective in March, 1985, requires city workers
seeking "domestic partnership" coverage to file an affidavit attesting that the partners are not
married, that both share the common necessities of life, and that both are responsible for their
common welfare. See II FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1151, 1151-52 (Jan. 29, 1985).
632. See R. ACHTENBERG. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1985) (chapters 1-4 deal
with family and property); H. CURRY & D. CUFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY
COUPLES (1980) (contains information regarding the buying and selling of property, dealing with
child custody and visitation, estate planning, and contractual "living together" arrangements).
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what disapproved in society, can be assimilated as a trial run before the
nuptials. Choosing to live together, for gay persons, often can lead to
"talk" and thus blow their cover, i.e., their closet.
Many gay couples want to be legally married. They desire the
symbolism and recognition of the marital relationship, and the financial
and legal benefits enjoyed by married couples. 63 3 However, marriages
between persons of the same sex are not legally recognized anywhere in
'
the United States." ' While many gay couples have been "married in

religious ceremonies, the religious validity of such ceremonies is not
recognized by most denominations; the ceremonies are at the discretion
of individual clergypersons who do not have the approval of the whole
denomination.618 The Unitarian-Universalists have officially approved
such ceremonies. " The Metropolitan Community Church also offi63 7
cially approves of these ceremonies which are called Holy Unions.

Regardless of any religious significance, these ceremonies do not affect
the couple's legal status.
Just as the law does not recognize the formation of these family

units, the law also does not provide a mechanism for the dissolution of
these units. 38 Hence, uncoupling can cause serious legal problems for
which no specific remedy exists. For example, suppose a couple buys a
home and takes title in both names. Years later, the couple breaks up.
If the couple had no contract providing for this eventuality, how is the
real estate divided? In a marriage, the divorce court can order a sale of

633. Desirable legal benefits include tax advantages when joint filing would be advantageous, recovery of damages for actions such as wrongful death, receipt of social security, military
and veterans' benefits, and insurance coverage. See Note, Religion and Morality Legislation. A
Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 389 n.379 (1984). See
also Van Gelder, Marriage as a Restricted Club, MS., Feb. 1984, at 59.
634. See Rivera II, supra note i, at 324; Rivera I, supra note i, at 904; Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982). Some
countries, however, are considering recognition of such unions. See The Bells are Ringing in Sweden, Gay Community News, June 13, 1981, at 2. See also supra notes 340-53 and accompanying
text.
635. See Homosexual Weddings Stir Dispute, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1984, at B4, col. I
(describing the controversy sparked in Syracuse, N.Y., by the Grace Episcopal Church rector's
approval of the Ray of Hope Metropolitan Community Church's use of the Episcopal church for
worship and gay marriages).
636. See Gay and Lesbian Weddings Affirmed By Church, Gay Community News, July 14,
1984, at 2; Unitarian Assembly OKs Gay Marriages,Columbus Citizen-Journal, June 29, 1984,
at 11.
637. The Metropolitian Community Church is a church whose ministry is aimed predominantly at the gay community. Holy Unions are religious commitment or joining ceremonies. Holy
Unions are also performed by clergy involved with groups such as DIGNITY (Catholic gay community organization), Integrity (Episcopal), and Lutherans Concerned. See Columbus CitizenJournal, June 14, 1984, at 1I (discussing gay unions).
638. See supra notes 340-45 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
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the home or order transfer of title to one of the parties based on the
court's equity powers. The gay couple, if they cannot agree on a
method of separation, is forced into an action for partition. Not only is
such a suit time-consuming and expensive, neither party may have kept
records which could be used to prove his or her contribution to the
purchase and maintenance of the property. The intermingling of funds
expected in a traditional marriage poses acute problems of proof in a
gay union.
How have gay couples handled divorce? Using a variety of causes
of action, they have sued each other. One of the earliest cases, of those
discoverable, is the California case of Richardson v. Conley.63 9 Denease
Conley and Sherry Richardson not only had a Holy Union at the Metropolitan Community Church, but also signed a written agreement
wherein Conley agreed to support Richardson. When the couple broke
up, Richardson took Conley to court on a contract theory, similar to
that used in Marvin v. Marvin."' The California Superior Court
awarded Richardson support of one hundred dollars per month from
Conley."'
Not all couples live in California. In the case of Cox v. Elwing,"'
the parties, Don Cox and David Elwing lived in Chicago, Illinois,
where they met and married in a Holy Union at the Metropolitan
Community Church. Elwing moved to Washington, D.C. because of a
job opportunity, and Cox followed. Cox gave up his job and devoted his
time to maintenance of their joint home. Upon their breakup, Cox
claimed that Elwing had made express promises to support him until he
became employed again. Cox sued in the District of Columbia Superior
Court on a quantum meruit theory, alleging an oral promise to support
him in return for maintaining a common domicile and renovating certain property. The superior court granted Elwing's motion for judgment
on the pleadings, and Cox appealed."' The appellate court vacated the
judgment and remanded, stating that material and factual issues existed which needed to be resolved. Thus, Cox was awarded his day in

639. 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2532 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 27, 1978). See The Advocate, July
12, 1978, at 12; Bliss. Then Divorce-All Very Ladylike, Columbus Citizen-Journal, June 3,
1978, at 5.
640. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). In Marvin, the California
Supreme Court held that either party to a nonmarital relationship could enforce an express
or
implied agreement dividing accumulated property, and that express contracts between unmarried
cohabitants could be enforced "except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on
the
consideration of meretricious sexual services." Id. at 661, 557 P.2d at 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
641. Richardson, 4 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) at 2572.
642. 432 A.2d 736 (D.C. 1981).
643. Id. at 737.
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court." 4
Of seeming importance in the Cox decision was the fact that the
plaintiff did not mention sexual services as part of the bargain. In
Jones v. Daly,6" 5 however, the admission of sexual relations resulted in
dismissal of the action. Randal Jones brought suit against the ;state of
James Daly claiming that Daly promised to support him. Jones claimed
that in return for this promise, he was to quit his job and "devote a
substantial portion of his time to Daly's benefit as his lover, companion,
'
Jones
homemaker, traveling companion, housekeeper and cook."
claimed that he met all these obligations until Daly's death. As in Conley the basis of Jones' suit was the Marvin decision. In Jones, the trial
court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the appellate court
affirmed. 4 The court noted that the Marvin decision required that a
6 48 The
cohabitant's suit "not rest on illicit meretricious consideration.
Jones court found that the facts clearly indicated that the "rendition ' of9
sexual services to Daly was an inseparable part of the consideration.""
Hence, the agreement was not enforceable. °
More recently, two very famous persons found themselves in the
midst of same-sex cohabitant suits, both in California. Billie Jean King
65 1 In
was sued by Marilyn Barnett on a Marvin-like cause of action.
her pleadings, Barnett described the sexual and emotional intimacies of
the two women and alleged that King had made an express oral contract to support Barnett for the rest of Barnett's life. King answered
Barnett's complaint, admitting the intimacies but denying any contractual undertaking. In addition, King counterclaimed for unlawful detainer. Barnett's suit was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
52
To illustrate just how viand King won the unlawful detainer suit.
brought suit against Barreportedly
has
King
get,
can
suits
cious such

644. Unfortunately, the final outcome is unknown to the author. None of the attorneys
listed as counsel could be located.
645. 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981).
646. Id. at 505, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
647.

Id.

648. Id. at 507, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 18Cal. 3d 660, 674, 557
P.2d 106, 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1976)). See supra note 640.
649. Jones, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The only permissible sale of
sexual services is in marriage.
650. On appeal, the attorneys for Jones felt that the suit could have been won if no admission of sexual services had been made at the trial level. Jones' appellate attorneys very carefully
pointed out that they did not represent Jones at the trial level. Interview with Sheldon W. Andelson, of Andelson & Andelson, Los Angeles, Cal., attorney for Jones at appellate court level (July
17, 1985).
651. Barnett v. King, No. C365232 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County Dec. 22, 1982).
652. King v. Barnett, No. C274391 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County June 4, 1981).
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nett and her lawyer for malicious prosecution.153
In 1982, Liberace found himself in a similar position when he was
sued by Scott Thorson. 6 "4 Thorson alleged both a Marvin-like cause of
action and a more traditional action in contract. The trial judge dismissed the former action because the contract was for sexual services. 65 The cause of action in contract remains before the court and
has not yet been tried or settled.
A final case of interest is Ruth v. Smith,e5 e an Ohio action. In this
case the parties, James Ruth and Tommy Smith, separated after
cohabitating for over twenty years. During that period of time, their
monetary affairs became inextricably entwined. For a variety of reasons, many pieces of property were in Smith's name. When Smith left,
he allegedly conveyed away their joint home to a third party without
Ruth's permission and sold his interest in their joint business without
notice to his former mate. Ruth brought suit, in part alleging a partnership and asking for an accounting and dissolution. Since Smith had
owed him money, making Ruth a creditor, Ruth alleged that the sale of
the residence was a fraudulent conveyence. In addition, Ruth also argued a traditional contract theory. Finally, he asked that a constructive
trust be imposed on the proceeds of the sale. Smith's answer to most of
the claims alleged by Ruth was that everything he received was a gift
"for his companionship, affection and service." Ruth never makes any
reference to their intimacy, but Smith refers to Ruth as his cohabitor.
The Ohio court will probably find the contract tainted with sexual services and dismiss the case. If that is the result, the manifest injustice is
apparent. In Ohio, sex between two persons of the same sex is not criminal; the participants, however, are punished nonetheless. If Ruth's allegations are true, then Smith has taken financial advantage of him;
Smith can benefit merely by naming their relationship for what it really was. Thus, Ruth would have no remedy under Ohio's current legal
system.
Presenting all the legal theories raised by James Ruth concerning
the now-defunct relationship required creative lawyering. Until society
either grants some legal recognition to gay couples or until all couples
enter into written agreements providing for dissolution, creative lawyer-

653. Telephone interview with Dennis M. Wasser, of Wasser, Rosenson & Carter, Los Angeles, Cal., attorney for King (July 15, 1985). See Granelli, Palimony Courts Get New Players,
Nat'l L.J., May 18, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
654. Thorson v. Liberace, No. C428492 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County Oct. 14,
1985).
655. Id., slip op. at _. See Liberace Trial Ordered, Columbus Citizen-Journal, Mar. 21,
1985. at 3.
656. No. 83CV-12-69 (Ohio C.P. Ct.. Franklin County filed Dec. 7, 1983).
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ing will be needed.
One option which has been utilized by gay couples to give their
7
relationship legal status has been adult adoption," in which one member of the life partnership adopts the other. Two immediate benefits
accrue: first, the adopted "child" will inherit from his or her new "parent" without benefit of a will and vice-versa; second, the parties to the
adoption can legally be defined as a family.e6 Two detriments, however, are also immediately evident. Adoption is forever; you cannot divorce your child or your parent. In addition, the adult who is adopted
and who is technically the child of the relationship may lose inheritance
rights from his or her biological family. Aside from the practical benefits and detriments, a larger policy issue still looms. Should adults who
are in a sexual relationship be allowed to adopt one another? Does this
relationship constitute incest? Should the state allow a "pseudo
marriage"?
Only three reported cases involving adult adoption among gay persons exist, and all three arose in New York. In 1981, the Family Court
of Kings County, New York, granted the adoption of one gay man by
another.159 The purpose of the adoption, according to the court, was
'
that the parties "wished to establish a more permanent legal bond."
In this case, the younger of the two men adopted the older because the
younger did not wish to cut off his inheritance expectations from his
biological family. The two men said they wished to establish legal and
economic responsibility for one another. They indicated that "even if
there were a failing in intimacy, there would still be a bond, a responsibility." ' The court ruled out a public policy-public morals argument,
noting that homosexual acts were no longer criminal in New York after
People v. Onofre.1e 1 Because the court viewed the couple's purpose as
seeking valid legal and economic benefits, the adoption was upheld.
Only ten months later, the Family Court of New York County,
3
New York, came to the opposite conclusion." The couple in that instance consisted of two gay men with the younger seeking to adopt the
older. The court held that "such an adoption would violate the intent of

657. See Comment, Adult Adoption: A "New" Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 667 (1984).
658. The second benefit is of particular interest where, for example, a rental lease restricts
occupancy to family members.
659. In re Anonymous, 106 Misc. 2d 792, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Fain. Ct. 1981).
660. Id. at 793, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
661. Id.
662. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987

(1981).
663. In re Adult Anonymous 11, 111 Misc. 2d 320, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Fain. Ct. 1981),
rev'd. 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1982).
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the Domestic Relations Law and do violence to the public policy that
generates this state's laws on adoption."' " The court expressed sympathy with "the yearning of two decent people living exemplary, productive lives who are seeking to obtain some legal recognition of the bond
that exists between them."" 8 However, the adoption was disapproved.
The parties appealed, and the decision was reversed."" The appellate
court said adult adoption "is permissible as long as the parties' purpose
is neither insincere nor fraudulent."' 667 The court, while noting that homosexual relationships were not criminal in New York, also stated that
the couple did not seek adoption to cultivate their sexual relationship
but rather to formalize themselves as a family for both symbolic and
highly practical reasons."6 Justice Asch took exception to the opinion
of the lower court and took judicial notice that the "'nuclear' family
arrangement is no longer the only model of family life in America." e 9
He stated that a court could not deny an adoption petition simply on
the basis of the court's view of what a family should be. He described
the family as "a continuing relationship of love and care, and an assumption of responsibility for some other person,I' 7 M adding that such a
relationship "[c]ertainly [was] present in the instant case."671 Justice
Sullivan registered a strong dissent, calling the situation a "subversion"
and a "cynical distortion" of the adoption process. 72
The third New York adoption case eventually reached the highest
New York court; the adoption petition was denied.7 3 In the case of In
re Robert Paul P.,67 4 the adoption had initially been denied at both the
family court level and at the appellate division level. 675 The New York

664. Id. at 320, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 1009.
665. Id. at 322, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 1010. The court also stated, "The relationship is no longer
what it was for Oscar Wilde and Lord Alfred Douglas-the love that dares not speak its name."
Id.
666. In re Adult Anonymous i, 88 A.D.2d 30, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1982), rev'g, I1IMisc.
2d 320, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Fain. Ct. 1981).
667. Id. at 31, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
668. Id. at 34-35, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 201. One of the practical reasons was the giving of
consent in medical situations when one of the two might be hospitalized. See infra notes 763-64
and accompanying text.
669. Anonymous !!,88 A.D.2d at 35, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 38, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
673. In re Robert P., 117 Misc. 2d 279, 458 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Fain. Ct.), affd sub nom. In re
Pavlik, 97 A.D.2d 991, 469 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1983), affd sub nom. In re Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d
233. 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984).
674. 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984).
675. See In re Robert P., II7 Misc. 2d 279, 458 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Fain. Ct.), afd sub nom.
In re Pavlik, 97 A.D.2d 991. 469 N Y.S.2d 833 (1983).
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Court of Appeals affirmed . 7 The two gay men in this adoption were
fifty-seven and fifty-years-old and had lived together for twenty-five
years. In their petition of adoption, the two listed a variety of economic,
legal, and practical reasons for the adoption. However, their bottom
line was, "[s]imply stated we are a family and seek to formalize
such. 6 77 Quoting Justice Sullivan's dissent in the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division case In re Adult Anonymous II, the court of
appeals described the use of adoption in this context as "a cynical distortion of the adoption function."678 The purpose of the adoption statute was to create a filial relationship, and "sexual intimacy is utterly
repugnant" to such a relationship.6 79 The issue, the court said, had
nothing to do with a concept of private morality nor with the morality
of the parties' conduct; rather, the issue addressed was whether the
New York Domestic Relations Law was an appropriate means to formalize an indisputedly non-filial relationship between sexual partners.
The court's answer was in the negative. The court maintained, however, that the ruling applied equally to nongay persons as well as to gay

persons.680
The dissent, in its opinion, concluded that nothing in the statute
81 What
provided for an inquiry into the sexual habits of the parties.
the parties desired in this case was the legal status of parent and child
with its concomitant rights and responsibilities. According to the dissenting judge's reasoning, these motives were proper and were within
the purview of the statute.68 2 However, the majority denied the adoption, thus rendering unavailable that method of formalizing a relationship between New York citizens."s At trial, in the adoption case of In
re Robert Paul P., the family court said that the parties were utilizing
adoption for purposes which were properly served by marriage, wills,
and business contracts. Ohio has a unique statute that provides against
all the criticisms leveled at the use of adoption by gay couples. By Ohio
statute an adult cannot adopt another adult except under very limited
circumstances.6 84 However, under another statute, an adult can desig-

676. Robert Paul P., in re 63 N.Y.2d at 235, 471 N.E.2d at 425, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
677. Id. at 235 n.1, 471 N.E.2d at 425 n.1, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 653 n.I.
678. Id. at 238, 471 N.E.2d at 427, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (quoting Anonymous 11, 88
A.D.2d at 38, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 203 (Sullivan J., dissenting)).
679. Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d at 236, 471 N.E.2d at 425, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
680. Id. at 236-39, 471 N.E.2d at 425-27, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 653-55.
681. See id. at 239-42, 471 N.E.2d at 427-29, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 655-57 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
682. Id. at 242, 471 N.E.2d at 429, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
683. Id. at 239, 471 N.E.2d at 427, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
684. In Ohio, an adult may only be adopted:
(1) If he is totally and permanently disabled;
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nate an heir.6 85 A person so designated will inherit from the party who
so designates as if the designee were the designator's child. The statute
is not an adoption statute so it cannot be argued that its use is a "cynical distortion of filial relationships." Moreover, the designation need
not last forever. After one year, the designator can withdraw the designation.6 80 The use of adoption to formalize a gay relationship always
faces a problem of what happens should the relationship fail. The designation of an heir is relatively simple in Ohio. The parties merely appear before a probate judge with two disinterested witnesses and state
their intentions.6 8 7 A couple can each designate one another as heir. 88
Revocation of the designation of an heir is by a similar process.68 9 The
major difference is that the relationship becomes legally viable only on
the death of one of the parties, 9 0 unlike adoption where the persons'
positions change while they are alive.
For gay couples, marriage, even "pseudo-marriage," is not available. Contracts may be helpful, but only if the taint of sexuality is carefully avoided. What of wills? One of the main worries surrounding the
wills of a gay couple is that the biological families will contest the wills
with charges of undue influence. This problem has been explored extensively by Jeffrey Sherman in his article Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator.6'1 Sherman looked at the few cases that reveal the
sexual orientation of the testator and his legatee. Four such published
cases exist, although two cases shed little light on the subject. 9 ' Of

(2) If he is determined to be a mentally retarded person as defined in section
5123.01 of the Revised Code;
(3) If he had established a child-foster parent or child-stepparent relationship with
the petitioners as a minor, and he consents to the adoption.
Otuo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02(B) (Page Supp. 1984).
685. Id. § 2105.15 (Page 1976).
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. Id.
691. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225
(1981).
692. The first case is In re Anonymous, 75 Misc. 2d 133, 347 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Surrogate's
Ct. 1973). This case involved a will contest where undue influence was charged based on a samesex relationship between the testator and the legatee. However, the undue influence issue was
never reached because the legatee refused to answer discovery questions about sexual relations, on
the basis of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court granted him transactional immunity to answer the questions. According to Sherman, the case was settled before
trial, so the undue influence issue was never resolved. Sherman, supra note 691, at 234. The
second case is In re Larendon's Estate, 216 Cal. App. 2d 14, 30 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In
Larendon, the testator was murdered by his legatee. At that time in California, no statute prevented a murderer from benefiting from the decedent's estate; the charge of undue influence was
therefore brought. To read about the murder which is particularly gruesome, see People v. Dal-
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e
interest is In re Spaulding's Estate," where the will of the homosexual testator was upheld against a charge of undue influence. Although
the court noted that "an unnatural sexual relation" existed between the
decedent and his beneficiary," 4 it held that the mere existence of this
5
relationship was insufficient to create undue influence." Another note6 " characterized by Sherman as
worthy case is In re Kaufmann's Will,
6 7 What one notices in these
a "clear example of judicial homophobia."
decisions is that the courts expect, in traditional mixed-sex marriages,
that the partners will have a strong influence on one another. However,
the influence of a gay person on his or her partner is treated as unnatural and "undue." In Kaufmann, the decedent wrote a letter to his family to prevent the suit that was subsequently brought. In the letter, he
said:

"Walter [his lover and beneficiary] gave me the courage to start something which slowly but eventually permitted me to supply for myself everything my life heretofore lacked: an outlet for my long-latent but strong
creative ability in painting . . . a balanced, healthy sex life which before
had been spotty, furtive and destructive; an ability to reorientate myself
to actual life . . . All of this adds up to Peace of Mind-what a delight, what a relief after so many wasted, dark, groping, fumbling imma60 8
ture years to be reborn and become adult!"
on reality" 6 "
The court asserted that this letter was "not based
and its "emotional base" was "gratitude utterly unreal, highly exagger7
ated and pitched to a state of fervor and ecstasy."1 00 Another description might have simply said this was a letter written by a man in love.
Needless to say, the legatee lost and the money went to Kaufmann's
dispostion. 7 0 1
nieces and nephews, "[a] natural plan of testamentary
After his review and analysis, Sherman concluded: "[A] homosexual
testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands in
greater risk of having his testamentary plans overturned than does a

ton, 201 Cal. App. 2d 396, 20 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962).
693. 83 Cal. App. 2d 15, 187 P.2d 889 (1947).
694. Id. at 16, 187 P.2d at 890.
695. Id. at 22, 187 P.2d at 893 ("Only by entering upon the field of conjecture could a jury
have decided that in making this will decedent was moved not by his own unnatural inclination
but by undue pressure of proponent.").
696. 20 A.D.2d 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964), aflfd. 15 N.Y.2d 825, 205 N.E.2d 864, 257
N.Y.S.2d 941 (1965). For a thorough discussion of this case, see Sherman, supra note 691, at
239-46. See also infra notes 698-702 and accompanying text.
697. Sherman, supra note 691, at 239.
698. Kaufmann, 20 A.D.2d at 470, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
699. Id. at 471, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
700. Id. at 474, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
701. Id. at 486, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
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heterosexual testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to a spouse
7 02
or lover.1
Lawyers representing gay clients who wish to have wills drawn expend a great deal of effort tailoring the wills in order to prevent or
defeat contests brought by the biological families. Some attorneys suggest a video tape of the signing with a statement by the testator. Others
use in terrorem or no contest clauses.703 Testators are advised to leave
some items to the natural objects of their testamentary affections, i.e.,
their biological family. In wills made by traditional spouses, each
spouse is often nominated the other's executor. In gay wills, cautious
attorneys urge a neutral executor if the gay spouse is the primary beneficiary. The devices are numerous but the results remain to be seen.704
The will contest over the estate of John D. McBride illustrates an
attempt by a biological family to overturn a gay testator's will. 70 5 John
McBride died in 1983, leaving an estate valued at over $150,000 to a
named trustee:
"[T]o be devoted to furthering the civil rights of American homosexuals,
one half. . . to be devoted to aid and assist those homosexuals who have
been victims of legal duress, with the other one-half used in helping to
further in the courts and the U.S. Congress abolition of restriction of any
kind or nature against the civil rights of homosexuals. ' ' 7"
The will had been drawn by a Pennsylvania attorney, the executor
named was a Pennsylvania bank, and the estate's assets were in Pennsylvania. McBride had lived in Pennsylvania until his retirement two
years before his death. He spent his last two years in Mexico. McBride's will was challenged by two nieces who were not mentioned in
the contested will nor in McBride's previous will. In fact, whether McBride knew the two women at all is unclear. The nieces made two
claims. One was that McBride's will was invalid under Mexican law
where they claimed he was domiciled and, hence, he actually died intestate. Secondly, if the will was technically valid, McBride lacked testamentary capacity due to senility and alcoholism. If either of their
arguments succeeded, the nieces would inherit under the law of intes-

702. Sherman, supra note 691, at 267.
703. For a model will incorporating such provisions, see R. ACHTENBERG, supra note 632,
at 4-41 app. 4B.
704. See supra note 632 and accompanying text. See also R. RIVERA, OUR RIGHT To LOVE
(1978) (chapter entitled Legal Planning for Loving Relationships).
705. In re Estate of McBride, No. 251 (Pa. C.P. Ct., Orphan's Ct. Div., Erie County Sept.
20, 1984).
706. Amended Petition for Appeal to Probate, In re Estate of McBride, No. 251 (Pa. C.P.
Ct., Orphan's Ct. Div., Erie County May 4, 1984) (section 1iB of attached McBride will).
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tacy. 707 At first, the named trustee refused to fight the nieces, thus
prompting five different gay rights groups to attempt to intervene.
However, the trustee did eventually agree to contest the nieces' allegations.708 On January 4, 1985, the court declared the will valid. Although the further allegation that McBride lacked testamentary capacity was withdrawn, 709 the nieces indicated that they would appeal the
probate court's decision with regard to the validity of the will. However, in May, 1985, the nieces agreed to settle for six thousand dollars.
In upholding the will's validity, Judge Dwyer said: "No doubt there
may be many people who would disagree with the propriety of such a
distribution, but since a testator has a right to dispose of his property in
any manner not illegal or against public policy, such disposition must
be allowed . ..."10

The laws of intestacy not only favor biological family members but
also protect the rights of spouses. A gay person must, therefore, use a
will if the goal is to guarantee that his or her spousal equivalent will be
a beneficiary upon his or her death.
Other important benefits hinge on the marital relationship. Fringe
benefits which accrue to spouses are among the most important employment perquisites. The ability to enroll one's spouse in medical, dental, and vision care plans is an expected fringe benefit in today's society. Similarly, the right of survivorship in an employee's retirement
plan is a benefit which also accrues automatically to traditional
spouses. Death benefits in various entitlement programs are also frequently tied to the marital relationship. Life-partners of gay employees,
however, are generally not entitled to any of the aforementioned benefits. As a result, the gay employee in a committed relationship receives
substantially less compensation than the married nongay employee.
The battle to equalize job benefits is, without a doubt, the new
issue facing gay rights litigators. The front lines of the battle are probprotect gay emably in California and Wisconsin, the two states which
711 Another battleemployment.
public
ployees both in private and
ground is within large private corporations which have already

707. Id.
708. The trustee retained as his counsel the local lawyer retained by The Advocate, National Gay Alliance. Lambda, and the National Gay Task Force. Lambda Reports, Apr. 2, 1985,
at _.
709. Id.
See Gay Community News, Feb. 2, 1985, at 1.
710. McBride, No. 251, slip op. at -.
711. Wisconsin has the first statewide gay rights statute. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31
(West Supp. 1985). California has an executive order which covers public employees. Cal. Exec.
Order B-54-79 (Apr. 4, 1979). Case law in California also brings open gay employees under the
24 Cal. 3d
California Labor Code. See. e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
(1979).
14
458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr.
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discovered that "prohibitions against hiring homosexuals make neither
economic nor social sense."7"2 A third battleground is in labor negotiations by those unions which have taken an official stand opposing discrimination against gay union members.71 3 Finally, the battle is being
waged by state employees in at least two of the states which have executive orders: Ohio and New York. 1 4
Aside from intense lobbying and pressure, the issue of benefits
equality is the subject of a number of suits, many of them far from
final disposition. The case of Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,71 however, has been resolved. On November 26, 1976,
Thomas Finnerty died, following a short hospitalization caused by a
suicide attempt. Prior to his death, Finnerty was found to be one-hundred percent disabled as a result of an injury to his nervous system. On
January 4, 1977, plaintiff Earl Donovan applied to the California
Worker's Compensation Board for death benefits as a dependent of
Finnerty. He alleged that Finnerty's disability had left the decedent
with a suicidal tendency, and thus Finnerty's death was job related. On
July 18, 1978, the application was denied because the board held that
Donovan's relationship with Finnerty was "illicit," and therefore, he
could not be a "good faith member of Finnerty's household. 71 Donovan petitioned for reconsideration, and the same judge denied his petition, saying, "[T]he legislature could not have conceived, in imposing
the good faith requirement for dependency, that is (sic) could be diluted to include the relationship of homosexual lovers. The requirement
of good faith does in fact import 'moral content .... .',"'7 Donovan
appealed to the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. The
appeals board took additional testimony on the issue of the cause of
Finnerty's death and on Donovan's economic dependency on Finnerty.
The appeals board subsequently found that Donovan had not proven

712. Muskowitz, Job Rights for Gays: The Price Tag Gets Higher, Bus. WK., Nov. 26,
1984, at 133.
713. See Rivera, Part I, supra note 1, at 476-78.
714. For a listing of these executive orders, see infra note 749. Pennsylvania also has an
executive order, but at the present time the author knows of no action being taken with regard to
this particular issue. See Pa. Exec. Order No. 1975-5 (Sept. 19, 1975) (commitment toward equal
rights). New Mexico's Governor has also issued an executive order, thus becoming the fifth state
governor to do so. See N.M. Exec. Order No. 85-15 (Apr. 1, 1985). The order forbids discrimination in hiring, promotion, and administration of state services and requires all businesses contracting with the state to include in their contracts a provision stating that they will not discriminate against gays in employment. See id. See also The Washington Blade, Apr. 12, 1985, at 1.
715. 138 Cal. App. 3d 323, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982).
716. Workers' Compensation Judge's Opinion at 2, No. 73 LA 385-107 (Cal. Workers'
Comp. Bd., Los Angeles County July 18, 1978).
717. Recommendation of Workers' Compensation Judge on Petition for Reconsideration at
4, No. 73 LA 385-107 (Cal. Workers' Comp. Bd., Los Angeles County Aug. 23, 1978).
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that Finnerty's death was a result of his disability.718 However, the appeals board did award Donovan some medical costs. 719 This decision
was appealed to the California Court of Appeals. The court of appeals
found that in making the decision as to the cause of Finnerty's death,
an incorrect burden of proof had been imposed. 7 10 The court also noted
that the dependency issue was "purposefully avoided" because the
board was "confronted" by the problem of a homosexual relationship.71 The court remanded to the appeals board to correct the burden
of proof and also to decide the dependency issue.""' On remand, the
California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board found not only that
the death was caused by the decedent's disability, but also found that
Donovan was a good faith member of the decedent's household and his
total dependent. a In finding Donovan a "good faith" member of decedent's household, the appeals board rested its decision on the Marvin
case which the board said was equally applicable to gay relationships
as to nongay relationships. On December 3, 1983, the appeals board
awarded Donovan a $25,000 death benefit.72 4 This order was challenged one more time by a petition to reconsider, which was denied.
The board held that "the inability to enter a recognized marriage
725
should not control the issue of good faith member of a household.
In December, 1984, almost eight years after he applied for the benefits,
Earl Donovan received his check from the California Compensation Insurance Fund.726 The decision stands for the principle that, in California, a gay person can be a "good faith member of another's household"
and can be recognized as a "dependent." The benefit involved is statutory, and under Donovan, a gay person can meet the statutory definitions in order to receive benefits.
718. Opinion and Decision After Reconsideration at 8, No. 73 LA 385-107 (Cal. Workers'
Comp. App. Bd. May 28, 1981).
719. Id. Donovan also moved to have this decision reconsidered. His petition was denied on

June 17, 1981.
720. Donovan, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
721. Id.at 329, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
722. Id., 187 Cal. Rptr. at 874. A petition to the court of appeals for a rehearing was
denied on January 11, 1983; petition for rehearing before the supreme court was denied on February 16, 1983.
723. Opinion and Notice of Intention at 9, No. 73 LA 385-107 (Cal. Workers' Comp. App.
Bd. Nov. 3, 1983).
724. Opinion and Decision After Remittitur at 2, No. 73 LA 385-107 (Cal. Workers'
Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 3, 1983) ($3000 in attorney fees was to be subtracted and interest added).
725. Id. at 3.
726. The Advocate, Dec. II, 1984, at 10. Glassman, Donovan's attorney, is quoted as saying that the case took eight years because "the original judge on the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board at the trial level belonged to the dinosaur age." Id.
727. This case has been cited by many as the first of its kind. That distinction may, however, belong to Scott Smith. the life partner of Harvey Milk, the San Francisco supervisor who
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A similar case is Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration, 3 8 currently before the California Supreme Court on a petition for
review. 7 " Boyce Hinman, an employee of the State of California for
over ten years, lived with his life partner, Larry Beatty. At the time of
the suit, they had lived together more than twelve years. When Hinman attempted to enroll his partner in a health care plan, which provided dental care for state employees, 80 the application was denied."'
Hinman appealed to the California Court of Appeals and argued that
the denial of benefits violated both the equal protection clause of the
California Constitution and the executive order of the governor.73 2 The
court of appeals upheld the decision,7 3 holding that the denial of Hinman's application did not violate the equal protection clause. Although
Hinman had argued that a classification by sexual orientation should
be reviewed with "strict scrutiny," 734 the court found that no classification based on sexual orientation had been made.73 Rather, the classification used to award or deny benefits was on the basis of marital status. 783 According to the court, Hinman and his fellow state employees
who are gay and have life partners are similarly situated, not to married heterosexual employees, but to unmarried heterosexual employees." s Bona fide medical plans, the court said, are specifically exempt
from issues of marital status by state statute. 78 The appeals court also
rejected the application of the executive order 73 9 stating that the executive order bans discrimination solely on the basis of sexual orientation. 740 Hinman, the court found, was not discriminated against solely
because of his sexual orientation; he had not been denied promotion or

was murdered by Dan White in 1978. The New York Times reported that Smith was awarded a
survivor's benefit by the San Francisco Retirement Board as he was Milk's partial dependent.
N.Y. Times. Nov. 11, 1982, at A26. This benefit was expected to be routinely approved by the
California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.
728. 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985).
729. Petition for Review, Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., No. C23749 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. filed June 6. 1985).
730. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 213 Cal. Rptr. at 413. See also Lesbian Rights
Project Newsletter, Summer 1985, at 1. It is interesting to note that Hinman was the Lesbian
Rights Project's first male client. See also The Advocate, Mar. 31, 1983, at 9.
731. Hlnman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 213 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
732. Id. at _
213 Cal. Rptr. at 412. See CAL. CONST.art. 1, § 7; Cal. Exec. Order B54-79 (Apr. 4, 1979).
733. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 213 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
734. Id. at 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
735. Id. at _
213 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
736. Id.
737. Id.
738. Id. at 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
739. Id.

740.

Id.
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harassed.74' The court found no differences between the dental benefits
42
given Hinman and other unmarried state employees.
The Hinman case is currently before the California State Supreme
Court on a petition for review.74 3 The outcome of that review, if undertaken, is crucial to the development of gay legal protection far beyond
the outcome of the case itself. An important argument, made to the
court in the petition for review, is that sexual orientation is a suspect
class under California law. 744 The brief filed on behalf of Hinman notes
that a classification based on sexual orientation meets all the requirements under California law for a suspect class, and since Gay Law Stu74
dents Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 5 was decided
in 1979, lower courts in the California appellate system have consid74 6 A declaration that sexered sexual orientation to be a suspect class.
ual orientation is a suspect class would require that strict scrutiny be
used to examine the classification under the equal protection analysis
the petition that
under the California Constitution. Hinman argues in7 47
scrutiny.
strict
withstand
such a classification cannot
In addition to his equal protection argument, Hinman argues that
an executive order should be treated in the same manner as a statute
which bans discrimination. Discrimination based on sexual orientation,
Hinman argues, is a well-recognized form of employment
discrimination. 4 s
The outcome of Hinman's arguments is important. In particular, if
a decision is rendered that defines and determines the strength of an
executive order, the effect will be felt in the four other states with executive orders.7 4 ' A decision, on the issue of a classification based on abil-

741. Id.
742. id.
743. Petition for Review, Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., No. C23749 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. filed June 6, 1985).
744. Gender is a "suspect" class under California law. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.
3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). It is not, however, a suspect class under the United
States Constitution. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
745. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
746. See. e.g., Halford v. Alexis, 126 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 179 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1981); Kubik
v. Scripps College, 118 Cal. App. 3d 544, 173 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1981).
747. Petition for Review at 4-5, Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., No. C23749
(Cal. Sup. Ct. filed June 6. 1985).
748. Id. at 5-6.
749. See N.M. Exec. Order No. 85-15 (Apr. 1, 1985); N.Y. Exec. Order No. 28 (Nov. 18,
1983); Ohio Exec. Order No. 64-83 (Dec. 30, 1983); Pa. Exec. Order No. 1975-5 (Sept. 19,
1975). In Ohio, for example, the Advisory Committee on Executive Order 64-83, which banned
state government employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, had worked out a
method by which spousal equivalents of gay employees could be covered under the state insurance
plan. The committee's plan was overridden by a committee controlled by the legislature. An advisory opinion by the Office of the Counsel to the Governor indicated that because the executive
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ity to have a spouse, if rendered, will be equally important. Marriage
laws seem intractable. If a comparable status for gay partners can be
recognized, the legality of marriage will become, for most, a moot issue.1"0 If Hinman is reviewed by the California Supreme Court, the
decision is bound to make legal waves.
A similar case involving employee benefits is Brinkin v. Southern
Pacific Transportation.5 1 Plaintiff Lawrence Brinkin was a clerk for
the defendant railroad. His life partner of eleven years died. The railroad denied him the funeral benefit leave that was given automatically
to married employees.7 2 Subsequently, his grievance appeal to his labor union was denied.76 Brinkin sued both Southern Pacific and his
union in the San Francisco County Superior Court, alleging three
causes of action: the first based on the California Constitution privacy
provision; the second based on the California Fair Employment and
75
Housing Act; and the third based on the San Francisco Police Code. '
The union sought to have the case tried in federal court. The federal
district court found no federal jurisdiction and remanded the case to
7 e
the original court75 5 where the case is still pending. 5
Another pending California case is Chamberlin v. Frontier Airlines75 7 which also involves an employee benefit. In this case, the benefit extended to employees of Frontier Airlines is reduced air fare for
spouses and dependents. The plaintiff, Allen Chamberlin, requested
that these benefits be extended to his life partner of ten years.
Chamberlin applied for the benefits under both categories, i.e., spouse
and household dependent. The airline denied both requests. Chamberlin also claimed that after he filed a complaint with the California De-

order did not have the force of an antidiscrimination statute, the advisory committee had no recourse. A decision to the contrary by the California Supreme Court would be extremely significant. The author is privy to this information as Co-Chair of the Ohio Governor's Advisory
Committee.
750. The author believes that marriage is a heterosexual tradition and rite. Moreover, the
author would like to see the state out of the marriage business altogether. In this scheme, marriage as a sacrament should be administered by churches if they so choose. The state can decide in
a neutral manner what patterns of residency or economic dependency shall be benefited under tax
schemes. Employers can provide whatever benefits they wish, not conditioned on religiously conferred status.
751. 572 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
752. Id. at 237.
753. Id. Brinkin was covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the railroad and
his union, the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express &
Station Employees, AFL-CIO. Id.
754. Id.
755. Id. at 239.
756. Telephone interview with Matthew Coles, San Francisco, Cal., attorney for Brinkin
(July 15, 1985).
757. No. 310989 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento County filed Dec 22, 1983).
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partment of Fair Employment and Housing, he was harassed and suspended on pretextual grounds. Chamberlin brings his suit alleging a
7 68
and a violation of the privacy
violation of the California Labor Code
7 59
He also claims that the susprovision of the California Constitution.
statutes. 760
pension was retaliatiory and, hence, violates two California
The case is still in its discovery stages. The outcome will test the cause
created for "out" gay employees by the Gay Law Students case.
In addition, other important and interesting issues are raised for
gay people because no legal relationship can be created between life
partners. For example, what happens if one of the life partners is seriously injured and is in a hospital intensive care unit? Does the other
life partner have a right to see his or her partner or paticipate in medical decisions? Without some mechanism, the answer is no. If parents or
other biologically-related relatives are available, the hospital and often
the doctors will rely on these persons and consult with them to the
exclusion of the life partner. The only way a life partner can participate is to be recognized and consulted by the biological family. Quite
often, the biological family is unrelenting in its exclusion. A dramatic
example of such a situation is that of Karen Thompson and her life
partner, Sharon Kowalski..7 6 Thompson and Kowalski had lived together for five years, owned a home together, and had exchanged rings
in a ceremony of commitment. Kowalski was subsequently injured in a
near fatal accident which left her a quadraplegic. Thompson spent
hours each day at the hospital with Kowalski. At the suggestion of a
psychiatrist, Thompson explained the nature of her relationship with
Kowalski to Kowalski's parents. The parents denied her explanation
and accused her of "sexually abusing" their daughter. The parents petitioned the court to be named Kowalski's guardian; Thompson also
filed. The court granted the guardianship to the parents with the condition that Thompson be allowed "equal access." The parents then filed a
petition and had their daughter moved 150 miles from Thompson's
home so as to make visits nearly impossible. In April, 1985, the father
filed a motion with the court to terminate completely the life partner's
visits with his daughter.7 6 2 While this behavior may seem inexplicable
to the outside observer, the family's reaction is, unfortunately, rather

758. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101-1105 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986). See also Gay Law
Students Ass'n, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1978) (cause of action was
created under the Code for "manifest homosexuals").
759. CAL. CONST. art. 1. § 1.
CODE
760. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12995 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); CAL. LAB.
1986).
Supp.
&
1971
(West
1101-1105
§3
761. See The Advocate, June 25, 1985, at 13.
762. The Washington Blade, Apr. 26, 1985. at 10.
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common.
In order to prevent this situation, gay couples have begun to protect their relationship through "medical" powers of attorney. 6 3 In
those states where legally valid, the medical powers may be durable
powers. 7 " A durable medical power might have allowed Karen Thompson to remain an important person in Sharon Kowalski's life regardless
of the wishes of Kowalski's parents.
Another issue which arises due to a lack of a legal relationship is
the question of confidential communications. In most states, a spouse
cannot be compelled to testify against his or her spouse, and a spouse
can claim that his or her communications with the other spouse are
privileged. 7 a Since marriage is not possible for gay couples, the privilege does not apply to them. 7 "
Numerous instances exist in the daily lives of nongay people where
benefits accrue because of the ability to marry. Seldom are these situations noticed unless one is unable to take full advantage of them. For
example, the American Automobile Association (AAA) gives married
couples a discount on their insurance and offers a special rate for associate members (spouses and children). Some gay couples at various locations in the United States are applying for these discounts. At least
one AAA chapter has agreed to extend its programs and discounts to
gay couples.76 7
Another common problem arises when a gay couple rents an
apartment together. Insurance companies have refused to grant gay
couples joint policies and they insist that each person take out a separate renter's policy. The home office of Allstate Insurance Company

763. See R. ACHTENBERG, supra note 632. See also Note, Appointing an Agent to Make
Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 985 (1984).
764. A "durable" power of attorney allows the power of attorney to remain in effect notwithstanding the later incapacity of the principal. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09
(Page Supp. 1984). Also, the author's former relentless research assistant located an Ohio statute
which permits a person to nominate an eventual guardian should one need to be appointed. See id.
§ 2111.121. The use of instruments drafted pursuant to such statutes might have eased the
Thompson-Kowalski guardianship problems.
765. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 78-86 (3d ed. 1984).
766. See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 422 (1980); The Advocate, June 11, 1985, at 25, col. 1
(Describing a trial situation where the issue was whether "two gay defendants have to testify
against each other where theirs is a relationship analogous to a marital relationship?").
767. The Washington Blade, May 31, 1985, at 9, col. 2 (reporting on the decision by the
AAA of Southern California to offer gay couples the same auto insurance discount offered to
heterosexual couples). In Ohio, a representative of the Ohio Automobile Club stated "specifically
to the definition of spouse, we leave that to the master member. In enrolling a master member, we
request only that the prospective member identify the associates as his or her spouse, and if dependents, whether or not they are under the age of 23. No further proof of a relationship is required."
Letter from Anthony Priore, Vice President of Marketing, Ohio Automobile Club, to Craig
Covey, Stonewall Union (Feb. 8, 1985).
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recently decided to issue a joint policy to a gay couple after a complaint was made to the Michigan State Insurance Bureau. The claim
was that the insurance company was discriminating on the basis of
marital status. State Farm Fire and Casualty Group has settled a lawsuit brought on a related issue by the Lesbian Rights Project by conmarried and unmarried couples who seek
senting to treat equally,
7 68
policies.
homeowners
Another insurance problem is the inability of gay couples to obtain
medical insurance to cover both parties. Progress, however, has been
made toward eradicating this problem. For example, on August 1,
1984, the Berkeley School Board voted to include domestic partners of
69
school district employees in benefit programs.
Numerous other issues confront gay families and the lawyers that
serve them. Many lawyers representing gay clients who reside together
advise them to enter into a contract which defines their economic arrangements. Such contracts also should provide for a fair and sane
method of disengagement in order to lessen the situations delineated in
7 0
the various gay divorce cases. 7 How to draft such contracts to make
them both enforceable and practical is beyond the scope of this article
771
Finally, the gay
but is certainly a legal issue facing gay families.
client's lawyer must consider the tax consequences of such economic
arrangements.
Many gay families have children in the home. The children are
generally the issue of one of the partner's previous heterosexual relationship, usually a marriage. Aside from these children who were conceived by traditional methods, gay couples are increasingly seeking
other parenthood opportunities. Three potential situations are possible:
adoption, foster parenting, and biological parenting through artificial
insemination. When known gay persons have attempted any of these
processes, controversy has arisen.
Persons allowed to adopt have generally been in traditional marriages; only recently have single persons even been considered. No estimate is possible as to how many adoptive parents who are officially
labeled as single parents are, in reality, gay. Such parents have probably exercised great discretion about their sexual orientation, fearing

768. See Lesbian Rights Project Newsletter, Summer 1985.
769. Gay Community News, Dec. 12, 1984, at 1. The American Psychiatric Association
offers such insurance to its members. Correspondence from the American Psychiatric Association
to Rhonda Rivera (July 17, 1985). The National Organization of. Women also offers such
insurance.
770. See supra notes 638-57 and accompanying text.
771. C. Blackburn, Legal Structures for Intimate Relationships 8 (1982) (unpublished
manuscript) (available in author's files). See generally R. AcHTENBERG, supra note 632.
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that if they were revealed to be gay, they would not be allowed to
adopt.7 7 1 However, in a number of instances, openly gay persons have
sought to adopt. In 1982, New York's Department of Social Services
adopted new regulations which prohibited discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation against candidates for adoptive parents. One of
the regulations provides: "Applicants shall not be rejected solely on the
basis of homosexuality. A decision to accept or reject when homosexuality is at issue shall be made on the basis of individual factors as explored and found in the adoption study process as it related to the best
interests of adoptive children. ' ' 7 The Department indicated in July,
1985, that no figures exist as to the number of approved gay applicants
or approved placements with gay persons which have occurred since
77
implementation of the regulation. 4
David Frater, a Californian, made the New York Times when he,
an openly gay man, was allowed to adopt his foster son, Kevin.7 75 Kevin
was described in one newspaper as a "professed heterosexual. ' ' 77' The
county adoption agency granted permission only after Frater sued

them. Kevin had lived in Frater's home for three years under emergency protective custody. Prior to being placed with Frater, Kevin had
been placed unsuccessfully in fifteen other homes.7 77
While Kevin is not gay, young persons who are gay often need
foster care or adoptive parents either because their natural parents
have disowned them,778 or adoptive7 7 9 or foster parents have refused

772. Schultz, Expanding the Parent Pool: Adoption and Gay Men Who Wish To Father,
The Advocate, July 21, 1983, at 25. See also Letters from M.J.W. to Rhonda Rivera (July 9,
1985; May 8, 1983) (detailing M.J.W.'s experience in attempting to become an adoptive father as
an openly gay man in Ohio).
773. N.Y. Dept. Social Servs. Reg., pt. 421(h) (1982). The guidelines which accompany the
regulation add: "There is no basis for any belief that sexual contact with children or exploitation
of children under their care occurs with any more frequency among homosexually oriented persons
than is the case with heterosexuals." Id. See also Lambda Notes, Winter 1983, at 4.
774. Letter from Joseph Semidei, Deputy Commissioner, Division of Family and Children
Services, New York State Department of Social Services, to Rhonda Rivera (July 15, 1985).
775. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1983, at A8. col. 2.
776. Columbus Citizen-Journal, Dec. 10, 1982, at 2.
777. Gay Community News, Jan. 29, 1983, at 1.
778. For example, consider "a father who continually taunted his fourteen-year-old son with
accusations about the boy's sexuality .... The father sought to justify his behavior as a legitimate form of discipline designed to cure the child of certain unspecified 'girlie' behavior." In re
Shane T., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 1982, at 14, col. 5-6 (N.Y. Fain. Ct., Richmond County Aug. 19,
1982). The boy was repeatedly called a "fag," "faggot," and "queer" by his father. His father
told him many times he should have been a girl and humilitated him in public by calling him a
"fag" while they were shopping. Id. The judge found the father guilty of abuse under the New
York Family Court Act. Id.
779. See, e.g., In re Russell, 170 Pa. Super. 358, 85 A.2d 878 (1952). In this case, the
person adopted was a homosexual young man. The executor of the adoptive mother's estate sought
to set aside the adoption. One reason given was the young man's sexual orientation. The judge
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them shelter. 8 ° In at least one case in Missouri, the Department of
actively sought to place a gay youth with a gay adopSocial Services
781
parent.
tive
Foster care is another option for gay persons who wish to be parents. A consensus is growing that gay adults can be good placements
7 2
for gay youth. Programs have been initiated in New Jersey, R Pennsyl8
vania 7 83 and in Los Angeles, California. S Thus, foster parenting
seems possible for gay adults if the children are of an age to have identified themselves as gay. However, foster parenting in general by gay
adults has recently come under attack in Boston, Massachusetts. "Last
Spring, a Boston couple in their thirties, responsibly employed, churchgoing people without children, applied to the State Department of So7 85
This description from the
cial Services to become foster parents.1
New York Times introduced the story of Donald Babets and David
Jean of Boston, Massachusetts, who received two foster children only to
have them removed following a media uproar. The two little boys, who
had been battered children, were placed with Babets and Jean after a
year-long investigation. This placement was done with the knowledge
and consent of the children's mother. When a newspaper story sensa7
removed8.
tionalized the placement, the children were immediately
However, the story did not end there. In response to the newspaper
furor, the Massachusetts House of Representatives added an amendment to a budget bill instructing the Massachusetts Department of Social Services not to place children in gay households for foster care,
adoption, or day care.7 87 The amendment also stated: "A homosexual
preference shall be considered a threat to the psychological and physical well being of the child."7 88 Responding to the political furor, the
Department of Social Services announced a new guideline along simi-

declined to set aside the adoption, saying: "The appellants also take the position that if Thomas
Russell-Freeman was a homosexual the adoption decree had to be vacated. We are at a loss to
understand this reasoning. While homosexuality is abhorrent, we know of no rule of law that a
homosexual has no civil rights." Id. at 363, 85 A.2d at 880.
780. See T. Bergara, Meeting the Needs of Sexual Minority Youths (19-) (unpublished
manuscript) (available in author's files).
781. Letters from Susan C. Guerra, J.D., Missouri Department of Social Services, to
Rhonda Rivera (July 17, 1985; Jan. 17, 1985).
782. See 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2118 (Dec. 18, 1979); N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1979, at E6,
col. 1; Columbus Citizen-Journal, Nov. 27, 1979, at 5.
783. The Advocate, July 9, 1985, at 9; New York Native, June 3-16, 1985, at 9.
784. The Advocate, July 9, 1985, at 19.
785. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1985, at L12, col. 1.
786. Gay Community News (Boston, Mass.), June 1, 1985, at 1; The Washington Blade,
May 17, 1985, at 10.
787. See The Washington Blade, May 31, 1985, at 1.
788.

See id.
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lar, but less harsh lines. The Department announced that "children are
best served when they are placed in traditional family settings."' 8 9
Thus, Massachusetts surprisingly became the first state to actively discriminate against gay foster or adoptive parents. One needs to be re7 90
minded that Massachusetts is the setting of Bezio v. Patenaude
and
79
Doe v. Doe, 1 two of the most progressive gay parenting cases. If adoption and foster parenting seem controversial, consider the issue of artificial insemination of gay parents. 79 a Lest California appear to be the
only avant-garde state, the first case to be examined, Karin T. v.
Michael T.,7 " will be from New York. While not technically a gay
rights case, the legal issues raised are exactly the same. In Karin T.,
suit was brought by the New York Department of Social Services as
the assignee of the mother of two children in order to collect support
from the other parent. The "other parent," Michael T., turns out to
have been a somatic female at birth and was born with the name Marlene A.T. 7 " When sued, Michael T.'s answer denied that she was the

789. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1985, at 9.
790. 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980). See Note, Bezio v. Patenaude: The "Coming
Out" Custody Controversy of Lesbian Mothers in Court, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 331 (1980-1981).
See also supra notes 571-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bezio.
791. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983). See supra notes 580-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of Doe.
792. Ellen Goodman, a relatively liberal syndicated columnist, wrote: "I have never understood the need of gay couples to define their relationships as 'family.' I am uncomfortable with
those gay women who deliberately go out to get children of their own through artificial insemination." Columbus Citizen-Journal, June 6, 1985, at 4.
793. 127 Misc. 2d 14, 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985).
794. As indicated, this case is not a gay case because investigation beyond the published
case revealed that Marlene/Michael is a transsexual who at the time of the case had begun but
not completed the transsexual protocol. Telephone interview with James Phillipone, Michael T.'s
attorney (July 15, 1985). Michael has had a breast reduction and has taken male hormones. The
remaining procedures for Michael T. would normally be a hysterectomy and the construction of a
penis using vaginal tissue.
A person who has a same-sex sexual orientation is not a transsexual. In fact, 85% of all
transsexuals are heterosexual in their sexual orientation. A transsexual is a person whose
psychosexual identification differs from their somatic identification. For example, in this case,
Marlene's psychosexual identity was male (Michael) but her body structure was female. In her
mind, her sexual orientation was toward a person of the opposite sex; she thought herself male so
her erotic choice was female. An outside observer would believe her to be a lesbian, a woman
(bodily) who is attracted to women. When her body type was conformed to her psychosexual
identity, "his" mind and "his" body were congruent, and he was Michael. Michael, in his own
mind, is a heterosexual who was attracted to Karin. A gay person's psychosexual identity conforms to his or her body type. A gay man is physically male and believes himself to be male and
has no desire to change his mind or his body. His sexual orientation, however, is toward another
male. See Rivera 1, supra note I. at 803, 803 nn.19-21. See also Haag & Sullinger, Is He or Isn't
She? Transsexualisnu" Legal Impediments to Integrating a Product of Medical Definition and
Te'hnology, 21 WASHBURN L. J. 342 (1982); Richardson, The Challenge of Transsexuality: Legal Responses to an Assertion of Rights, 4 N. ILL. L. REV. 119 (1983).
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76
father of the children because she was female. 9 According to the evidence, Michael T. dressed in traditional male clothing and worked at
jobs which Michael considered men's work. Michael and Karin were
married in New York state, and subsequently, the couple had two children by artificial insemination. As part of the artificial insemination
process, Michael signed an agreement with Karin T. and with the doctor who administered the process. The agreement provided that any
child or children born of the process were Michael's "own legitimate
child or children and are heirs of his body ... ."19 Concurrent with
the support suit, an action was brought to declare the marriage of
Karin and Michael void.
The judge in Karin T. began his opinion by stating that "[n]either
counsel for the parties nor the Court has found any authority similar to
the fact situation in this case."' 797 The judge turned from an examination of parental support laws to a decision based on contract and estoppel. First, he held Michael T. liable for support based on the contract
made between Karin T., Michael T., and the doctor who performed the
artificial insemination.79 8 The court found the children to be third party
beneficiaries of the contract.7 9 9 When the defendant argued that she
was not a "parent" under New York domestic relations law, the judge
8 0 0 The
estopped her from making the argument on equitable grounds.
court would not allow Michael T./Marlene A.T. "to completely abrogate her responsibilities for the support of the children involved . . .
[nor] benefit from her own frauduent acts which induced their birth
... .-80 After the court's decision, the parties reached a private settlement as to support, and, in return, Michael received the visitation
rights which he desired.80 2
A similar case with a similar outcome is the California case of
Loftin v. Flournoy,80 - noted by the New York Times as raising "novel"
legal issues. 804 Ms. Loftin and Ms. Flournoy joined their households in
April, 1977. Flournoy brought two children from a previous marriage

T.,
16,
15,
16,
18,

127
484
484
484
484

Misc. 2d at 14, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
N.Y.S.2d at 782.
N.Y.S.2d at 782.
N.Y.S.2d at 783-84.
N.Y.S.2d at 784.

795.
796.
797.
798.
799.

Karin
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

800.

Id. at 19, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 784.

801. Id. at 18, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
802. Michael's lawyer believed that Michael would have won on appeal by claiming that
the family court did not have jurisdiction in the matter because the decision was essentially
reached on a contract basis. However, Michael did not appeal because he wanted visitation. Telephone interview with James Phillipone, Michael T.'s attorney (July 15, 1985).
803. No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County Jan. 2, 1985).
804. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at I1.
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with her. In June, 1977, the couple exchanged vows at the local Metropolitan Community Church. In November, 1977, using a turkey baster
armed with sperm from her brother, Loftin artificially inseminated
Flournoy. On August 28, 1978, a female baby was born to Flournoy
and named Sparkle C. Loftin; the name L. Loftin was used as the father's name on the birth certificate. Subsequent to the birth of the
child, the parties entered into a written legal agreement which provided
primarily for property arrangements. One section of the agreement,
however, dealt with the children. The provision obligated the person
who vacated their joint residence to turn guardianship of all three children over to the person remaining in the home. The same provision
provided that the parties would agree to mediation prior to any suit. S0 5
The parties separated in July, 1980, and were granted a dissolution by their church in September, 1980. The question of the rights of
the non-biological parent arose in a manner similar to Karin T. The
biological mother applied for support from Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The District Attorney of Alameda County brought a
"Complaint for Reimbursement of Public Assistance and Child Support" against Loftin on October 6, 1981. Thirteen days later, a stipulation and order were entered whereby Ms. Loftin agreed to pay one
hundred dollars per month in child support for Sparkle Loftin's support. On March 4, 1983, Loftin filed a complaint, seeking visitation
rights. The court referred the matter to family court services on August
31, 1983, for investigation. Flournoy answered and denied that the
court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. On August 17, 1984, a hearing was conducted for the sole purpose of determining whether the
court had jurisdiction. 8 The court came to the conclusion that Ms.
Loftin was not a parent within the California Family Law Act, thus,
the statute did not confer jurisdiction. 8° Similarly, neither the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act nor the Uniform Parentage Act was
found to grant jurisdiction.808 Flournoy's attorney conceded that Loftin
could, if she wished, apply as a non-biological parent for guardianship.
The court pointed out that California had precedents where non-biologically related persons were found to be pyschological parents of children and were given custody. The court concluded that Loftin may not
be prevented from asserting a right to custody simply because there is
805. Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 1-4, Loftin v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County Jan. 2, 1985).
806. Id. See also Defendant's Trial Brief, Loftin v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Alameda County Jan. 2, 1985).
807. Loftin, No. 569630-7, slip op. at 7.
808. Id., slip op. at 8-9.
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8 9
no specific statute or case that covers the particular situation. " The
court then found jurisdiction "to be the general custody law of this
[state] that is embedded in statutes and cases . .. ."810 After the determination of jurisdiction, the court asked for an update of the family
service investigation and set a date for a hearing on the merits. However, prior to the hearing the parties reached an agreement which provided supervised visitation rights to Loftin who was ordered not to re81 1
move the child from California.
In both Karin T. and Loftin, serious questions remain as to the
jurisdiction of the courts which rendered judgment. However, as
neither decision was appealed, the issue remains unresolved. Logically
and equitably, the family courts seem best suited to settle such disputes. The lack of a forum results, however, because no legal recognition exists for the parties and their relationship to the child. Moreover,
the law does not provide legal parameters for artificial insemination,
except those laws which cover doctors providing such a service to married couples.8 12 Practical techniques, of a self help variety, are not covered by statutes and, given the ease of administration, seem impossible
to prevent or regulate. The state could criminalize artificial insemination of non-approved persons. Such a prohibition, however, would probably be no more successful than the prohibition of alcohol or abortion.
Jailing a mother of a small child and creating a new ward of the state
would be counterproductive. Moreover, gathering proof of how artificial
insemination took place would raise serious invasion of privacy issues.
The situation is best controlled by providing a legal relationship for the
child and co-parents so that continuity of emotional relationships can
be maintained, and the child can be adequately supported by those who
813
brought him or her into the world. The issue is extremely complex;
however, anecdotal evidence leads the author to believe that the number of children already conceived in a fashion similar to Sparkle Loftin
8 14
may be significant.

809. Id., slip op. at 20.
810. Id., slip op. at 21.
811. Id., slip op. at 2-3 (Stipulation & Order).
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812. See Kritchesky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination:
(1981).
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The many facets of the legal issues involved with the creation of
gay families is indicative of the legal system's failure to accommodate
reality.8 15 In the past, nonmarital relationships between nongay persons
were in a similar situation. When a dispute arose, the courts left the
parties as they found them, as a method of showing societal disapproval
of their meretricious relationship. However, neither this approach nor
"justice" ended nonmarital relationships between mixed-sex couples.
Sometimes, when left as they were found, the parties resorted to violence to settle their disagreements. More often, the more physically
and/or financially powerful person took advantage of the weaker person. Children of such arrangements were often the innocent victims.
The Marvin decision, and similar decisions in other states, recognized
the resulting inequities and attempted to create some remedies within
the legal system for nonmarried mixed-sex cohabitants. Some of these
same cases can, no doubt, be used in same-sex cohabitation litigation.
However, the law has not found an equitable way to deal with gay
relationships or the children they produce. Contractual arrangements
can perhaps resolve property disputes. Such contracts, however, cannot
make enforceable decisions about issues in which the state has a strong
public interest, such as the welfare of children. Even valiant efforts,
made by lawyers who represent gay family members, to adapt current
legal remedies simply do not bridge the gap.

1982, at - (reporting that a doctor at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.,
appointment because he artificially inseminated a lesbian); The Advocate, Oct. __,
(reporting that in Melbourne, Australia, the Queen victoria Hospital had provided
semination for lesbians); Lesbians Having Babies by AID (Artificial Insemination by

lost his staff
1981, at artificial in-

Donor), The
Advocate. Feb. 22, 1978, at 7.
815. See Sutton, The Lesbian Family. Rights in Conflict Under the California Uniform
Parentage Act, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L REV 1007 (1980).
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